Narrative:

My company in response to increasing economic pressure(south), has diluted the flight crew's ability to both be assured of the quantity and access to fire suppression in main deck hazardous material xportation. On this particular friday night, I was completing a week of training (IOE) a new first officer. I am a line check airman on the airbus (A300 and A310). Approximately 15 mins prior to scheduled push back, having already reviewed the dangerous goods loading form, the first officer stepped to the rear to inspect the actual pallet with hazmat, once it was loaded on the main deck. After about 2 mins, he returned to the cockpit to seek my help in determining our legality in carrying this shipment. The hazmat specialist (a company employee) returned with the first officer. Normally, all hazmat, and most especially, flammables (primary hazard) are loaded into a closed container and placed in position #1, the most forward on the airplane. This allows us to connect a flexible hose, which allows us to flood the container with halon - - activated forward of the smoke curtain, aft of the cockpit. However, we as crew members, have seen an increased use of palletized goods, loaded and properly secured, but 'contained' only by plastic, with a prohibition from even placing a fire hose from the system installed in the aircraft, under the plastic. The aircraft MEL requires at least 2 of the 3 14 pound halon fire extinguishers to be svcable if any hazmat is carried. The flight operations manual requires hoses, if installed, to be connected. The airplane flight manual requires both a preflight and a final check of the proper connection(south) of the fire system, before push back. None of these elements were apparently complied with. My company flight safety report, submitted then, is being researched. I took political heat, upon arrival at ord, was instructed to call the duty officer, who after hearing my reasons, instructed me to call my flight manager (boss) on monday morning, I have, and my boss may want further statements. This is a potential hazard with no guidance for the crew. Management indicates that 'we don't expect you to fight the fire...just land as soon as possible.' I will do that anyway, but I have requested written guidance from the company, to include the maximum allowable mass of such palletized (non containerized) flammable liquids -- if any. I trust that such declaration is forthcoming. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: this A300-600 instructor/line check pilot found an improperly contained shipment of hazmat had been placed on his aircraft. He said that he referred to his manuals and consulted with the local company hazmat specialist after which he had the shipment removed from his aircraft. He said that the shipment had arrived from another carrier and may have been packaged by them. However, the shipment did not meet the standards for fire protection at his company. He alleges that his company is considering rewriting their operations manual to allow this less protective packaging. He has discussed this shipment and the possible rewrite with his chief, but has received no response yet. The reporter wanted to emphasize that his company's standards were very strict, but correct in his opinion. This shipment should have been in a metal container with a gas fitting and with a hose from an 11 pound halon container connected to the fitting. The container is supposed to be both liquid and gas tight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR FLC HAS AN IMPROPERLY PACKAGED HAZMAT SHIPMENT REMOVED FROM THEIR ACFT BECAUSE OF FIRE SAFETY CONCERNS. A300-600.

