Narrative:

On dec tue 1996, I was receiving training at the radar position at sector 2 at hnl cerap. I am an fpl xfer to ZHN, with 12 yrs of previous ATC experience in both center and terminal options. My instructor and I had been on position for about one and one half hours prior to this occurrence. Sector 2 is an arrival and departure sector, feeding hnl approach on the west and maui approach on the east. This is the third busiest traffic corridor in the nation, behind washington, dc-new york, and one other that I don't remember, probably san francisco-los angeles. Traffic in this sector comes and goes in flurries, and we were on the down side of a flurry at the time this incident occurred. The WX throughout the sector was excellent. The aircraft involved were atx X, a C402 operating VFR from mue to hnl, and air carrier Y, a scheduled DH8 flight from hnl to lny. I received a handoff on atx X from sector 5 to my east, with the aircraft level at 8500 ft, receiving VFR advisory service only. That aircraft proceeded wbound toward hnl through my sector. Several times I called traffic to atx X -- in one case, a DC9 on the camps 1 arrival to maui that leveled at 9000 ft rather than continue descent through 8500 ft without visual contact with the C402. When atx X was about over lny, I received a handoff from hnl approach on air carrier Y. Air carrier Y checked on my frequency level at 7000 ft. I observed at that time that the 2 aircraft were potentially traffic for each other. When the 2 aircraft were about 15 NM apart, at each other's 12 O'clock position, atx X announced he was beginning his descent to hnl. Ground speed was 170 KTS, and the DH8's was 220 KTS, for a 390 KT rate of closure. I advised atx X of his traffic, telling him that I was calling it well out of visual range due to the potential conflict. He rogered and continued to descend. At about 10 mi, with atx X leaving 8000 ft, I called traffic to both aircraft again. They both advised 'looking.' at about 8 mi, with atx X leaving 7800 ft I again repeated the traffic call to both aircraft. At 4 mi, I made the same call, with atx X now leaving 7200 ft. Air carrier Y advised he had the other aircraft on TCASII. At about 1 mi, with both aircraft showing 7000 ft, I (in a somewhat frantic tone) again issued traffic information. As the targets merged, both showing 7000 ft, air carrier Y advised he was in a TCASII climb. Atx X advised he saw the DH8 going over him. I replied he had made a TCASII climb to avoid a collision. With the event over, air carrier Y returned to 7000 ft from 7500 ft where he had ended up, and atx X continued on his way. I cannot for the life of me understand what the pilot of atx X was thinking about this day. Did he think I was going to provide separation? I shouldn't think so, as that aircraft and several other company aircraft use our radar advisory services frequently, and should know what it is, and what it isn't. Were I the pilot of atx X, I would have continued my descent only to 7500 ft after I got the first traffic call, and no further until I had the opposing aircraft in sight. If I was nearing 7000 ft, and still didn't see the other aircraft (less than a min away), I would alter course to assure some kind of separation. I, as controller, could have suggested that he maintain 7500 ft, but I didn't. I assumed commonsense on the part of the pilot. This was apparently a mistake. Next time, I'll certainly make sure I clear the DH8 as follows: 'air carrier Y, cleared to maneuver as required to avoid the ding- dong in the twin cessna, 12 O'clock, 4 mi, opposite direction, zeroed in on your nose....' I wonder about the so-called free flight system. The pilots want the traffic information so they can separate themselves, yet when provided the information, they persist in trying to prang each other.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ARTCC RADAR CTLR GETTING TRAINING ON THE SECTOR GAVE A VFR ATX C402 TA'S ON AN ACR DH8 THAT WAS HEAD ON AND BELOW HIM. THE ATX ADVISED HE WAS STARTING HIS DSCNT AND THE CTLR GAVE BOTH ACFT SEVERAL ADVISORIES ON THEIR POS WITH RESPECT TO EACH OTHER. THE ACR DH8 HAD TO RESPOND TO HIS TCASII RA TO MISS THE ATX C402 AND THE CTLR OBSERVED THEIR TARGETS MERGE. ATX DID NOT SEE THE ACR UNTIL HE PASSED OVERHEAD.

