Narrative:

I was riding as a passenger on one of my airline's BE1900's. I was sitting in row X behind the right wing. During the landing at XXX the flaps were set to landing. During the landing flare the flaps retracted uncommanded to the approach setting. On the taxi to the ramp, I noticed the flaps were cycled several times before they would retract fully. This particular aircraft had the same problem a week earlier and was sent to maintenance. It returned and after 1 full day of flying, the problem seemed to have returned, only the time before the flaps were stuck in the landing position, not intermittent as they appeared to be now. A flaps up landing was made at YYY with only myself and the flight crew on board. The next morning I was on the schedule to fly. Upon arriving, I performed my preflight inspection and out of curiosity, cycled the flaps. They deployed and retracted normally and after checking the logbook, saw that they had not been written up by the previous crew. I reported to the captain what I had observed the night before, and that the flaps functioned normally for me on the preflight. The captain got on the phone with maintenance, and I continued with my preflight duties. The captain and I did not discuss MEL'ing the flaps. Meanwhile at the ticket counter, the sole passenger was concerned about getting to AAA. During the taxi checklist, it was decided by the captain not to use the flaps for fear they may get stuck in the takeoff position. At the time I did not question that the flaps were not MEL'ed. In fact, it did not even cross my mind. The flight proceeded towards ZZZ uneventfully until just passing southeast of BBB. At that time the master warning flasher went off. I looked up to the panel to see that the aft cabin door unsecure light had gone off. This door is 56 inches by 56 inches, and its checklist for an unsecure light calls for a descent and landing at the nearest suitable airport. I was the PNF, and saw it first, so I called the light to the captain's attention. The captain was the PF, and he began an immediate descent. I attempted to contact BBB approach. No response prompted me to callagain with a more insistent tone of voice. I attempted 2 more times, while the captain continued the descent and was in a turn towards BBB. By this time the captain was behaving very nervous and angry, flying the airplane with jerky control inputs. He then got on the radio and announced that we required priority handling for an immediate landing into BBB. They wanted to know if we were declaring an emergency, to which the captain replied, 'no, we had a red annunciator light go off and need to land at BBB.' no checklist was called for. From this point on, the captain flew the aircraft as well as communicating with ATC. Until we got onto base leg, I was a passenger. With the captain's excited state, I felt it would be better not to raise an issue about this. The airplane was under control, the WX was great with light winds. I was confident that the airplane was safe, and I did not want to make the captain more agitated. The passenger on board listening was also a factor, I did not want him to think the captain and I were arguing. Once on base leg, I resumed radio communications. We landed flaps up, taxied to our ramp and shut down the #1 engine. I remained on board guarding the brakes while the captain got out and jiggled the handle, which extinguished the light. In the cockpit, I was getting a VFR clearance to ZZZ from BBB clearance. The captain started up the #1, got in touch with ground and began to taxi. We got our squawk code and took off flaps up. We continued to ZZZ, landed and swapped aircraft. We then proceeded to AAA, and finished out the rest of the schedule. 