Narrative:

During the approach to runway 22R at ord approach control asked us to maintain 250 KTS to nolen and cleared us for the approach. Inside nolen ATC requested 210 KTS or better and contact tower at ridge. Then ATC requested we maintain 190 KTS or greater. Due to the greater than normal airspeed at ridge, I was concentrating on configuring the aircraft for landing. We forgot to switch to tower, and landed without clearance. Something I would like to see us do that they already do in canada is for approach control to hand you off to tower when he is finished with you. In this situation we were given 3 airspeed changes after we were told to change frequencys. I think this contributed to us forgetting to switch. Also, I would like to see the tower only issue landing clearance when #1 for the runway, not '#4 cleared to land.' supplemental information from acn 354813: the aircraft must be handled in a specific way in order to maintain the GS and be stabilized and configured correctly. Because of this, my attention was distraction from my PNF duties, and I was too engrossed in monitoring the captain. We proceeded on the approach. Ridge came and passed, and we did not contact the tower. Our carrier has a standard callout at 1000 ft AGL: PNF '1000 ft, instruments are crosschecked.' PF: 'runway xx, cleared to land.' this callout occurred inside of ridge, and the captain falsely confirmed with his statement 'runway 22R cleared to land' that we were cleared to land on runway 22R. We hadn't even switched to tower so obviously we weren't cleared to land. Both of us missed this false callout. I forgot my PNF duties at ridge to call tower and the captain missed his PF duty of confirming that we had been cleared to land. We landed without a clearance and pulled off of runway 22R, short of runway 27R at taxiway C. At this point I found it strange that we hadn't been given more instructions by tower. This is when I realized we weren't on tower frequency. I immediately tried to contact tower on north complex frequency 126.9 -- no answer. Then on south complex frequency 120.75 he said go to 127.92. When we finally made contact, the tower said 'cleared to land on runway 22R, cross runway 27R, make a right turn on taxiway B, contact ground when clear of runway 27R.' this was an apparent 'we'll let you go this time' by tower. He had cleared us to land on runway 22R when we were already on the ground short of runway 27R. The next problem occurred when we made a right turn on taxiway B and ground was never contacted and we continued to taxi via taxiway B to our gate. I had been too busy with my PNF duties after landing -- contacting ramp control and reconfiguring the aircraft. But most of all, I was very disturbed by the landing without a clearance. It seems so was the captain because not for another approximately 30 seconds did we finally go to ground control. When I checked in with ground, he was curious why we hadn't checked in earlier, as we were supposed to have held short of a taxiway for a B727 to pass. He then cleared us to the gate. Contributing factors: both the captain and I were on our first trip for a while. I was coming off of 5 weeks off with a broken ankle, and the captain 2 1/2 weeks from vacation. We both were a little rusty. We shouldn't have accepted the 3 speeds from approach -- should have slowed up much earlier. We let approach control fly our airplane and we got behind the aircraft. As far as the taxi-in incident, both the captain and I were so frazzled and disturbed because of our previous mistake that it affected our duties at hand. I take my job very seriously as most pilots do, and the landing without a clearance really bothered me. I had never done anything like this before. I realize in retrospect that if something like this happens, it is very important to 'break' the chain of events and continue to operate the aircraft safely. Worry about the deviation at the gate, not when your full undivided attention is needed when operating an aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 FLC PERFORMS AN UNAUTH LNDG AT ORD. CLRNC LNDG NOT RECEIVED. ONCE ON TWR FREQ CLRING RWY THEY FAIL TO CONTACT GND CTL AT REQUIRED HOLDING POINT. 2 CASES OF NON ADHERENCE TO ATC CLRNC INSTRUCTION.

