Narrative:

Passenger on recent france to USA flight asked 'a' flight attendant for access to cockpit crew while on the ground in france in order to share 'important' information with crew. Passenger stated that he had intended to carry a small metal thermos with dry ice on the flight. He stored the sealed thermos in his refrigerator the prior evening. Several hours later, the thermos exploded violently, tearing off the door of the refrigerator and doing serious damage to his home. He said that he wanted to share this information with the crew so that they could inform the airline and others of this 'little known' aspect of dry ice sublimation. Please pass this along to FAA hazmat people and anyone else who would benefit from this knowledge. Again, this package was just hours from being onboard a flight. It is unlikely that security would have stopped it. One can only imagine the consequences of an onboard explosion of severity that caused such serious physical damage to 'earthbound' property. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter (B767 captain) was approached by a physician who, although embarrassed by this incident, felt that it was more important to inform the crew. The captain was not aware of the volatility of dry ice stored under pressure. His company's operations manual does not clearly state that dry ice cannot be stored under pressure. The flight operations manual hazmat section could be misleading because it even addresses the transportation of modules containing oxygen and carbon dioxide under pressure, for use as transportation of human organs for transplant purposes. The only requirement is that the shipment must be accompanied by a copy of the DOT exemption letter, and a physician or technician to supervise its operation. The operations manual also stipulates that a 'dangerous goods' form is not necessary for dry ice unless the total qty on board exceeds 5 pounds, and that up to 440 pounds may be carried.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767 CAPT RELATES A STORY ABOUT DRY ICE THAT WAS TO BE CARRIED BY A PAX ON BOARD HIS FLT. THE DRY ICE WAS CONTAINED IN A THERMOS, AND HAD BEEN PLACED IN THE PAX'S REFRIGERATOR FOR STORAGE UNTIL THE FLT'S DEP. IN THE MEANTIME, THE THERMOS EXPLODED CAUSING SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE PAX'S HOME.

Narrative: PAX ON RECENT FRANCE TO USA FLT ASKED 'A' FLT ATTENDANT FOR ACCESS TO COCKPIT CREW WHILE ON THE GND IN FRANCE IN ORDER TO SHARE 'IMPORTANT' INFO WITH CREW. PAX STATED THAT HE HAD INTENDED TO CARRY A SMALL METAL THERMOS WITH DRY ICE ON THE FLT. HE STORED THE SEALED THERMOS IN HIS REFRIGERATOR THE PRIOR EVENING. SEVERAL HRS LATER, THE THERMOS EXPLODED VIOLENTLY, TEARING OFF THE DOOR OF THE REFRIGERATOR AND DOING SERIOUS DAMAGE TO HIS HOME. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO SHARE THIS INFO WITH THE CREW SO THAT THEY COULD INFORM THE AIRLINE AND OTHERS OF THIS 'LITTLE KNOWN' ASPECT OF DRY ICE SUBLIMATION. PLEASE PASS THIS ALONG TO FAA HAZMAT PEOPLE AND ANYONE ELSE WHO WOULD BENEFIT FROM THIS KNOWLEDGE. AGAIN, THIS PACKAGE WAS JUST HRS FROM BEING ONBOARD A FLT. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT SECURITY WOULD HAVE STOPPED IT. ONE CAN ONLY IMAGINE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ONBOARD EXPLOSION OF SEVERITY THAT CAUSED SUCH SERIOUS PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO 'EARTHBOUND' PROPERTY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR (B767 CAPT) WAS APCHED BY A PHYSICIAN WHO, ALTHOUGH EMBARRASSED BY THIS INCIDENT, FELT THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO INFORM THE CREW. THE CAPT WAS NOT AWARE OF THE VOLATILITY OF DRY ICE STORED UNDER PRESSURE. HIS COMPANY'S OPS MANUAL DOES NOT CLRLY STATE THAT DRY ICE CANNOT BE STORED UNDER PRESSURE. THE FLT OPS MANUAL HAZMAT SECTION COULD BE MISLEADING BECAUSE IT EVEN ADDRESSES THE TRANSPORTATION OF MODULES CONTAINING OXYGEN AND CARBON DIOXIDE UNDER PRESSURE, FOR USE AS TRANSPORTATION OF HUMAN ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT PURPOSES. THE ONLY REQUIREMENT IS THAT THE SHIPMENT MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A COPY OF THE DOT EXEMPTION LETTER, AND A PHYSICIAN OR TECHNICIAN TO SUPERVISE ITS OP. THE OPS MANUAL ALSO STIPULATES THAT A 'DANGEROUS GOODS' FORM IS NOT NECESSARY FOR DRY ICE UNLESS THE TOTAL QTY ON BOARD EXCEEDS 5 LBS, AND THAT UP TO 440 LBS MAY BE CARRIED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.