Narrative:

I was in command of flight from pit to dca on nov/xx/96. After an aircraft change in pit, we experienced problems with the ACARS system. We could not receive incoming data (pre departure clearance, WX) and had to call for clearance. The original passenger count of 46 at 5 mins before departure was changed at the last min by 2 additional passenger. The first officer and I discussed giving load control the new count of 48 (although recognizing that an off- count of 2 was acceptable). We were parked at gate with ATIS departures off runway 10C. We discussed the very short taxi to runway 10C prior to pushback and advised the flight attendants as well. Despite the last min closeout, we were able to push back on schedule. I decided to accomplish both the after start and before takeoff checklists prior to calling for taxi in anticipation of a short night taxi. It was my intention to be as fully prepared as possible prior to entering the taxi environment and departure runway. The takeoff data and trim settings were set according to the flight planned weight on our dispatched release. However, both the first officer and I acknowledged that these were only approximately figures and would certainly be updated to the final data received from load control via ACARS or radio. Our departure runway, however, was changed to runway 14 due to numerous sbound flts and expected delays on runway 10C. Load control was contacted with our count of 48. Between calls to load by us and other aircraft, we acknowledged taxi instructions, discussed those instructions and proper turns in the cockpit, and discovered that we were in fact next for takeoff on runway 14 (there were no numerous departures ahead of us). Tower cleared us onto the runway, and I requested the line items. At that moment (if not sooner), we had both forgotten about the final weight and balance. Neither of us realized this error until we arrived at the gate in dca and operations informed us on the radio and that there was no load information for our flight. Departing without the final weight and balance was completely unintentional on our part. Several factors, however, contributed to this situation. This incident was primarily caused by attempting to get ahead of an anticipated rushed departure. Once we had set the approximately takeoff data, the procedures erroneously felt as though they were completed. The light fuel and passenger load did not trigger any warning flags associated with briefing heavy takeoffs. We were both distraction by the runway change and often focused on the night taxi. Both the first officer and I had just completed 9 and 8 days respectfully of company business within the last 10 days. This was the last of a 5 leg day. Finally, from the very beginning of the flight the ACARS system presented us with irregular operations and an increased workload. A possible change in company policy may prevent a recurrence of this situation. The airport environment often presents changing conditions which demand a pilot's uninterrupted attention. Problems stemming from ACARS weight and balance is an unwarranted addition. I believe the best corrective measure is to make the final weight and balance a required cockpit item (like the fuel slip) prior to closing out a flight. This would not only enhance safety, but also prevent bothersome congestion and delays by flts waiting for data. Both pilots and airport controllers would find this beneficial in their joint efforts to depart aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC9-30 ACFT PARKED AT GATE WITH NO COM ON ACARS HAD TO RECEIVE CLRNC FROM CLRNC DELIVERY AS WELL AS ATIS INFO. FLC EXPECTED DEP RWY TO BE VERY CLOSE TO GATE SO PREPARED FOR A SHORT TAXI, WHICH INCLUDED DOING AFTER START AND BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS PRIOR TO TAXI. FLC RUSHED FOR AN ON TIME DEP FORGOT ABOUT THE WT AND BAL UNTIL THEY WERE TOLD AT THE DEST ARPT.

