Narrative:

I believe the problem was the transition of previous aircraft departing on same runway being vectored through a SID which was to be used by our aircraft. I also believe that a frequency handoff from the tower controller to departure control may have contributed to communication breakdown between our aircraft and ATC. The difference in our course on departure and the course required on the SID was only 20 degree difference (the SID required a turn out of 400 ft to a heading of 300 degrees whereas the aircraft was flown on a 320 degree heading because of TCASII alert). High performance aircraft in very low visibility sits should be kept well apart and no turn on course should be approved until all aircraft are well away from the departure area. I believe that perhaps the tower controller should be instructed to stay with a departing aircraft (assuming radar coverage) until he has safely made a transition to a departure segment. As the gulfstream in front of us was cleared for takeoff on runway 32, we were told to taxi into position and hold. Soon after we were cleared for takeoff. All operations on takeoff proceeded normally with the TCASII set on and the traffic alert and RA modes set on. After rotation of the aircraft and climb through the low fog bank into clear WX (approximately 300-400 ft AGL), a yellow then red TCASII alert was activated with the target converging from the left of the aircraft. The aircraft was in full sight of the crew and the captain elected not to commence the left hand turn to 300 degrees as published for fear of a collision. Concurrent with this event was a frequency handoff from the tower controller to departure control which contributed to the workload. As the frequency was changed, the departure controller issued instructions to immediately stop our climb as we checked in on frequency. The captain elected to monitor the converging traffic visually and proceed in a manner that would keep both aircraft safely separated. Lateral separation between the gulfstream that departed in front of our aircraft appeared to be adequate, approximately 3-5 mi. This did not appear to be the aircraft that caused the alert. The aircraft that was crossing left to right in front of us was climbing through our altitude and is estimated to be approximately 1/2 to 1 mi in front of our aircraft. After visual separation had been established, the captain elected to fly a heading that would provide safe separation. No further information regarding this event was relayed to our aircraft by departure control.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ATX GULFSTREAM IV CREW HAD TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION NO TURN ON SID TO AVOID CLOSING ON AN INTRUDER ACFT RIGHT AFTER TKOF. WX FACTORS 100 FT CEILING WITH 400 FT TOPS.

Narrative: I BELIEVE THE PROB WAS THE TRANSITION OF PREVIOUS ACFT DEPARTING ON SAME RWY BEING VECTORED THROUGH A SID WHICH WAS TO BE USED BY OUR ACFT. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT A FREQ HDOF FROM THE TWR CTLR TO DEP CTL MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO COM BREAKDOWN BTWN OUR ACFT AND ATC. THE DIFFERENCE IN OUR COURSE ON DEP AND THE COURSE REQUIRED ON THE SID WAS ONLY 20 DEG DIFFERENCE (THE SID REQUIRED A TURN OUT OF 400 FT TO A HDG OF 300 DEGS WHEREAS THE ACFT WAS FLOWN ON A 320 DEG HDG BECAUSE OF TCASII ALERT). HIGH PERFORMANCE ACFT IN VERY LOW VISIBILITY SITS SHOULD BE KEPT WELL APART AND NO TURN ON COURSE SHOULD BE APPROVED UNTIL ALL ACFT ARE WELL AWAY FROM THE DEP AREA. I BELIEVE THAT PERHAPS THE TWR CTLR SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO STAY WITH A DEPARTING ACFT (ASSUMING RADAR COVERAGE) UNTIL HE HAS SAFELY MADE A TRANSITION TO A DEP SEGMENT. AS THE GULFSTREAM IN FRONT OF US WAS CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 32, WE WERE TOLD TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD. SOON AFTER WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. ALL OPS ON TKOF PROCEEDED NORMALLY WITH THE TCASII SET ON AND THE TFC ALERT AND RA MODES SET ON. AFTER ROTATION OF THE ACFT AND CLB THROUGH THE LOW FOG BANK INTO CLR WX (APPROX 300-400 FT AGL), A YELLOW THEN RED TCASII ALERT WAS ACTIVATED WITH THE TARGET CONVERGING FROM THE L OF THE ACFT. THE ACFT WAS IN FULL SIGHT OF THE CREW AND THE CAPT ELECTED NOT TO COMMENCE THE L HAND TURN TO 300 DEGS AS PUBLISHED FOR FEAR OF A COLLISION. CONCURRENT WITH THIS EVENT WAS A FREQ HDOF FROM THE TWR CTLR TO DEP CTL WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THE WORKLOAD. AS THE FREQ WAS CHANGED, THE DEP CTLR ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO IMMEDIATELY STOP OUR CLB AS WE CHKED IN ON FREQ. THE CAPT ELECTED TO MONITOR THE CONVERGING TFC VISUALLY AND PROCEED IN A MANNER THAT WOULD KEEP BOTH ACFT SAFELY SEPARATED. LATERAL SEPARATION BTWN THE GULFSTREAM THAT DEPARTED IN FRONT OF OUR ACFT APPEARED TO BE ADEQUATE, APPROX 3-5 MI. THIS DID NOT APPEAR TO BE THE ACFT THAT CAUSED THE ALERT. THE ACFT THAT WAS XING L TO R IN FRONT OF US WAS CLBING THROUGH OUR ALT AND IS ESTIMATED TO BE APPROX 1/2 TO 1 MI IN FRONT OF OUR ACFT. AFTER VISUAL SEPARATION HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, THE CAPT ELECTED TO FLY A HEADING THAT WOULD PROVIDE SAFE SEPARATION. NO FURTHER INFO REGARDING THIS EVENT WAS RELAYED TO OUR ACFT BY DEP CTL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.