Narrative:

I arrived at sfo, loaded my luggage in my plane, paid my bill with the FBO, and conducted a preflight inspection of my plane. It was dark, but the FBO ramp was fairly well lit, so I did not use a flashlight. Everything seemed normal during the preflight inspection that I conducted without a checklist. I received my IFR clearance from sfo to dlo. I taxied out from the FBO ramp, and did a run-up while holding short of taxiway C to allow a B727 to pass as instructed by sfo ground. Everything looked good on the run- up. Sfo ground cleared me to taxi via taxiway C to taxiway east for an intersection departure, and instructed me to follow the B727. Sfo ground cleared me to cross runway 28R and hold short of runway 28L, and instructed me to monitor the tower frequency. While I was holding short of runway 28L, I was cleared for takeoff by sfo tower. I departed with full throttle, maximum engine RPM, and flaps extended 10 degrees, and commenced the eugen 5 departure (EUGEN5.sns) in accordance with my clearance. Sfo tower handed me off to bay departure. While climbing through an overcast layer with base at approximately 1000 ft, the cylinder head temperature and oil pressure climbed into the red range on the gauges, and the oil pressure dropped below the green range on its gauge. I broke out on top of the overcast layer at about 1700-1800 ft and kept flying the eugen 5 departure. I contacted bay departure and described the problem. The bay departure controller asked if I wanted to declare an emergency. I declined to declare an emergency because there was: no engine failure or sign of major engine oil release, no sign of engine fire, no loss of manifold pressure or engine RPM, and because the engine was running smoothly. Bay departure said they would vector me for an ILS runway 28L approach with a tight left base, which I accepted. Bay departure asked how much fuel I had, and how many people were on board. I informed them that I had 6 hours of fuel and one person on board. Bay departure asked if I had the sql in sight, and I replied in the negative and that I was above an overcast layer. After several more mins, I informed bay departure that the engine had become rough. I was handed off to a second bay departure controller, who began vectoring me to intercept the ILS runway 28L localizer and cleared me for my initial descent. I was inside the brijj locator OM before the localizer needle became unpegged from full right deflection. I informed the controller that the localizer was slow coming in. The controller asked me to confirm that I had the ILS receiver tuned to frequency 109.55, and I replied in the affirmative. A little while later, the localizer and GS needles both became active, I informed the controller that this had occurred, and I continued to fly the approach. After breaking out through the base of the overcast layer, the sequenced flashing lights of the approach light system as well as the runway lights for runway 28L were in sight. I informed the sfo tower controller that I had the runway in sight. I was informed by sfo tower that emergency vehicles would be standing by, and I saw the flashing lights of several of them to the right of the runway. On final approach, I had a feeling that I had not removed my engine cowl plugs prior to engine startup, and suspected that this was the cause of the problem. I informed the sfo tower controller that I had sufficient power to assure a landing, continued flying the approach, and landed on runway 28L. I was cleared to exit runway 28L, cross runway 28R and runways 1R and 1L, and taxi to the FBO via taxiway C. One of the emergency vehicles followed me to the FBO ramp, where I was directed to a parking spot by one of the FBO personnel and shut down the engine. I found that I had failed to remove my cowl plugs during my preflight inspection. This had restr airflow to the engine, causing the observed overheating. I checked the engine oil level, and found that it was still at about 10 quarts, which is what I had departed with. I left the door to the engine oil filter cap, the door to the engine oil dipstick, and the cowl flaps open to help the engine cool down. While waiting in the FBO office for about an hour while the engine cooled down, I filed a new IFR flight plan to dlo. After conducting a thorough preflight in daylight, I turned the engine on and found that the cylinder head temperature, the oil temperature and the oil pressure were all in the normal operating range. I successfully conducted my flight without further incident. Contributing to the problem was the absence of my primary set of day-glow yellow cowl plugs that are connected by a cord, from which hangs a large 'remove before flight' flag. I used an old, dark red, unconnected pair of cowl plugs that I did not see in the illumination from the ramp lights. The way to avoid this in the future is to always do a complete preflight inspection using a printed checklist, and to always use a flashlight unless in daylight conditions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C182 PLT NEGLECTS TO REMOVE COWL PLUGS DURING PREFLT. ENG OVERHEATS FORCING A RETURN LAND.

