Narrative:

Was vectored for ILS runway 4 approach at roc and handed off to the tower frequency outside avon which is 2.9 NM from the OM. It was the end of a 2 hour leg in IMC most of the way from bdl (bradly international airport). I called tower outside the marker for a clearance to land and received a response, part of which I thought was a clearance to land on runway 4. Because of headwinds, and an early handoff I was with the tower frequency for at least 5 mins after my initial call. The approach was normal for a low visibility approach, most of my time and attention was focused on the needles and occasionally looking for the approach lights. The lights were seen by myself right above decision ht, about 100 ft above. I proceeded to follow the needles and visually finish the landing. After landing while slowing the aircraft I discovered that the snowplows were still on the runway to my left side. I maneuvered the plane to the right side of the runway and continued to slow the aircraft. By the time I was abeam the first plow the plane had been slowed to taxi speed and I passed well to the side of the line of plows. At some point, while maneuvering the plane I told the tower I was on the runway and so were the plows 'there are plows still on the runway!!?' the tower told me to go around but I concluded it would have been more dangerous to go around than to continue to slow the aircraft and maneuver around the snowplows. I taxied into the ramp area without further incident. Factors that contributed to the incident included: 1) very low visibility, (I did not see the snowplows until I was no the ground and slowing the aircraft). 2) time of day XA15 am and the long 2 hour leg I had flown before (I was tired). 3) first big snow of the yr in roc. People were not used to winter operations. Conclusion: as winter approachs pilots and controllers need to be more aware of what is going on on the airport surface (situational awareness). Important: no communications between the time that I checked in with tower and time I landed were made on tower frequency between the tower and the equipment on runway. As a pilot I will continue to ask for confirmation of a clearance to land especially late at night. Although redundant in this particular incident I thought about getting confirmation when I was inside the marker but did not because in the past I have felt at times that I was 'bothering' the controllers in the tower. Note: not necessarily the tower at roc, but in general. Controllers also need to be aware of what is going on. My flight was the only one to land within the last hour. The lack of traffic in roc at XA00 am probably contributed to the lack of coordination between the approach and tower. (This is just an assumption.) callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that the FAA issued him a letter of warning for the lack of contacting the tower and obtaining landing clearance. He further stated that the tower tapes revealed that the approach controller was unable to pass on his clearance for the approach to the tower since there was no answer from the tower after several calls. It seems that the tower operator was out of the cabin attendant and did not hear the calls. He was relieved of duty and put in further training for a short period. The reporter was suspended from duty for 1 week without pay. He admits that he should have tried harder to recontact the tower, but he was busy as a single pilot IFR in IMC he did not take time to do so.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATX CARGO PLT OF A PIPER 60-600 LANDED OUT OF AN ILS APCH, IN IMC SNOW SHOWERS, WITHOUT LNDG AUTH AND WITH SNOWPLOWS STILL ON THE RWY. THE RPTING PLT HAD BELIEVED THAT HE HAD HEARD CLRED TO LAND WHEN CHKING IN OUTSIDE OF THE OM.