Narrative: DURING THE APCH TO RWY 22R AT ORD APCH CTL ASKED US TO MAINTAIN 250 KTS TO NOLEN AND CLRED US FOR THE APCH. INSIDE NOLEN ATC REQUESTED 210 KTS OR BETTER AND CONTACT TWR AT RIDGE. THEN ATC REQUESTED WE MAINTAIN 190 KTS OR GREATER. DUE TO THE GREATER THAN NORMAL AIRSPD AT RIDGE, I WAS CONCENTRATING ON CONFIGURING THE ACFT FOR LNDG. WE FORGOT TO SWITCH TO TWR, AND LANDED WITHOUT CLRNC. SOMETHING I WOULD LIKE TO SEE US DO THAT THEY ALREADY DO IN CANADA IS FOR APCH CTL TO HAND YOU OFF TO TWR WHEN HE IS FINISHED WITH YOU. IN THIS SIT WE WERE GIVEN 3 AIRSPD CHANGES AFTER WE WERE TOLD TO CHANGE FREQS. I THINK THIS CONTRIBUTED TO US FORGETTING TO SWITCH. ALSO, I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE TWR ONLY ISSUE LNDG CLRNC WHEN #1 FOR THE RWY, NOT '#4 CLRED TO LAND.' SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 354813: THE ACFT MUST BE HANDLED IN A SPECIFIC WAY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE GS AND BE STABILIZED AND CONFIGURED CORRECTLY. BECAUSE OF THIS, MY ATTN WAS DISTR FROM MY PNF DUTIES, AND I WAS TOO ENGROSSED IN MONITORING THE CAPT. WE PROCEEDED ON THE APCH. RIDGE CAME AND PASSED, AND WE DID NOT CONTACT THE TWR. OUR CARRIER HAS A STANDARD CALLOUT AT 1000 FT AGL: PNF '1000 FT, INSTS ARE XCHKED.' PF: 'RWY XX, CLRED TO LAND.' THIS CALLOUT OCCURRED INSIDE OF RIDGE, AND THE CAPT FALSELY CONFIRMED WITH HIS STATEMENT 'RWY 22R CLRED TO LAND' THAT WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 22R. WE HADN'T EVEN SWITCHED TO TWR SO OBVIOUSLY WE WEREN'T CLRED TO LAND. BOTH OF US MISSED THIS FALSE CALLOUT. I FORGOT MY PNF DUTIES AT RIDGE TO CALL TWR AND THE CAPT MISSED HIS PF DUTY OF CONFIRMING THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND. WE LANDED WITHOUT A CLRNC AND PULLED OFF OF RWY 22R, SHORT OF RWY 27R AT TXWY C. AT THIS POINT I FOUND IT STRANGE THAT WE HADN'T BEEN GIVEN MORE INSTRUCTIONS BY TWR. THIS IS WHEN I REALIZED WE WEREN'T ON TWR FREQ. I IMMEDIATELY TRIED TO CONTACT TWR ON N COMPLEX FREQ 126.9 -- NO ANSWER. THEN ON S COMPLEX FREQ 120.75 HE SAID GO TO 127.92. WHEN WE FINALLY MADE CONTACT, THE TWR SAID 'CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 22R, CROSS RWY 27R, MAKE A R TURN ON TXWY B, CONTACT GND WHEN CLR OF RWY 27R.' THIS WAS AN APPARENT 'WE'LL LET YOU GO THIS TIME' BY TWR. HE HAD CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 22R WHEN WE WERE ALREADY ON THE GND SHORT OF RWY 27R. THE NEXT PROB OCCURRED WHEN WE MADE A R TURN ON TXWY B AND GND WAS NEVER CONTACTED AND WE CONTINUED TO TAXI VIA TXWY B TO OUR GATE. I HAD BEEN TOO BUSY WITH MY PNF DUTIES AFTER LNDG -- CONTACTING RAMP CTL AND RECONFIGURING THE ACFT. BUT MOST OF ALL, I WAS VERY DISTURBED BY THE LNDG WITHOUT A CLRNC. IT SEEMS SO WAS THE CAPT BECAUSE NOT FOR ANOTHER APPROX 30 SECONDS DID WE FINALLY GO TO GND CTL. WHEN I CHKED IN WITH GND, HE WAS CURIOUS WHY WE HADN'T CHKED IN EARLIER, AS WE WERE SUPPOSED TO HAVE HELD SHORT OF A TXWY FOR A B727 TO PASS. HE THEN CLRED US TO THE GATE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: BOTH THE CAPT AND I WERE ON OUR FIRST TRIP FOR A WHILE. I WAS COMING OFF OF 5 WKS OFF WITH A BROKEN ANKLE, AND THE CAPT 2 1/2 WKS FROM VACATION. WE BOTH WERE A LITTLE RUSTY. WE SHOULDN'T HAVE ACCEPTED THE 3 SPDS FROM APCH -- SHOULD HAVE SLOWED UP MUCH EARLIER. WE LET APCH CTL FLY OUR AIRPLANE AND WE GOT BEHIND THE ACFT. AS FAR AS THE TAXI-IN INCIDENT, BOTH THE CAPT AND I WERE SO FRAZZLED AND DISTURBED BECAUSE OF OUR PREVIOUS MISTAKE THAT IT AFFECTED OUR DUTIES AT HAND. I TAKE MY JOB VERY SERIOUSLY AS MOST PLTS DO, AND THE LNDG WITHOUT A CLRNC REALLY BOTHERED ME. I HAD NEVER DONE ANYTHING LIKE THIS BEFORE. I REALIZE IN RETROSPECT THAT IF SOMETHING LIKE THIS HAPPENS, IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO 'BREAK' THE CHAIN OF EVENTS AND CONTINUE TO OPERATE THE ACFT SAFELY. WORRY ABOUT THE DEV AT THE GATE, NOT WHEN YOUR FULL UNDIVIDED ATTN IS NEEDED WHEN OPERATING AN ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.