Narrative:

We had just turned off of runway 22L in ewr when the captain stated he was having trouble steering as he tried to turn the aircraft onto taxiway P. He stopped the aircraft and noted that the left hydraulic system indicated zero pressure and qty. Simultaneously one of the cabin attendants called to report smoke in the cabin. At that time we could see smoke coming through the door grill of the cockpit. We immediately opened the cockpit windows and smoke was never a problem in the cockpit. However, upon opening the cockpit door, the captain reported thick smoke and poor visibility in the cabin. He called for the cabin smoke checklist, however, there was a delay in running it because I first had trouble finding it in our QRH and then had trouble deciding which to use since all checklists specifically addressed airborne problems. In the interim, the captain turned off the APU air and pack switches and I turned on the ram air fan. We then started the passenger evacuate/evacuation checklist. We shut the engines down, notified the tower and began to evaluate the situation. The lead cabin attendant suggested opening the aircraft doors. The captain felt there was no fire and did not want to evacuate/evacuation. He gave the ok and continued to monitor the situation. He felt the source of the smoke problem was removed and, in fact, 30 seconds after opening the doors the smoke had cleared appreciably, so the necessity of disarming the doors had been overridden by the dangers inherent in an emergency evacuate/evacuation. 2 mins later the smoke was completely gone and we were subsequently towed to the gate. This was a close situation to call. Our company does not have specific procedures for clearing smoke on the ground, which is very different then clearing it in the air. Opening the aircraft doors seemed to work fine once the source of the smoke was isolated and removed. However, it forced us to disarm the doors. This is not an uncommon occurrence and should be addressed by a checklist that gives procedures, considerations, and guidance to help in a very difficult decision. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter said that the hydraulic leak occurred in the left engine thrust reverser return line and the smoke from the fluid spraying onto the hot engine was ingested through the air conditioning system. The aircraft was stopped and the door slides were disarmed and the doors were opened to clear the smoke and fumes, fortunately the aircraft was in a crosswind at the time. This first officer said that a quick reaction handbook was not of much assistance since all of the smoke removal procedures were for in-flight, pressurized sits. He also was wary of the FAA criticizing their decision to evacuate/evacuation the smoke rather than the passenger and disarming the slides with passenger on board. Supplemental information from acn 351743: after a normal landing on runway 22L at ewr, the aircraft exited the runway on high speed 'north.' I noticed the nosewheel steering was difficult to move. A quick check revealed left hydraulic qty and pressure loss.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MD82 FLC HAS SMOKE ENTER THE ACFT FROM A BROKEN HYD LINE THAT SPRAYED ONTO AN ENG AFTER THE ACFT TURNED OFF OF THE RWY AFTER LNDG. THE FLC HAD THE SLIDES DISARMED AND THE DOORS OPENED TO REMOVE THE SMOKE AND THEN WERE TOWED TO THE GATE. MD82.

Narrative: WE HAD JUST TURNED OFF OF RWY 22L IN EWR WHEN THE CAPT STATED HE WAS HAVING TROUBLE STEERING AS HE TRIED TO TURN THE ACFT ONTO TXWY P. HE STOPPED THE ACFT AND NOTED THAT THE L HYD SYS INDICATED ZERO PRESSURE AND QTY. SIMULTANEOUSLY ONE OF THE CABIN ATTENDANTS CALLED TO RPT SMOKE IN THE CABIN. AT THAT TIME WE COULD SEE SMOKE COMING THROUGH THE DOOR GRILL OF THE COCKPIT. WE IMMEDIATELY OPENED THE COCKPIT WINDOWS AND SMOKE WAS NEVER A PROB IN THE COCKPIT. HOWEVER, UPON OPENING THE COCKPIT DOOR, THE CAPT RPTED THICK SMOKE AND POOR VISIBILITY IN THE CABIN. HE CALLED FOR THE CABIN SMOKE CHKLIST, HOWEVER, THERE WAS A DELAY IN RUNNING IT BECAUSE I FIRST HAD TROUBLE FINDING IT IN OUR QRH AND THEN HAD TROUBLE DECIDING WHICH TO USE SINCE ALL CHKLISTS SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED AIRBORNE PROBS. IN THE INTERIM, THE CAPT TURNED OFF THE APU AIR AND PACK SWITCHES AND I TURNED ON THE RAM AIR FAN. WE THEN STARTED THE PAX EVAC CHKLIST. WE SHUT THE ENGS DOWN, NOTIFIED THE TWR AND BEGAN TO EVALUATE THE SIT. THE LEAD CABIN ATTENDANT SUGGESTED OPENING THE ACFT DOORS. THE CAPT FELT THERE WAS NO FIRE AND DID NOT WANT TO EVAC. HE GAVE THE OK AND CONTINUED TO MONITOR THE SIT. HE FELT THE SOURCE OF THE SMOKE PROB WAS REMOVED AND, IN FACT, 30 SECONDS AFTER OPENING THE DOORS THE SMOKE HAD CLRED APPRECIABLY, SO THE NECESSITY OF DISARMING THE DOORS HAD BEEN OVERRIDDEN BY THE DANGERS INHERENT IN AN EMER EVAC. 2 MINS LATER THE SMOKE WAS COMPLETELY GONE AND WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TOWED TO THE GATE. THIS WAS A CLOSE SIT TO CALL. OUR COMPANY DOES NOT HAVE SPECIFIC PROCS FOR CLRING SMOKE ON THE GND, WHICH IS VERY DIFFERENT THEN CLRING IT IN THE AIR. OPENING THE ACFT DOORS SEEMED TO WORK FINE ONCE THE SOURCE OF THE SMOKE WAS ISOLATED AND REMOVED. HOWEVER, IT FORCED US TO DISARM THE DOORS. THIS IS NOT AN UNCOMMON OCCURRENCE AND SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY A CHKLIST THAT GIVES PROCS, CONSIDERATIONS, AND GUIDANCE TO HELP IN A VERY DIFFICULT DECISION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID THAT THE HYD LEAK OCCURRED IN THE L ENG THRUST REVERSER RETURN LINE AND THE SMOKE FROM THE FLUID SPRAYING ONTO THE HOT ENG WAS INGESTED THROUGH THE AIR CONDITIONING SYS. THE ACFT WAS STOPPED AND THE DOOR SLIDES WERE DISARMED AND THE DOORS WERE OPENED TO CLR THE SMOKE AND FUMES, FORTUNATELY THE ACFT WAS IN A XWIND AT THE TIME. THIS FO SAID THAT A QUICK REACTION HANDBOOK WAS NOT OF MUCH ASSISTANCE SINCE ALL OF THE SMOKE REMOVAL PROCS WERE FOR INFLT, PRESSURIZED SITS. HE ALSO WAS WARY OF THE FAA CRITICIZING THEIR DECISION TO EVAC THE SMOKE RATHER THAN THE PAX AND DISARMING THE SLIDES WITH PAX ON BOARD. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 351743: AFTER A NORMAL LNDG ON RWY 22L AT EWR, THE ACFT EXITED THE RWY ON HIGH SPD 'N.' I NOTICED THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING WAS DIFFICULT TO MOVE. A QUICK CHK REVEALED L HYD QTY AND PRESSURE LOSS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.