Narrative: I ARRIVED AT SFO, LOADED MY LUGGAGE IN MY PLANE, PAID MY BILL WITH THE FBO, AND CONDUCTED A PREFLT INSPECTION OF MY PLANE. IT WAS DARK, BUT THE FBO RAMP WAS FAIRLY WELL LIT, SO I DID NOT USE A FLASHLIGHT. EVERYTHING SEEMED NORMAL DURING THE PREFLT INSPECTION THAT I CONDUCTED WITHOUT A CHKLIST. I RECEIVED MY IFR CLRNC FROM SFO TO DLO. I TAXIED OUT FROM THE FBO RAMP, AND DID A RUN-UP WHILE HOLDING SHORT OF TXWY C TO ALLOW A B727 TO PASS AS INSTRUCTED BY SFO GND. EVERYTHING LOOKED GOOD ON THE RUN- UP. SFO GND CLRED ME TO TAXI VIA TXWY C TO TXWY E FOR AN INTXN DEP, AND INSTRUCTED ME TO FOLLOW THE B727. SFO GND CLRED ME TO CROSS RWY 28R AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 28L, AND INSTRUCTED ME TO MONITOR THE TWR FREQ. WHILE I WAS HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 28L, I WAS CLRED FOR TKOF BY SFO TWR. I DEPARTED WITH FULL THROTTLE, MAX ENG RPM, AND FLAPS EXTENDED 10 DEGS, AND COMMENCED THE EUGEN 5 DEP (EUGEN5.SNS) IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY CLRNC. SFO TWR HANDED ME OFF TO BAY DEP. WHILE CLBING THROUGH AN OVCST LAYER WITH BASE AT APPROX 1000 FT, THE CYLINDER HEAD TEMP AND OIL PRESSURE CLBED INTO THE RED RANGE ON THE GAUGES, AND THE OIL PRESSURE DROPPED BELOW THE GREEN RANGE ON ITS GAUGE. I BROKE OUT ON TOP OF THE OVCST LAYER AT ABOUT 1700-1800 FT AND KEPT FLYING THE EUGEN 5 DEP. I CONTACTED BAY DEP AND DESCRIBED THE PROB. THE BAY DEP CTLR ASKED IF I WANTED TO DECLARE AN EMER. I DECLINED TO DECLARE AN EMER BECAUSE THERE WAS: NO ENG FAILURE OR SIGN OF MAJOR ENG OIL RELEASE, NO SIGN OF ENG FIRE, NO LOSS OF MANIFOLD PRESSURE OR ENG RPM, AND BECAUSE THE ENG WAS RUNNING SMOOTHLY. BAY DEP SAID THEY WOULD VECTOR ME FOR AN ILS RWY 28L APCH WITH A TIGHT L BASE, WHICH I ACCEPTED. BAY DEP ASKED HOW MUCH FUEL I HAD, AND HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE ON BOARD. I INFORMED THEM THAT I HAD 6 HRS OF FUEL AND ONE PERSON ON BOARD. BAY DEP ASKED IF I HAD THE SQL IN SIGHT, AND I REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE AND THAT I WAS ABOVE AN OVCST LAYER. AFTER SEVERAL MORE MINS, I INFORMED BAY DEP THAT THE ENG HAD BECOME ROUGH. I WAS HANDED OFF TO A SECOND BAY DEP CTLR, WHO BEGAN VECTORING ME TO INTERCEPT THE ILS RWY 28L LOC AND CLRED ME FOR MY INITIAL DSCNT. I WAS INSIDE THE BRIJJ LOCATOR OM BEFORE THE LOC NEEDLE BECAME UNPEGGED FROM FULL R DEFLECTION. I INFORMED THE CTLR THAT THE LOC WAS SLOW COMING IN. THE CTLR