Narrative: WAS VECTORED FOR ILS RWY 4 APCH AT ROC AND HANDED OFF TO THE TWR FREQ OUTSIDE AVON WHICH IS 2.9 NM FROM THE OM. IT WAS THE END OF A 2 HR LEG IN IMC MOST OF THE WAY FROM BDL (BRADLY INTL ARPT). I CALLED TWR OUTSIDE THE MARKER FOR A CLRNC TO LAND AND RECEIVED A RESPONSE, PART OF WHICH I THOUGHT WAS A CLRNC TO LAND ON RWY 4. BECAUSE OF HEADWINDS, AND AN EARLY HDOF I WAS WITH THE TWR FREQ FOR AT LEAST 5 MINS AFTER MY INITIAL CALL. THE APCH WAS NORMAL FOR A LOW VISIBILITY APCH, MOST OF MY TIME AND ATTN WAS FOCUSED ON THE NEEDLES AND OCCASIONALLY LOOKING FOR THE APCH LIGHTS. THE LIGHTS WERE SEEN BY MYSELF RIGHT ABOVE DECISION HT, ABOUT 100 FT ABOVE. I PROCEEDED TO FOLLOW THE NEEDLES AND VISUALLY FINISH THE LNDG. AFTER LNDG WHILE SLOWING THE ACFT I DISCOVERED THAT THE SNOWPLOWS WERE STILL ON THE RWY TO MY L SIDE. I MANEUVERED THE PLANE TO THE R SIDE OF THE RWY AND CONTINUED TO SLOW THE ACFT. BY THE TIME I WAS ABEAM THE FIRST PLOW THE PLANE HAD BEEN SLOWED TO TAXI SPD AND I PASSED WELL TO THE SIDE OF THE LINE OF PLOWS. AT SOME POINT, WHILE MANEUVERING THE PLANE I TOLD THE TWR I WAS ON THE RWY AND SO WERE THE PLOWS 'THERE ARE PLOWS STILL ON THE RWY!!?' THE TWR TOLD ME TO GAR BUT I CONCLUDED IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE DANGEROUS TO GAR THAN TO CONTINUE TO SLOW THE ACFT AND MANEUVER AROUND THE SNOWPLOWS. I TAXIED INTO THE RAMP AREA WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT INCLUDED: 1) VERY LOW VISIBILITY, (I DID NOT SEE THE SNOWPLOWS UNTIL I WAS NO THE GND AND SLOWING THE ACFT). 2) TIME OF DAY XA15 AM AND THE LONG 2 HR LEG I HAD FLOWN BEFORE (I WAS TIRED). 3) FIRST BIG SNOW OF THE YR IN ROC. PEOPLE WERE NOT USED TO WINTER OPS. CONCLUSION: AS WINTER APCHS PLTS AND CTLRS NEED TO BE MORE AWARE OF WHAT IS GOING ON ON THE ARPT SURFACE (SITUATIONAL AWARENESS). IMPORTANT: NO COMS BTWN THE TIME THAT I CHKED IN WITH TWR AND TIME I LANDED WERE MADE ON TWR FREQ BTWN THE TWR AND THE EQUIP ON RWY. AS A PLT I WILL CONTINUE TO ASK FOR CONFIRMATION OF A CLRNC TO LAND ESPECIALLY LATE AT NIGHT. ALTHOUGH REDUNDANT IN THIS PARTICULAR INCIDENT I THOUGHT ABOUT GETTING CONFIRMATION WHEN I WAS INSIDE THE MARKER BUT DID NOT BECAUSE IN THE PAST I HAVE FELT AT TIMES THAT I WAS 'BOTHERING' THE CTLRS IN THE TWR. NOTE: NOT NECESSARILY THE TWR AT ROC, BUT IN GENERAL. CTLRS ALSO NEED TO BE AWARE OF WHAT IS GOING ON. MY FLT WAS THE ONLY ONE TO LAND WITHIN THE LAST HR. THE LACK OF TFC IN ROC AT XA00 AM PROBABLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE LACK OF COORD BTWN THE APCH AND TWR. (THIS IS JUST AN ASSUMPTION.) CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE FAA ISSUED HIM A LETTER OF WARNING FOR THE LACK OF CONTACTING THE TWR AND OBTAINING LNDG CLRNC. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THE TWR TAPES REVEALED THAT THE APCH CTLR WAS UNABLE TO PASS ON HIS CLRNC FOR THE APCH TO THE TWR SINCE THERE WAS NO ANSWER FROM THE TWR AFTER SEVERAL CALLS. IT SEEMS THAT THE TWR OPERATOR WAS OUT OF THE CAB AND DID NOT HEAR THE CALLS. HE WAS RELIEVED OF DUTY AND PUT IN FURTHER TRAINING FOR A SHORT PERIOD. THE RPTR WAS SUSPENDED FROM DUTY FOR 1 WK WITHOUT PAY. HE ADMITS THAT HE SHOULD HAVE TRIED HARDER TO RECONTACT THE TWR, BUT HE WAS BUSY AS A SINGLE PLT IFR IN IMC HE DID NOT TAKE TIME TO DO SO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.