Narrative: MY COMPANY IN RESPONSE TO INCREASING ECONOMIC PRESSURE(S), HAS DILUTED THE FLC'S ABILITY TO BOTH BE ASSURED OF THE QUANTITY AND ACCESS TO FIRE SUPPRESSION IN MAIN DECK HAZARDOUS MATERIAL XPORTATION. ON THIS PARTICULAR FRIDAY NIGHT, I WAS COMPLETING A WK OF TRAINING (IOE) A NEW FO. I AM A LINE CHK AIRMAN ON THE AIRBUS (A300 AND A310). APPROX 15 MINS PRIOR TO SCHEDULED PUSH BACK, HAVING ALREADY REVIEWED THE DANGEROUS GOODS LOADING FORM, THE FO STEPPED TO THE REAR TO INSPECT THE ACTUAL PALLET WITH HAZMAT, ONCE IT WAS LOADED ON THE MAIN DECK. AFTER ABOUT 2 MINS, HE RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT TO SEEK MY HELP IN DETERMINING OUR LEGALITY IN CARRYING THIS SHIPMENT. THE HAZMAT SPECIALIST (A COMPANY EMPLOYEE) RETURNED WITH THE FO. NORMALLY, ALL HAZMAT, AND MOST ESPECIALLY, FLAMMABLES (PRIMARY HAZARD) ARE LOADED INTO A CLOSED CONTAINER AND PLACED IN POS #1, THE MOST FORWARD ON THE AIRPLANE. THIS ALLOWS US TO CONNECT A FLEXIBLE HOSE, WHICH ALLOWS US TO FLOOD THE CONTAINER WITH HALON - - ACTIVATED FORWARD OF THE SMOKE CURTAIN, AFT OF THE COCKPIT. HOWEVER, WE AS CREW MEMBERS, HAVE SEEN AN INCREASED USE OF PALLETIZED GOODS, LOADED AND PROPERLY SECURED, BUT 'CONTAINED' ONLY BY PLASTIC, WITH A PROHIBITION FROM EVEN PLACING A FIRE HOSE FROM THE SYS INSTALLED IN THE ACFT, UNDER THE PLASTIC. THE ACFT MEL REQUIRES AT LEAST 2 OF THE 3 14 LB HALON FIRE EXTINGUISHERS TO BE SVCABLE IF ANY HAZMAT IS CARRIED. THE FLT OPS MANUAL REQUIRES HOSES, IF INSTALLED, TO BE CONNECTED. THE AIRPLANE FLT MANUAL REQUIRES BOTH A PREFLT AND A FINAL CHK OF THE PROPER CONNECTION(S) OF THE FIRE SYS, BEFORE PUSH BACK. NONE OF THESE ELEMENTS WERE APPARENTLY COMPLIED WITH. MY COMPANY FLT SAFETY RPT, SUBMITTED THEN, IS BEING RESEARCHED. I TOOK POLITICAL HEAT, UPON ARR AT ORD, WAS INSTRUCTED TO CALL THE DUTY OFFICER, WHO AFTER HEARING MY REASONS, INSTRUCTED ME TO CALL MY FLT MGR (BOSS) ON MONDAY MORNING, I HAVE, AND MY BOSS MAY WANT FURTHER STATEMENTS. THIS IS A POTENTIAL HAZARD WITH NO GUIDANCE FOR THE CREW. MGMNT INDICATES THAT 'WE DON'T EXPECT YOU TO FIGHT THE FIRE...JUST LAND ASAP.' I WILL DO THAT ANYWAY, BUT I HAVE REQUESTED WRITTEN GUIDANCE FROM THE COMPANY, TO INCLUDE THE MAX ALLOWABLE MASS OF SUCH PALLETIZED (NON CONTAINERIZED) FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS -- IF ANY. I TRUST THAT SUCH DECLARATION IS FORTHCOMING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS A300-600 INSTRUCTOR/LINE CHK PLT FOUND AN IMPROPERLY CONTAINED SHIPMENT OF HAZMAT HAD BEEN PLACED ON HIS ACFT. HE SAID THAT HE REFERRED TO HIS MANUALS AND CONSULTED WITH THE LCL COMPANY HAZMAT SPECIALIST AFTER WHICH HE HAD THE SHIPMENT REMOVED FROM HIS ACFT. HE SAID THAT THE SHIPMENT HAD ARRIVED FROM ANOTHER CARRIER AND MAY HAVE BEEN PACKAGED BY THEM. HOWEVER, THE SHIPMENT DID NOT MEET THE STANDARDS FOR FIRE PROTECTION AT HIS COMPANY. HE ALLEGES THAT HIS COMPANY IS CONSIDERING REWRITING THEIR OPS MANUAL TO ALLOW THIS LESS PROTECTIVE PACKAGING. HE HAS DISCUSSED THIS SHIPMENT AND THE POSSIBLE REWRITE WITH HIS CHIEF, BUT HAS RECEIVED NO RESPONSE YET. THE RPTR WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT HIS COMPANY'S STANDARDS WERE VERY STRICT, BUT CORRECT IN HIS OPINION. THIS SHIPMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN A METAL CONTAINER WITH A GAS FITTING AND WITH A HOSE FROM AN 11 LB HALON CONTAINER CONNECTED TO THE FITTING. THE CONTAINER IS SUPPOSED TO BE BOTH LIQUID AND GAS TIGHT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.