Narrative: ON DEC TUE 1996, I WAS RECEIVING TRAINING AT THE RADAR POS AT SECTOR 2 AT HNL CERAP. I AM AN FPL XFER TO ZHN, WITH 12 YRS OF PREVIOUS ATC EXPERIENCE IN BOTH CTR AND TERMINAL OPTIONS. MY INSTRUCTOR AND I HAD BEEN ON POS FOR ABOUT ONE AND ONE HALF HRS PRIOR TO THIS OCCURRENCE. SECTOR 2 IS AN ARR AND DEP SECTOR, FEEDING HNL APCH ON THE W AND MAUI APCH ON THE E. THIS IS THE THIRD BUSIEST TFC CORRIDOR IN THE NATION, BEHIND WASHINGTON, DC-NEW YORK, AND ONE OTHER THAT I DON'T REMEMBER, PROBABLY SAN FRANCISCO-LOS ANGELES. TFC IN THIS SECTOR COMES AND GOES IN FLURRIES, AND WE WERE ON THE DOWN SIDE OF A FLURRY AT THE TIME THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED. THE WX THROUGHOUT THE SECTOR WAS EXCELLENT. THE ACFT INVOLVED WERE ATX X, A C402 OPERATING VFR FROM MUE TO HNL, AND ACR Y, A SCHEDULED DH8 FLT FROM HNL TO LNY. I RECEIVED A HDOF ON ATX X FROM SECTOR 5 TO MY E, WITH THE ACFT LEVEL AT 8500 FT, RECEIVING VFR ADVISORY SVC ONLY. THAT ACFT PROCEEDED WBOUND TOWARD HNL THROUGH MY SECTOR. SEVERAL TIMES I CALLED TFC TO ATX X -- IN ONE CASE, A DC9 ON THE CAMPS 1 ARR TO MAUI THAT LEVELED AT 9000 FT RATHER THAN CONTINUE DSCNT THROUGH 8500 FT WITHOUT VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE C402. WHEN ATX X WAS ABOUT OVER LNY, I RECEIVED A HDOF FROM HNL APCH ON ACR Y. ACR Y CHKED ON MY FREQ LEVEL AT 7000 FT. I OBSERVED AT THAT TIME THAT THE 2 ACFT WERE POTENTIALLY TFC FOR EACH OTHER. WHEN THE 2 ACFT WERE ABOUT 15 NM APART, AT EACH OTHER'S 12 O'CLOCK POS, ATX X ANNOUNCED HE WAS BEGINNING HIS DSCNT TO HNL. GND SPD WAS 170 KTS, AND THE DH8'S WAS 220 KTS, FOR A 390 KT RATE OF CLOSURE. I ADVISED ATX X OF HIS TFC, TELLING HIM THAT I WAS CALLING IT WELL OUT OF VISUAL RANGE DUE TO THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT. HE ROGERED AND CONTINUED TO DSND. AT ABOUT 10 MI, WITH ATX X LEAVING 8000 FT, I CALLED TFC TO BOTH ACFT AGAIN. THEY BOTH ADVISED 'LOOKING.' AT ABOUT 8 MI, WITH ATX X LEAVING 7800 FT I AGAIN REPEATED THE TFC CALL TO BOTH ACFT. AT 4 MI, I MADE THE SAME CALL, WITH ATX X NOW LEAVING 7200 FT. ACR Y ADVISED HE HAD THE OTHER ACFT ON TCASII. AT ABOUT 1 MI, WITH BOTH ACFT SHOWING 7000 FT, I (IN A SOMEWHAT FRANTIC TONE) AGAIN ISSUED TFC INFO. AS THE TARGETS MERGED, BOTH SHOWING 7000 FT, ACR Y ADVISED HE WAS IN A TCASII CLB. ATX X ADVISED HE SAW THE DH8 GOING OVER HIM. I REPLIED HE HAD MADE A TCASII CLB TO AVOID A COLLISION. WITH THE EVENT OVER, ACR Y RETURNED TO 7000 FT FROM 7500 FT WHERE HE HAD ENDED UP, AND ATX X CONTINUED ON HIS WAY. I CANNOT FOR THE LIFE OF ME UNDERSTAND WHAT THE PLT OF ATX X WAS THINKING ABOUT THIS DAY. DID HE THINK I WAS GOING TO PROVIDE SEPARATION? I SHOULDN'T THINK SO, AS THAT ACFT AND SEVERAL OTHER COMPANY ACFT USE OUR RADAR ADVISORY SERVICES FREQUENTLY, AND SHOULD KNOW WHAT IT IS, AND WHAT IT ISN'T. WERE I THE PLT OF ATX X, I WOULD HAVE CONTINUED MY DSCNT ONLY TO 7500 FT AFTER I GOT THE FIRST TFC CALL, AND NO FURTHER UNTIL I HAD THE OPPOSING ACFT IN SIGHT. IF I WAS NEARING 7000 FT, AND STILL DIDN'T SEE THE OTHER ACFT (LESS THAN A MIN AWAY), I WOULD ALTER COURSE TO ASSURE SOME KIND OF SEPARATION. I, AS CTLR, COULD HAVE SUGGESTED THAT HE MAINTAIN 7500 FT, BUT I DIDN'T. I ASSUMED COMMONSENSE ON THE PART OF THE PLT. THIS WAS APPARENTLY A MISTAKE. NEXT TIME, I'LL CERTAINLY MAKE SURE I CLR THE DH8 AS FOLLOWS: 'ACR Y, CLRED TO MANEUVER AS REQUIRED TO AVOID THE DING- DONG IN THE TWIN CESSNA, 12 O'CLOCK, 4 MI, OPPOSITE DIRECTION, ZEROED IN ON YOUR NOSE....' I WONDER ABOUT THE SO-CALLED FREE FLT SYS. THE PLTS WANT THE TFC INFO SO THEY CAN SEPARATE THEMSELVES, YET WHEN PROVIDED THE INFO, THEY PERSIST IN TRYING TO PRANG EACH OTHER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.