Narrative:

I believe that all aircraft at uncontrolled airports should be required to have a radio on board, and all operators should be instructed to use their radios to report their position and intentions while operating in an uncontrolled environment. On the morning of our potential encounter with a light aircraft, I, along with my first officer and so, thoroughly scanned and cleared the entire airport area. There were no airborne aircraft observed. Our TCASII was turned on before we took the runway for departure. No targets were observed. We looked all the way down the other end of the runway and saw nothing, until the light aircraft became airborne. A TCASII target was then observed, since TCASII does not display targets that are on the ground. The other aircraft, with its low-mounted wing and small diameter fuselage, simply blended into the ground. As stated in my report, we heard no audio xmissions from him until he turned downwind. I find it unconscionable in this day and age that all aircraft are not required to have a radio on board. A hand-held radio would be sufficient. I believe that the age-old principle of 'see and avoid' is fundamentally flawed and should be reexamined. Of course we should always vigorously scan outside the cockpit for other aircraft. However, light aircraft can be difficult to see, especially in less than optimum lighting conditions, such as the early morning hours which was the case here. The 'see and avoid' concept would certainly be enhanced if one knew via radio xmissions where other aircraft are. An airplane can be visually acquired much more quickly if its position is known, rather than systematically scanning for targets that may or may not exist. I have been flying into uncontrolled airports safely and without incident for over 7 yrs, and resent the remark in the cover sheet message which states that I should be educated on the requirements of operating safely at uncontrolled airports. I believe the administration would be well-served to consider the possibility that the lack of a radio requirement should be changed, rather than focusing on which pilot or pilots should be blamed. It would be interesting to know how many conflicts and near- misses at uncontrolled airports go unrpted, because those people involved do not want to admit to anyone else that they failed to see another aircraft. Perhaps such an occurrence takes place much more often than one would think it happens. Neither we nor the pilot of the light aircraft did anything wrong. I believe that the lack of a requirement for radio xmissions contributed greatly to the possibility of a conflict. To allow the system to continue as it is would be an invitation to disaster at some time in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 INVOLVED IN A CRITICAL GND CONFLICT WHEN IT ENTERS THE RWY WHILE AN SMA TAKES OFF FROM THE OPPOSITE END OF THE RWY.

Narrative: I BELIEVE THAT ALL ACFT AT UNCTLED ARPTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO HAVE A RADIO ON BOARD, AND ALL OPERATORS SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO USE THEIR RADIOS TO RPT THEIR POS AND INTENTIONS WHILE OPERATING IN AN UNCTLED ENVIRONMENT. ON THE MORNING OF OUR POTENTIAL ENCOUNTER WITH A LIGHT ACFT, I, ALONG WITH MY FO AND SO, THOROUGHLY SCANNED AND CLRED THE ENTIRE ARPT AREA. THERE WERE NO AIRBORNE ACFT OBSERVED. OUR TCASII WAS TURNED ON BEFORE WE TOOK THE RWY FOR DEP. NO TARGETS WERE OBSERVED. WE LOOKED ALL THE WAY DOWN THE OTHER END OF THE RWY AND SAW NOTHING, UNTIL THE LIGHT ACFT BECAME AIRBORNE. A TCASII TARGET WAS THEN OBSERVED, SINCE TCASII DOES NOT DISPLAY TARGETS THAT ARE ON THE GND. THE OTHER ACFT, WITH ITS LOW-MOUNTED WING AND SMALL DIAMETER FUSELAGE, SIMPLY BLENDED INTO THE GND. AS STATED IN MY RPT, WE HEARD NO AUDIO XMISSIONS FROM HIM UNTIL HE TURNED DOWNWIND. I FIND IT UNCONSCIONABLE IN THIS DAY AND AGE THAT ALL ACFT ARE NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE A RADIO ON BOARD. A HAND-HELD RADIO WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. I BELIEVE THAT THE AGE-OLD PRINCIPLE OF 'SEE AND AVOID' IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED AND SHOULD BE REEXAMINED. OF COURSE WE SHOULD ALWAYS VIGOROUSLY SCAN OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT FOR OTHER ACFT. HOWEVER, LIGHT ACFT CAN BE DIFFICULT TO SEE, ESPECIALLY IN LESS THAN OPTIMUM LIGHTING CONDITIONS, SUCH AS THE EARLY MORNING HRS WHICH WAS THE CASE HERE. THE 'SEE AND AVOID' CONCEPT WOULD CERTAINLY BE ENHANCED IF ONE KNEW VIA RADIO XMISSIONS WHERE OTHER ACFT ARE. AN AIRPLANE CAN BE VISUALLY ACQUIRED MUCH MORE QUICKLY IF ITS POS IS KNOWN, RATHER THAN SYSTEMATICALLY SCANNING FOR TARGETS THAT MAY OR MAY NOT EXIST. I HAVE BEEN FLYING INTO UNCTLED ARPTS SAFELY AND WITHOUT INCIDENT FOR OVER 7 YRS, AND RESENT THE REMARK IN THE COVER SHEET MESSAGE WHICH STATES THAT I SHOULD BE EDUCATED ON THE REQUIREMENTS OF OPERATING SAFELY AT UNCTLED ARPTS. I BELIEVE THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE WELL-SERVED TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE LACK OF A RADIO REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE CHANGED, RATHER THAN FOCUSING ON WHICH PLT OR PLTS SHOULD BE BLAMED. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW HOW MANY CONFLICTS AND NEAR- MISSES AT UNCTLED ARPTS GO UNRPTED, BECAUSE THOSE PEOPLE INVOLVED DO NOT WANT TO ADMIT TO ANYONE ELSE THAT THEY FAILED TO SEE ANOTHER ACFT. PERHAPS SUCH AN OCCURRENCE TAKES PLACE MUCH MORE OFTEN THAN ONE WOULD THINK IT HAPPENS. NEITHER WE NOR THE PLT OF THE LIGHT ACFT DID ANYTHING WRONG. I BELIEVE THAT THE LACK OF A REQUIREMENT FOR RADIO XMISSIONS CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONFLICT. TO ALLOW THE SYS TO CONTINUE AS IT IS WOULD BE AN INVITATION TO DISASTER AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.