Narrative:

Buj 7 arrival hamak intersection descending, heading 170 degrees, WX 6000 ft scattered 5 mi haze. First officer's leg. Initial descent 11000 ft to 6000 ft with no runway assignment given. At 9000 ft given runway 35R, new runway, cleared to 4000 ft and knew we were in for slam dunk. Went to slats/flaps 15 degrees to expedite descent. Given right turn to 270 degrees at 6000 ft to 4000 ft about 7 DME from dfw airport. Cleared to 3000 ft with right turn to 310 degrees (45 degree intercept from runway heading). Airport in sight around 6 DME, called visual and cleared visual by ATC to runway 35R. First officer picked up traffic at 11 O'clock and TCASII confirmed co-altitude 3 NM. First appeared to west runways but actually runway 35C -- never received call from ATC on any aircraft. ATC switched us to tower and TCASII sounded 'traffic' then RA monitor vertical speed. Overshot localizer runway 35R due to intercept angle. Disconnected autoplt and autothrottle and hand flew aircraft back to localizer/runway centerline. Aircraft rolled out on runway 35R centerline in descent with a B757 abeam us at 3/4 NM co-altitude for runway 35C. Switched to tower, cleared to land and still no mention of traffic at our 9 O'clock. Landing uneventful. Entire situation could have been averted by ATC by informing us: 1) that we were #1 for the runway, or 2) expect short final approach or 7-8 mi final, or 3) giving TA call, especially since ATC workload was quiet at time and new runway arrs in progress at dfw airport. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter was particularly sensitive about their overshooting final of runway 35R and getting close to aircraft on their left. Because of the close proximity, they got a TCASII TA and RA. They didn't follow any RA commands as their high descent rate was already in excess of anything the TCASII RA was commanding. Flight crew believes the aircraft on the left made a go around as they lost track of the adjacent aircraft and never saw it land. This flight crew was disappointed that the TRACON controller didn't prepare them for this hurried approach by telling them that they were going to be a 'slam dunk,' aircraft on left would be going to runway 35C and could create a TCASII TA or RA. Nor did controller offer that runway 35R would be farther to the right than expected.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 TRACKS INBOUND TO RWY 35C INSTEAD OF RWY 35R DURING VISUAL APCH AT DFW (583 PT 40).

Narrative: BUJ 7 ARR HAMAK INTXN DSNDING, HDG 170 DEGS, WX 6000 FT SCATTERED 5 MI HAZE. FO'S LEG. INITIAL DSCNT 11000 FT TO 6000 FT WITH NO RWY ASSIGNMENT GIVEN. AT 9000 FT GIVEN RWY 35R, NEW RWY, CLRED TO 4000 FT AND KNEW WE WERE IN FOR SLAM DUNK. WENT TO SLATS/FLAPS 15 DEGS TO EXPEDITE DSCNT. GIVEN R TURN TO 270 DEGS AT 6000 FT TO 4000 FT ABOUT 7 DME FROM DFW ARPT. CLRED TO 3000 FT WITH R TURN TO 310 DEGS (45 DEG INTERCEPT FROM RWY HDG). ARPT IN SIGHT AROUND 6 DME, CALLED VISUAL AND CLRED VISUAL BY ATC TO RWY 35R. FO PICKED UP TFC AT 11 O'CLOCK AND TCASII CONFIRMED CO-ALT 3 NM. FIRST APPEARED TO W RWYS BUT ACTUALLY RWY 35C -- NEVER RECEIVED CALL FROM ATC ON ANY ACFT. ATC SWITCHED US TO TWR AND TCASII SOUNDED 'TFC' THEN RA MONITOR VERT SPD. OVERSHOT LOC RWY 35R DUE TO INTERCEPT ANGLE. DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLE AND HAND FLEW ACFT BACK TO LOC/RWY CTRLINE. ACFT ROLLED OUT ON RWY 35R CTRLINE IN DSCNT WITH A B757 ABEAM US AT 3/4 NM CO-ALT FOR RWY 35C. SWITCHED TO TWR, CLRED TO LAND AND STILL NO MENTION OF TFC AT OUR 9 O'CLOCK. LNDG UNEVENTFUL. ENTIRE SIT COULD HAVE BEEN AVERTED BY ATC BY INFORMING US: 1) THAT WE WERE #1 FOR THE RWY, OR 2) EXPECT SHORT FINAL APCH OR 7-8 MI FINAL, OR 3) GIVING TA CALL, ESPECIALLY SINCE ATC WORKLOAD WAS QUIET AT TIME AND NEW RWY ARRS IN PROGRESS AT DFW ARPT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR WAS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE ABOUT THEIR OVERSHOOTING FINAL OF RWY 35R AND GETTING CLOSE TO ACFT ON THEIR L. BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE PROX, THEY GOT A TCASII TA AND RA. THEY DIDN'T FOLLOW ANY RA COMMANDS AS THEIR HIGH DSCNT RATE WAS ALREADY IN EXCESS OF ANYTHING THE TCASII RA WAS COMMANDING. FLC BELIEVES THE ACFT ON THE L MADE A GAR AS THEY LOST TRACK OF THE ADJACENT ACFT AND NEVER SAW IT LAND. THIS FLC WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE TRACON CTLR DIDN'T PREPARE THEM FOR THIS HURRIED APCH BY TELLING THEM THAT THEY WERE GOING TO BE A 'SLAM DUNK,' ACFT ON L WOULD BE GOING TO RWY 35C AND COULD CREATE A TCASII TA OR RA. NOR DID CTLR OFFER THAT RWY 35R WOULD BE FARTHER TO THE R THAN EXPECTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.