3 days later, the chief pilot called to talk to the captain of that flight. He was out of town not to be reached. I was in the office, and was put on the phone. The chief pilot was wanting to know who authorized flaps up takeoffs and lndgs. I was taken by surprise by this because it was known by the company that the swap was made with no MEL of the flaps. It is also a common practice to swap an aircraft with inoperative items not MEL'ed. In fact not written up either. Normally the swaps are made with flight crew only. Thisis not to say we fly unairworthy aircraft, just that the legal paperwork is not always proper. The company management has a real bad attitude towards pilots who gripe an aircraft in the logbook, preferring instead to bring the plane to a maintenance base, and have them write it up. It turns out the FAA had been contacted by BBB controllers because of the 'priority handling' request. The FAA then contacted our maintenance man in ZZZ, wanting to know what happened. He told them about the red annunciator light, and they wanted to know why hadn't the cargo door handle been written up. He did not have a response for them. The mechanic got a hold of me. I told him what happened and what we did. He was satisfied that there was no actual gripe to be reproduced and felt as we did, it was 'just a light.' he said he would relay that to the FAA, and that he would adjust the light switch on the handle. The issue remains, however, that I ended up flying an aircraft with a malfunction, that was not written up, nor MEL'ed (the flaps). Factors affecting the incident: 1) insufficient ground school training. The ground school lasted an entire 5 days. 1 day on the company operations manual, 1 day on various items such as hazmat, icing operations, security, and 3 days on aircraft system. A written examination was given at the end on the aircraft system, but none on the FARS. While ultimately it is my responsibility to know the regulations, we in the ground school were left on our own to have knowledge of them, and how to integrate them into meaningful applications. 2) lack of a crew resource management policy by the company. 3) a captain who is a 'lone wolf' pilot, burned out on commuter flying with a lack of respect for the legal requirements of airworthy aircraft. We constantly have to worry about if what we do is legal. No one flies around in unsafe aircraft, there just is a very cavalier attitude of the company when it comes to compliance with far's. I have been asked by the company to pick up trips when they know that I will exceed the flight duty limitations, just to see if I catch it or not to help fix a scheduling problem brought on by lack of planning on their part. I feel very strongly also that if violated, I can expect absolutely no help or backup by the company. I have no faith in my company to protect me from prosecution by the FAA. Too, I have noticed how the pilots who do follow the regulations, write up aircraft and seek MEL's, turn down trips for flight-duty restrs, are held in contempt by the company and are harassed. After 6 months on the job I feel like a grizzled veteran dragged through the grinder.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B1900C HAVING PROBS WITH THE FLAPS. WOULD MOVE FROM LNDG TO 15 DEGS WITHOUT CTL INPUT. ACFT CHKED OK ON PREFLT AND RPTR ADVISED CAPT WHAT HE OBSERVED PREVIOUSLY. CHANGE OF ACFT WAS DECIDED AT MAINT BASE. ENRTE AFT DOOR WARNING LIGHT CAME ON AND A PRIORITY HANDLING WAS REQUESTED FOR LNDG BOS. MAINT REPAIRED AND FLT CONTINUED. NO MEL ENTRY WAS EVER MADE. RPTR VERY FRUSTRATED AT CAPT AND COMPANY FOR NOT COMPLYING WITH FAR.

