Narrative:

I may or may not have been involved in several chord angle repairs on B737-200-291 aircraft in which the maintenance manual was deviated from. Apparently mechanics were told to delete 3 fasteners from chord angle that were called out for in airworthiness directive note and an engineering variation authority/authorized would be produced to cover the fasteners. No engineering variation authority/authorized was ever produced and no problem was ever noticed until aug/xx/96. I was unaware of any fasteners being left out until it was discovered in aug/xx/96 by other mechanics. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: this mechanic was part of a team working on a B737-200. Part of the work required some repairs to the chord angle structure at the forward bulkhead of the aft baggage compartment. The reporter said that although he was not involved in this portion of the repair work he was part of the team and he and others signed off on this major task. As he now knows the chord angle portion of the repairs was improperly done. The reporter alleges that 3 of the fasteners were not correctly installed/fastened. 2 of them were apparently cut away from the area that fits under the flap torque tube bracket and the reporter does not know what happened to the other improperly installed fastener. The reporter emphasized that he did not do the work on this part of the repair nor did he inspect the work. He again said that he was not responsible, but may be held accountable since he was a part of the team assigned to the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE RPTR WAS PART OF A TEAM OF MECHS DOING MAJOR REPAIRS TO A B737-200 THAT DID NOT FASTEN 3 CHORD ANGLE FASTENERS ALONG THE FORWARD BULKHEAD OF THE AFT BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT. THESE ARE STRUCTURAL FASTENERS.

Narrative: I MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN SEVERAL CHORD ANGLE REPAIRS ON B737-200-291 ACFT IN WHICH THE MAINT MANUAL WAS DEVIATED FROM. APPARENTLY MECHS WERE TOLD TO DELETE 3 FASTENERS FROM CHORD ANGLE THAT WERE CALLED OUT FOR IN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE NOTE AND AN ENGINEERING VARIATION AUTH WOULD BE PRODUCED TO COVER THE FASTENERS. NO ENGINEERING VARIATION AUTH WAS EVER PRODUCED AND NO PROB WAS EVER NOTICED UNTIL AUG/XX/96. I WAS UNAWARE OF ANY FASTENERS BEING LEFT OUT UNTIL IT WAS DISCOVERED IN AUG/XX/96 BY OTHER MECHS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS MECH WAS PART OF A TEAM WORKING ON A B737-200. PART OF THE WORK REQUIRED SOME REPAIRS TO THE CHORD ANGLE STRUCTURE AT THE FORWARD BULKHEAD OF THE AFT BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT. THE RPTR SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THIS PORTION OF THE REPAIR WORK HE WAS PART OF THE TEAM AND HE AND OTHERS SIGNED OFF ON THIS MAJOR TASK. AS HE NOW KNOWS THE CHORD ANGLE PORTION OF THE REPAIRS WAS IMPROPERLY DONE. THE RPTR ALLEGES THAT 3 OF THE FASTENERS WERE NOT CORRECTLY INSTALLED/FASTENED. 2 OF THEM WERE APPARENTLY CUT AWAY FROM THE AREA THAT FITS UNDER THE FLAP TORQUE TUBE BRACKET AND THE RPTR DOES NOT KNOW WHAT HAPPENED TO THE OTHER IMPROPERLY INSTALLED FASTENER. THE RPTR EMPHASIZED THAT HE DID NOT DO THE WORK ON THIS PART OF THE REPAIR NOR DID HE INSPECT THE WORK. HE AGAIN SAID THAT HE WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE, BUT MAY BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE SINCE HE WAS A PART OF THE TEAM ASSIGNED TO THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.