Narrative:

Cleared for visual approach to runway 28 at mgm in cavu conditions. Idented airport (incorrectly) about 20 NM out. Approaching from north on a direct entry to a right base, turned final and descended on visual approach to mxf. I had the mgm runway 28 ILS tuned and noted a major GS discrepancy which I mentioned aloud to captain. Between 1000 ft and 500 ft AGL, captain and mgm tower about simultaneously questioned our position. Mgm tower issued go around vectors, from which we completed a visual to runway 28 at mgm. We did not actually land at mxf, probably 600 ft AGL minimum. Mitigating factors: 1) neither pilot had ever flown into mgm in daylight. At night mxf is usually dark and mgm easily seen, 2) mxf not shown on mgm ILS runway 28 commercial page, which was used to brief a visual with ILS backup. Mxf is shown on the mgm ILS 10 page!, 3) mgm VOR was OTS, so closest VOR was jyu, about 30 NM away. When ILS was tuned, and maybe even before, our non-IRS FMS went into dead reckoning and began to drift. The map was showing something roughly consistent with landing at mgm, which is PAR for a non-IRS ahrs equipped aircraft, and 4) similar runway alignment at mxf and mgm. Mistakes: 1) neither pilot checked runway heading after rolling out on final, 2) although the PNF tuned and idented the mgm ILS runway 28, neither pilot selected a raw data display to confirm our position. This would have prevented the incident. Lesson: if airports are close together, you can easily receive identify, localizer and GS information while landing at the wrong place, and 3) I briefed that mgm runway 28 would have a VASI on the right, but I saw a plasi on the left at mxf and I didn't get it even then! Recommend: 1) put mxf on mgm runway 28 approach page, and 2) add note to our airline's mgm description page warning about mxf. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter states that this was entirely the crew's fault. Mgm tower local controller apologized to the crew for not warning them of their error. The tower was 'heads down.' when the rptrs did not show up on final, the tower warned them of their error. Tower says, 'it happens all the time.' the reporter believes that a working mgm VOR or a VOR on the field would prevent this. The FMC in the ahrs equipped MD88 requires a VOR to keep it updated all of the time. The FMS will 'drift very rapidly' if it is not receiving any VOR signal. The nearest VOR was selma, out of range, and mgm was OTS. This was the first time into mgm by day for this reporter. A passenger called the FAA 'snitch line,' so the air carrier has given each pilot a 'permanent bad letter' in an attempt to prevent the FAA from taking enforcement action. The reporter has not heard from the FAA on this. The reporter believes that showing mxf on the mgm idlv approach, as it is on the imgm approach, might have helped.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MD88 MADE AN APCH TO MXF. THEIR DEST WAS MGM. TRACK DEV. FLT ASSIST.

Narrative: CLRED FOR VISUAL APCH TO RWY 28 AT MGM IN CAVU CONDITIONS. IDENTED ARPT (INCORRECTLY) ABOUT 20 NM OUT. APCHING FROM N ON A DIRECT ENTRY TO A R BASE, TURNED FINAL AND DSNDED ON VISUAL APCH TO MXF. I HAD THE MGM RWY 28 ILS TUNED AND NOTED A MAJOR GS DISCREPANCY WHICH I MENTIONED ALOUD TO CAPT. BTWN 1000 FT AND 500 FT AGL, CAPT AND MGM TWR ABOUT SIMULTANEOUSLY QUESTIONED OUR POS. MGM TWR ISSUED GAR VECTORS, FROM WHICH WE COMPLETED A VISUAL TO RWY 28 AT MGM. WE DID NOT ACTUALLY LAND AT MXF, PROBABLY 600 FT AGL MINIMUM. MITIGATING FACTORS: 1) NEITHER PLT HAD EVER FLOWN INTO MGM IN DAYLIGHT. AT NIGHT MXF IS USUALLY DARK AND MGM EASILY SEEN, 2) MXF NOT SHOWN ON MGM ILS RWY 28 COMMERCIAL PAGE, WHICH WAS USED TO BRIEF A VISUAL WITH ILS BACKUP. MXF IS SHOWN ON THE MGM ILS 10 PAGE!, 3) MGM VOR WAS OTS, SO CLOSEST VOR WAS JYU, ABOUT 30 NM AWAY. WHEN ILS WAS TUNED, AND MAYBE EVEN BEFORE, OUR NON-IRS FMS WENT INTO DEAD RECKONING AND BEGAN TO DRIFT. THE MAP WAS SHOWING SOMETHING ROUGHLY CONSISTENT WITH LNDG AT MGM, WHICH IS PAR FOR A NON-IRS AHRS EQUIPPED ACFT, AND 4) SIMILAR RWY ALIGNMENT AT MXF AND MGM. MISTAKES: 1) NEITHER PLT CHKED RWY HDG AFTER ROLLING OUT ON FINAL, 2) ALTHOUGH THE PNF TUNED AND IDENTED THE MGM ILS RWY 28, NEITHER PLT SELECTED A RAW DATA DISPLAY TO CONFIRM OUR POS. THIS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE INCIDENT. LESSON: IF ARPTS ARE CLOSE TOGETHER, YOU CAN EASILY RECEIVE IDENT, LOC AND GS INFO WHILE LNDG AT THE WRONG PLACE, AND 3) I BRIEFED THAT MGM RWY 28 WOULD HAVE A VASI ON THE R, BUT I SAW A PLASI ON THE L AT MXF AND I DIDN'T GET IT EVEN THEN! RECOMMEND: 1) PUT MXF ON MGM RWY 28 APCH PAGE, AND 2) ADD NOTE TO OUR AIRLINE'S MGM DESCRIPTION PAGE WARNING ABOUT MXF. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATES THAT THIS WAS ENTIRELY THE CREW'S FAULT. MGM TWR LCL CTLR APOLOGIZED TO THE CREW FOR NOT WARNING THEM OF THEIR ERROR. THE TWR WAS 'HEADS DOWN.' WHEN THE RPTRS DID NOT SHOW UP ON FINAL, THE TWR WARNED THEM OF THEIR ERROR. TWR SAYS, 'IT HAPPENS ALL THE TIME.' THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT A WORKING MGM VOR OR A VOR ON THE FIELD WOULD PREVENT THIS. THE FMC IN THE AHRS EQUIPPED MD88 REQUIRES A VOR TO KEEP IT UPDATED ALL OF THE TIME. THE FMS WILL 'DRIFT VERY RAPIDLY' IF IT IS NOT RECEIVING ANY VOR SIGNAL. THE NEAREST VOR WAS SELMA, OUT OF RANGE, AND MGM WAS OTS. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME INTO MGM BY DAY FOR THIS RPTR. A PAX CALLED THE FAA 'SNITCH LINE,' SO THE ACR HAS GIVEN EACH PLT A 'PERMANENT BAD LETTER' IN AN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE FAA FROM TAKING ENFORCEMENT ACTION. THE RPTR HAS NOT HEARD FROM THE FAA ON THIS. THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT SHOWING MXF ON THE MGM IDLV APCH, AS IT IS ON THE IMGM APCH, MIGHT HAVE HELPED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.