Narrative:

FSS briefing prior to departure indicated ceilings in the area forecast to be 2500 ft with 6 mi or greater visibility. Current conditions were lower than forecast. In fact, during initial departure from 3i7 en route to I23, ceiling was 300 ft AGL with 1 mi visibility. My mission was to fly one of our C172 aircraft to I23 where my boss had become stranded due to poor IFR WX. He would then fly myself and himself back home. Unfortunately, upon arrival at the missed approach on the NDB runway 22 approach to I23, I did not break out of the clouds. As I announced on CTAF my intention to go missed, the boss got on the radio and unicom and a conversation ensued whereby I was told -- encouraged to descend below minimums. Not wishing to do this, I went missed, contacted cmh approach on the missed, and requested another approach knowing full well that I had no chance of finding the runway at the MDA. But, I figured this would be good practice and it may help appease the boss. At least this way even though I refused to descend below minimums, at least I came back for a second approach. As I contacted I23 on CTAF, the boss once again told me how nice the WX was on the ground, with excellent visibility. And I was told there was nothing down there except corn stalks, so it's 'safe' to 'come on down and have a look.' once again I proceeded down to the MDA and no lower. After all, there must be some reason why the MDA exists at that altitude. If it was 'safe' to go lower, then the approach would say so. I announced the missed on CTAF and once again a conversation ensued, this time concerning where I should meet the boss. It was decided I would land at sgh and await his arrival. The WX at sgh was 300 ft overcast with 1 mi visibility. I shot the ILS runway 24 and landed. When the boss arrived, we took off with him as PIC and me as passenger. At the destination, 3i7, he proceeded to go below MDA and scud run to the airport. The point here is not to RAT on the boss, but to express some frustration about how some folks blatantly and willfully and repeatedly plan to deviate from procedures that were established to protect the safety of those in the aircraft as well as those on the ground. If a situation evolves whereby I end up in a questionable situation or a regulation is bent or broken, the first thing I do is situation down and analyze how the situation evolved, where were mistakes made, and how can a recurrence be prevented. As it happened on that day, when it came time to execute the missed, I did not promptly notify cmh approach, and the flying of the missed approach procedure itself was sloppy because my attention was diverted to the CTAF -- unicom conversations with the boss on the ground. While I refused the pressure to descend below MDA, I still slipped on applying the very old and very wise saying, 'aviate, navigation, communicate.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C172 MAKING NON PRECISION APCH I23 IS PRESSURED BY BOSS ON THE GND TO DSND BELOW MDA. RPTR ELECTS TO MAKE A GAR FOR SECOND APCH. SAME RESULTS AND IS TOLD BY BOSS TO PROCEED TO SGH WHERE HE WILL MEET HIM. BECAUSE OF DISTR ON THE RADIO WAS LATE IN ADVISING APCH CTL OF THE MISSED APCH.

Narrative: FSS BRIEFING PRIOR TO DEP INDICATED CEILINGS IN THE AREA FORECAST TO BE 2500 FT WITH 6 MI OR GREATER VISIBILITY. CURRENT CONDITIONS WERE LOWER THAN FORECAST. IN FACT, DURING INITIAL DEP FROM 3I7 ENRTE TO I23, CEILING WAS 300 FT AGL WITH 1 MI VISIBILITY. MY MISSION WAS TO FLY ONE OF OUR C172 ACFT TO I23 WHERE MY BOSS HAD BECOME STRANDED DUE TO POOR IFR WX. HE WOULD THEN FLY MYSELF AND HIMSELF BACK HOME. UNFORTUNATELY, UPON ARR AT THE MISSED APCH ON THE NDB RWY 22 APCH TO I23, I DID NOT BREAK OUT OF THE CLOUDS. AS I ANNOUNCED ON CTAF MY INTENTION TO GO MISSED, THE BOSS GOT ON THE RADIO AND UNICOM AND A CONVERSATION ENSUED WHEREBY I WAS TOLD -- ENCOURAGED TO DSND BELOW MINIMUMS. NOT WISHING TO DO THIS, I WENT MISSED, CONTACTED CMH APCH ON THE MISSED, AND REQUESTED ANOTHER APCH KNOWING FULL WELL THAT I HAD NO CHANCE OF FINDING THE RWY AT THE MDA. BUT, I FIGURED THIS WOULD BE GOOD PRACTICE AND IT MAY HELP APPEASE THE BOSS. AT LEAST THIS WAY EVEN THOUGH I REFUSED TO DSND BELOW MINIMUMS, AT LEAST I CAME BACK FOR A SECOND APCH. AS I CONTACTED I23 ON CTAF, THE BOSS ONCE AGAIN TOLD ME HOW NICE THE WX WAS ON THE GND, WITH EXCELLENT VISIBILITY. AND I WAS TOLD THERE WAS NOTHING DOWN THERE EXCEPT CORN STALKS, SO IT'S 'SAFE' TO 'COME ON DOWN AND HAVE A LOOK.' ONCE AGAIN I PROCEEDED DOWN TO THE MDA AND NO LOWER. AFTER ALL, THERE MUST BE SOME REASON WHY THE MDA EXISTS AT THAT ALT. IF IT WAS 'SAFE' TO GO LOWER, THEN THE APCH WOULD SAY SO. I ANNOUNCED THE MISSED ON CTAF AND ONCE AGAIN A CONVERSATION ENSUED, THIS TIME CONCERNING WHERE I SHOULD MEET THE BOSS. IT WAS DECIDED I WOULD LAND AT SGH AND AWAIT HIS ARR. THE WX AT SGH WAS 300 FT OVCST WITH 1 MI VISIBILITY. I SHOT THE ILS RWY 24 AND LANDED. WHEN THE BOSS ARRIVED, WE TOOK OFF WITH HIM AS PIC AND ME AS PAX. AT THE DEST, 3I7, HE PROCEEDED TO GO BELOW MDA AND SCUD RUN TO THE ARPT. THE POINT HERE IS NOT TO RAT ON THE BOSS, BUT TO EXPRESS SOME FRUSTRATION ABOUT HOW SOME FOLKS BLATANTLY AND WILLFULLY AND REPEATEDLY PLAN TO DEVIATE FROM PROCS THAT WERE ESTABLISHED TO PROTECT THE SAFETY OF THOSE IN THE ACFT AS WELL AS THOSE ON THE GND. IF A SIT EVOLVES WHEREBY I END UP IN A QUESTIONABLE SIT OR A REG IS BENT OR BROKEN, THE FIRST THING I DO IS SIT DOWN AND ANALYZE HOW THE SIT EVOLVED, WHERE WERE MISTAKES MADE, AND HOW CAN A RECURRENCE BE PREVENTED. AS IT HAPPENED ON THAT DAY, WHEN IT CAME TIME TO EXECUTE THE MISSED, I DID NOT PROMPTLY NOTIFY CMH APCH, AND THE FLYING OF THE MISSED APCH PROC ITSELF WAS SLOPPY BECAUSE MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED TO THE CTAF -- UNICOM CONVERSATIONS WITH THE BOSS ON THE GND. WHILE I REFUSED THE PRESSURE TO DSND BELOW MDA, I STILL SLIPPED ON APPLYING THE VERY OLD AND VERY WISE SAYING, 'AVIATE, NAV, COMMUNICATE.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.