Narrative: I WAS IN COMMAND OF FLT FROM PIT TO DCA ON NOV/XX/96. AFTER AN ACFT CHANGE IN PIT, WE EXPERIENCED PROBS WITH THE ACARS SYS. WE COULD NOT RECEIVE INCOMING DATA (PDC, WX) AND HAD TO CALL FOR CLRNC. THE ORIGINAL PAX COUNT OF 46 AT 5 MINS BEFORE DEP WAS CHANGED AT THE LAST MIN BY 2 ADDITIONAL PAX. THE FO AND I DISCUSSED GIVING LOAD CTL THE NEW COUNT OF 48 (ALTHOUGH RECOGNIZING THAT AN OFF- COUNT OF 2 WAS ACCEPTABLE). WE WERE PARKED AT GATE WITH ATIS DEPS OFF RWY 10C. WE DISCUSSED THE VERY SHORT TAXI TO RWY 10C PRIOR TO PUSHBACK AND ADVISED THE FLT ATTENDANTS AS WELL. DESPITE THE LAST MIN CLOSEOUT, WE WERE ABLE TO PUSH BACK ON SCHEDULE. I DECIDED TO ACCOMPLISH BOTH THE AFTER START AND BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS PRIOR TO CALLING FOR TAXI IN ANTICIPATION OF A SHORT NIGHT TAXI. IT WAS MY INTENTION TO BE AS FULLY PREPARED AS POSSIBLE PRIOR TO ENTERING THE TAXI ENVIRONMENT AND DEP RWY. THE TKOF DATA AND TRIM SETTINGS WERE SET ACCORDING TO THE FLT PLANNED WT ON OUR DISPATCHED RELEASE. HOWEVER, BOTH THE FO AND I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THESE WERE ONLY APPROX FIGURES AND WOULD CERTAINLY BE UPDATED TO THE FINAL DATA RECEIVED FROM LOAD CTL VIA ACARS OR RADIO. OUR DEP RWY, HOWEVER, WAS CHANGED TO RWY 14 DUE TO NUMEROUS SBOUND FLTS AND EXPECTED DELAYS ON RWY 10C. LOAD CTL WAS CONTACTED WITH OUR COUNT OF 48. BTWN CALLS TO LOAD BY US AND OTHER ACFT, WE ACKNOWLEDGED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, DISCUSSED THOSE INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPER TURNS IN THE COCKPIT, AND DISCOVERED THAT WE WERE IN FACT NEXT FOR TKOF ON RWY 14 (THERE WERE NO NUMEROUS DEPS AHEAD OF US). TWR CLRED US ONTO THE RWY, AND I REQUESTED THE LINE ITEMS. AT THAT MOMENT (IF NOT SOONER), WE HAD BOTH FORGOTTEN ABOUT THE FINAL WT AND BAL. NEITHER OF US REALIZED THIS ERROR UNTIL WE ARRIVED AT THE GATE IN DCA AND OPS INFORMED US ON THE RADIO AND THAT THERE WAS NO LOAD INFO FOR OUR FLT. DEPARTING WITHOUT THE FINAL WT AND BAL WAS COMPLETELY UNINTENTIONAL ON OUR PART. SEVERAL FACTORS, HOWEVER, CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SIT. THIS INCIDENT WAS PRIMARILY CAUSED BY ATTEMPTING TO GET AHEAD OF AN ANTICIPATED RUSHED DEP. ONCE WE HAD SET THE APPROX TKOF DATA, THE PROCS ERRONEOUSLY FELT AS THOUGH THEY WERE COMPLETED. THE LIGHT FUEL AND PAX LOAD DID NOT TRIGGER ANY WARNING FLAGS ASSOCIATED WITH BRIEFING HVY TKOFS. WE WERE BOTH DISTR BY THE RWY CHANGE AND OFTEN FOCUSED ON THE NIGHT TAXI. BOTH THE FO AND I HAD JUST COMPLETED 9 AND 8 DAYS RESPECTFULLY OF COMPANY BUSINESS WITHIN THE LAST 10 DAYS. THIS WAS THE LAST OF A 5 LEG DAY. FINALLY, FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE FLT THE ACARS SYS PRESENTED US WITH IRREGULAR OPS AND AN INCREASED WORKLOAD. A POSSIBLE CHANGE IN COMPANY POLICY MAY PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THIS SIT. THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT OFTEN PRESENTS CHANGING CONDITIONS WHICH DEMAND A PLT'S UNINTERRUPTED ATTN. PROBS STEMMING FROM ACARS WT AND BAL IS AN UNWARRANTED ADDITION. I BELIEVE THE BEST CORRECTIVE MEASURE IS TO MAKE THE FINAL WT AND BAL A REQUIRED COCKPIT ITEM (LIKE THE FUEL SLIP) PRIOR TO CLOSING OUT A FLT. THIS WOULD NOT ONLY ENHANCE SAFETY, BUT ALSO PREVENT BOTHERSOME CONGESTION AND DELAYS BY FLTS WAITING FOR DATA. BOTH PLTS AND ARPT CTLRS WOULD FIND THIS BENEFICIAL IN THEIR JOINT EFFORTS TO DEPART ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.