Narrative: I WAS RIDING AS A PAX ON ONE OF MY AIRLINE'S BE1900'S. I WAS SITTING IN ROW X BEHIND THE R WING. DURING THE LNDG AT XXX THE FLAPS WERE SET TO LNDG. DURING THE LNDG FLARE THE FLAPS RETRACTED UNCOMMANDED TO THE APCH SETTING. ON THE TAXI TO THE RAMP, I NOTICED THE FLAPS WERE CYCLED SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE THEY WOULD RETRACT FULLY. THIS PARTICULAR ACFT HAD THE SAME PROB A WK EARLIER AND WAS SENT TO MAINT. IT RETURNED AND AFTER 1 FULL DAY OF FLYING, THE PROB SEEMED TO HAVE RETURNED, ONLY THE TIME BEFORE THE FLAPS WERE STUCK IN THE LNDG POS, NOT INTERMITTENT AS THEY APPEARED TO BE NOW. A FLAPS UP LNDG WAS MADE AT YYY WITH ONLY MYSELF AND THE FLC ON BOARD. THE NEXT MORNING I WAS ON THE SCHEDULE TO FLY. UPON ARRIVING, I PERFORMED MY PREFLT INSPECTION AND OUT OF CURIOSITY, CYCLED THE FLAPS. THEY DEPLOYED AND RETRACTED NORMALLY AND AFTER CHKING THE LOGBOOK, SAW THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN WRITTEN UP BY THE PREVIOUS CREW. I RPTED TO THE CAPT WHAT I HAD OBSERVED THE NIGHT BEFORE, AND THAT THE FLAPS FUNCTIONED NORMALLY FOR ME ON THE PREFLT. THE CAPT GOT ON THE PHONE WITH MAINT, AND I CONTINUED WITH MY PREFLT DUTIES. THE CAPT AND I DID NOT DISCUSS MEL'ING THE FLAPS. MEANWHILE AT THE TICKET COUNTER, THE SOLE PAX WAS CONCERNED ABOUT GETTING TO AAA. DURING THE TAXI CHKLIST, IT WAS DECIDED BY THE CAPT NOT TO USE THE FLAPS FOR FEAR THEY MAY GET STUCK IN THE TKOF POS. AT THE TIME I DID NOT QUESTION THAT THE FLAPS WERE NOT MEL'ED. IN FACT, IT DID NOT EVEN CROSS MY MIND. THE FLT PROCEEDED TOWARDS ZZZ UNEVENTFULLY UNTIL JUST PASSING SE OF BBB. AT THAT TIME THE MASTER WARNING FLASHER WENT OFF. I LOOKED UP TO THE PANEL TO SEE THAT THE AFT CABIN DOOR UNSECURE LIGHT HAD GONE OFF. THIS DOOR IS 56 INCHES BY 56 INCHES, AND ITS CHKLIST FOR AN UNSECURE LIGHT CALLS FOR A DSCNT AND LNDG AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. I WAS THE PNF, AND SAW IT FIRST, SO I CALLED THE LIGHT TO THE CAPT'S ATTN. THE CAPT WAS THE PF, AND HE BEGAN AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT. I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT BBB APCH. NO RESPONSE PROMPTED ME TO CALLAGAIN WITH A MORE INSISTENT TONE OF VOICE. I ATTEMPTED 2 MORE TIMES, WHILE THE CAPT CONTINUED THE DSCNT AND WAS IN A TURN TOWARDS BBB. BY THIS TIME THE CAPT WAS BEHAVING VERY NERVOUS AND ANGRY, FLYING THE AIRPLANE WITH JERKY CTL INPUTS. HE THEN GOT ON THE RADIO AND ANNOUNCED THAT WE REQUIRED PRIORITY HANDLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE LNDG INTO BBB. THEY WANTED TO KNOW IF WE WERE DECLARING AN EMER, TO WHICH THE CAPT REPLIED, 'NO, WE HAD A RED ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT GO OFF AND NEED TO LAND AT BBB.' NO CHKLIST WAS CALLED FOR. FROM THIS POINT ON, THE CAPT FLEW THE ACFT AS WELL AS COMMUNICATING WITH ATC. UNTIL WE GOT ONTO BASE LEG, I WAS A PAX. WITH THE CAPT'S EXCITED STATE, I FELT IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT TO RAISE AN ISSUE ABOUT THIS. THE AIRPLANE WAS UNDER CTL, THE WX WAS GREAT WITH LIGHT WINDS. I WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS SAFE, AND I DID NOT WANT TO MAKE THE CAPT MORE AGITATED. THE PAX ON BOARD LISTENING WAS ALSO A FACTOR, I DID NOT WANT HIM TO THINK THE CAPT AND I WERE ARGUING. ONCE ON BASE LEG, I RESUMED RADIO COMS. WE LANDED FLAPS UP, TAXIED TO OUR RAMP AND SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG. I REMAINED ON BOARD GUARDING THE BRAKES WHILE THE CAPT GOT OUT AND JIGGLED THE HANDLE, WHICH EXTINGUISHED THE LIGHT. IN THE COCKPIT, I WAS GETTING A VFR CLRNC TO ZZZ FROM BBB CLRNC. THE CAPT STARTED UP THE #1, GOT IN TOUCH WITH GND AND BEGAN TO TAXI. WE GOT OUR SQUAWK CODE AND TOOK OFF FLAPS UP. WE CONTINUED TO ZZZ, LANDED AND SWAPPED ACFT. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO AAA, AND FINISHED OUT THE REST OF THE SCHEDULE. 3 DAYS LATER, THE CHIEF PLT CALLED TO TALK TO THE CAPT OF THAT FLT. HE WAS OUT OF TOWN NOT TO BE REACHED. I WAS IN THE OFFICE, AND WAS PUT ON THE PHONE. THE CHIEF PLT WAS WANTING TO KNOW WHO AUTHORIZED FLAPS UP TKOFS AND LNDGS. I WAS TAKEN BY SURPRISE BY THIS BECAUSE IT WAS KNOWN BY THE COMPANY THAT THE SWAP WAS MADE WITH NO MEL OF THE FLAPS. IT IS ALSO A COMMON PRACTICE TO SWAP AN ACFT WITH INOP ITEMS NOT MEL'ED. IN FACT NOT WRITTEN UP EITHER. NORMALLY THE SWAPS ARE MADE WITH FLC ONLY. THISIS NOT TO SAY WE FLY UNAIRWORTHY ACFT, JUST THAT THE LEGAL PAPERWORK IS NOT ALWAYS PROPER. THE COMPANY MGMNT HAS A REAL BAD ATTITUDE TOWARDS PLTS WHO GRIPE AN ACFT IN THE LOGBOOK, PREFERRING INSTEAD TO BRING THE PLANE TO A MAINT BASE, AND HAVE THEM WRITE IT UP. IT TURNS OUT THE FAA HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY BBB CTLRS BECAUSE OF THE 'PRIORITY HANDLING' REQUEST. THE FAA THEN CONTACTED OUR MAINT MAN IN ZZZ, WANTING TO KNOW WHAT HAPPENED. HE TOLD THEM ABOUT THE RED ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT, AND THEY WANTED TO KNOW WHY HADN'T THE CARGO DOOR HANDLE BEEN WRITTEN UP. HE DID NOT HAVE A RESPONSE FOR THEM. THE MECH GOT A HOLD OF ME. I TOLD HIM WHAT HAPPENED AND WHAT WE DID. HE WAS SATISFIED THAT THERE WAS NO ACTUAL GRIPE TO BE REPRODUCED AND FELT AS WE DID, IT WAS 'JUST A LIGHT.' HE SAID HE WOULD RELAY THAT TO THE FAA, AND THAT HE WOULD ADJUST THE LIGHT SWITCH ON THE HANDLE. THE ISSUE REMAINS, HOWEVER, THAT I ENDED UP FLYING AN ACFT WITH A MALFUNCTION, THAT WAS NOT WRITTEN UP, NOR MEL'ED (THE FLAPS). FACTORS AFFECTING THE INCIDENT: 1) INSUFFICIENT GND SCHOOL TRAINING. THE GND SCHOOL LASTED AN ENTIRE 5 DAYS. 1 DAY ON THE COMPANY OPS MANUAL, 1 DAY ON VARIOUS ITEMS SUCH AS HAZMAT, ICING OPS, SECURITY, AND 3 DAYS ON ACFT SYS. A WRITTEN EXAM WAS GIVEN AT THE END ON THE ACFT SYS, BUT NONE ON THE FARS. WHILE ULTIMATELY IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO KNOW THE REGS, WE IN THE GND SCHOOL WERE LEFT ON OUR OWN TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THEM, AND HOW TO INTEGRATE THEM INTO MEANINGFUL APPLICATIONS. 2) LACK OF A CREW RESOURCE MGMNT POLICY BY THE COMPANY. 3) A CAPT WHO IS A 'LONE WOLF' PLT, BURNED OUT ON COMMUTER FLYING WITH A LACK OF RESPECT FOR THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF AIRWORTHY ACFT. WE CONSTANTLY HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT IF WHAT WE DO IS LEGAL. NO ONE FLIES AROUND IN UNSAFE ACFT, THERE JUST IS A VERY CAVALIER ATTITUDE OF THE COMPANY WHEN IT COMES TO COMPLIANCE WITH FAR'S. I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY THE COMPANY TO PICK UP TRIPS WHEN THEY KNOW THAT I WILL EXCEED THE FLT DUTY LIMITATIONS, JUST TO SEE IF I CATCH IT OR NOT TO HELP FIX A SCHEDULING PROB BROUGHT ON BY LACK OF PLANNING ON THEIR PART. I FEEL VERY STRONGLY ALSO THAT IF VIOLATED, I CAN EXPECT ABSOLUTELY NO HELP OR BACKUP BY THE COMPANY. I HAVE NO FAITH IN MY COMPANY TO PROTECT ME FROM PROSECUTION BY THE FAA. TOO, I HAVE NOTICED HOW THE PLTS WHO DO FOLLOW THE REGS, WRITE UP ACFT AND SEEK MEL'S, TURN DOWN TRIPS FOR FLT-DUTY RESTRS, ARE HELD IN CONTEMPT BY THE COMPANY AND ARE HARASSED. AFTER 6 MONTHS ON THE JOB I FEEL LIKE A GRIZZLED VETERAN DRAGGED THROUGH THE GRINDER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.