ASKED ME TO CONFIRM THAT I HAD THE ILS RECEIVER TUNED TO FREQ 109.55, AND I REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. A LITTLE WHILE LATER, THE LOC AND GS NEEDLES BOTH BECAME ACTIVE, I INFORMED THE CTLR THAT THIS HAD OCCURRED, AND I CONTINUED TO FLY THE APCH. AFTER BREAKING OUT THROUGH THE BASE OF THE OVCST LAYER, THE SEQUENCED FLASHING LIGHTS OF THE APCH LIGHT SYS AS WELL AS THE RWY LIGHTS FOR RWY 28L WERE IN SIGHT. I INFORMED THE SFO TWR CTLR THAT I HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT. I WAS INFORMED BY SFO TWR THAT EMER VEHICLES WOULD BE STANDING BY, AND I SAW THE FLASHING LIGHTS OF SEVERAL OF THEM TO THE R OF THE RWY. ON FINAL APCH, I HAD A FEELING THAT I HAD NOT REMOVED MY ENG COWL PLUGS PRIOR TO ENG STARTUP, AND SUSPECTED THAT THIS WAS THE CAUSE OF THE PROB. I INFORMED THE SFO TWR CTLR THAT I HAD SUFFICIENT PWR TO ASSURE A LNDG, CONTINUED FLYING THE APCH, AND LANDED ON RWY 28L. I WAS CLRED TO EXIT RWY 28L, CROSS RWY 28R AND RWYS 1R AND 1L, AND TAXI TO THE FBO VIA TXWY C. ONE OF THE EMER VEHICLES FOLLOWED ME TO THE FBO RAMP, WHERE I WAS DIRECTED TO A PARKING SPOT BY ONE OF THE FBO PERSONNEL AND SHUT DOWN THE ENG. I FOUND THAT I HAD FAILED TO REMOVE MY COWL PLUGS DURING MY PREFLT INSPECTION. THIS HAD RESTR AIRFLOW TO THE ENG, CAUSING THE OBSERVED OVERHEATING. I CHKED THE ENG OIL LEVEL, AND FOUND THAT IT WAS STILL AT ABOUT 10 QUARTS, WHICH IS WHAT I HAD DEPARTED WITH. I LEFT THE DOOR TO THE ENG OIL FILTER CAP, THE DOOR TO THE ENG OIL DIPSTICK, AND THE COWL FLAPS OPEN TO HELP THE ENG COOL DOWN. WHILE WAITING IN THE FBO OFFICE FOR ABOUT AN HR WHILE THE ENG COOLED DOWN, I FILED A NEW IFR FLT PLAN TO DLO. AFTER CONDUCTING A THOROUGH PREFLT IN DAYLIGHT, I TURNED THE ENG ON AND FOUND THAT THE CYLINDER HEAD TEMP, THE OIL TEMP AND THE OIL PRESSURE WERE ALL IN THE NORMAL OPERATING RANGE. I SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTED MY FLT WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROB WAS THE ABSENCE OF MY PRIMARY SET OF DAY-GLOW YELLOW COWL PLUGS THAT ARE CONNECTED BY A CORD, FROM WHICH HANGS A LARGE 'REMOVE BEFORE FLT' FLAG. I USED AN OLD, DARK RED, UNCONNECTED PAIR OF COWL PLUGS THAT I DID NOT SEE IN THE ILLUMINATION FROM THE RAMP LIGHTS. THE WAY TO AVOID THIS IN THE FUTURE IS TO ALWAYS DO A COMPLETE PREFLT INSPECTION USING A PRINTED CHKLIST, AND TO ALWAYS USE A FLASHLIGHT UNLESS IN DAYLIGHT CONDITIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.