Narrative:

After landing at dts, called eglin AFB approach for a clearance to shv. Clearance was copied and read back as follows: 'ATC clears nabcd to shv direct cew V198 loxly bfm coordinates N3224 W0933.6 direct shv, climb and maintain 2000 ft, expect FL390 in 10 mins, contact approach on 120.9, squawk XXXX.' on taxi out, which followed immediately, the copilot questioned if we were to call from ground, at which time I told him to give eglin a call. His reply was, did they (eglin) say to call before takeoff? I answered no. He said then why do we want to call them? We were busy with the checklist, and the PNF being the chief pilot, I let him influence my decision and departed. Departure runway was runway 32, which put us climbing out toward eglin AFB. On climb out, visual contact was made with 2 military aircraft. Evasive action was taken, and contact was made with eglin AFB. We were vectored to heading of 180 degrees. I was questioned if told to contact eglin before takeoff. My answer was no. (I did not copy that as part of my clearance nor did I put it in my readback.) I should have had red flags, knowing that cew is north of eglin and dts being south of eglin. The clearance was a complete rerouting from what was filed. The complete transmission was a little unusual in that eglin AFB did not ask for a departing runway, or what number for takeoff, or how long before takeoff, or give a void time. It would seem safer to be given a heading to enter controled airspace in the clearance instead of direct cew. In reading clearance back the coordinates given were for emg which I did not recognize at the time and question it. That may have led to some of the confusion. This one time I think crew coordination was poor and led to the breakdown of procedures. Supplemental information from acn 356006: the problem arose due to confusion in the clearance. It was understood by the captain (PF) that the clearance he copied didn't include a void time or a contact prior to departure position before departing dts (an uncontrolled airport). This was a new captain on this aircraft and I deferred judgement in an effort to increase his confidence level. As a result of his not hearing the clearance and restrs correctly or as a result of ATC failure to include those in the clearance, we departed dts on course and after establishing contact with eglin approach, were given immediate instructions to level and turn south, away from the airfield at eglin. Evasive action was taken but a near miss didn't seem to be a factor as we cleared the F18 in the pattern as his base leg turn took him away from us. In the future, all doubts will be addressed prior to departure, regardless of the PF or captain's experience level.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POTENTIAL CONFLICT AS CORPORATE C560 PERFORMS AN ERRONEOUS UNCOORD PENETRATION OF RESTR MIL AIRSPACE. CLRNC INTERP READBACK HEARBACK PROB. TIME RESTR.

Narrative: AFTER LNDG AT DTS, CALLED EGLIN AFB APCH FOR A CLRNC TO SHV. CLRNC WAS COPIED AND READ BACK AS FOLLOWS: 'ATC CLRS NABCD TO SHV DIRECT CEW V198 LOXLY BFM COORDINATES N3224 W0933.6 DIRECT SHV, CLB AND MAINTAIN 2000 FT, EXPECT FL390 IN 10 MINS, CONTACT APCH ON 120.9, SQUAWK XXXX.' ON TAXI OUT, WHICH FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY, THE COPLT QUESTIONED IF WE WERE TO CALL FROM GND, AT WHICH TIME I TOLD HIM TO GIVE EGLIN A CALL. HIS REPLY WAS, DID THEY (EGLIN) SAY TO CALL BEFORE TKOF? I ANSWERED NO. HE SAID THEN WHY DO WE WANT TO CALL THEM? WE WERE BUSY WITH THE CHKLIST, AND THE PNF BEING THE CHIEF PLT, I LET HIM INFLUENCE MY DECISION AND DEPARTED. DEP RWY WAS RWY 32, WHICH PUT US CLBING OUT TOWARD EGLIN AFB. ON CLB OUT, VISUAL CONTACT WAS MADE WITH 2 MIL ACFT. EVASIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN, AND CONTACT WAS MADE WITH EGLIN AFB. WE WERE VECTORED TO HDG OF 180 DEGS. I WAS QUESTIONED IF TOLD TO CONTACT EGLIN BEFORE TKOF. MY ANSWER WAS NO. (I DID NOT COPY THAT AS PART OF MY CLRNC NOR DID I PUT IT IN MY READBACK.) I SHOULD HAVE HAD RED FLAGS, KNOWING THAT CEW IS N OF EGLIN AND DTS BEING S OF EGLIN. THE CLRNC WAS A COMPLETE REROUTING FROM WHAT WAS FILED. THE COMPLETE XMISSION WAS A LITTLE UNUSUAL IN THAT EGLIN AFB DID NOT ASK FOR A DEPARTING RWY, OR WHAT NUMBER FOR TKOF, OR HOW LONG BEFORE TKOF, OR GIVE A VOID TIME. IT WOULD SEEM SAFER TO BE GIVEN A HDG TO ENTER CTLED AIRSPACE IN THE CLRNC INSTEAD OF DIRECT CEW. IN READING CLRNC BACK THE COORDINATES GIVEN WERE FOR EMG WHICH I DID NOT RECOGNIZE AT THE TIME AND QUESTION IT. THAT MAY HAVE LED TO SOME OF THE CONFUSION. THIS ONE TIME I THINK CREW COORD WAS POOR AND LED TO THE BREAKDOWN OF PROCS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 356006: THE PROB AROSE DUE TO CONFUSION IN THE CLRNC. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD BY THE CAPT (PF) THAT THE CLRNC HE COPIED DIDN'T INCLUDE A VOID TIME OR A CONTACT PRIOR TO DEP POS BEFORE DEPARTING DTS (AN UNCTLED ARPT). THIS WAS A NEW CAPT ON THIS ACFT AND I DEFERRED JUDGEMENT IN AN EFFORT TO INCREASE HIS CONFIDENCE LEVEL. AS A RESULT OF HIS NOT HEARING THE CLRNC AND RESTRS CORRECTLY OR AS A RESULT OF ATC FAILURE TO INCLUDE THOSE IN THE CLRNC, WE DEPARTED DTS ON COURSE AND AFTER ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH EGLIN APCH, WERE GIVEN IMMEDIATE INSTRUCTIONS TO LEVEL AND TURN S, AWAY FROM THE AIRFIELD AT EGLIN. EVASIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN BUT A NEAR MISS DIDN'T SEEM TO BE A FACTOR AS WE CLRED THE F18 IN THE PATTERN AS HIS BASE LEG TURN TOOK HIM AWAY FROM US. IN THE FUTURE, ALL DOUBTS WILL BE ADDRESSED PRIOR TO DEP, REGARDLESS OF THE PF OR CAPT'S EXPERIENCE LEVEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.