Narrative:

Shortly after brake release on takeoff roll, while advancing the power levers (aircraft was moving less than 60 KTS), a loud banging noise was heard accompanied by the left engine overtemp light and a high itt. Nonstandard phraseology in the cockpit delayed abort call and engine shutdown. There was no evidence of fire and the aircraft taxied to the gate without assistance. Engine shutdown checklist (emergency procedure) was read at the gate. Length of day and the 'last flight for remain overnight' were contributing. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: a hydromechanical fuel control unit seal had failed which caused excessive fuel flow into the engine during power advance. The first officer conveyed the first indication of a problem, but failed to respond appropriately and follow the captain's commands after the abort. The captain had to tell the first officer to call 'abort' to the tower 3 times and became distraction by this breakdown in communication. The first officer was new to the company (but not inexperienced), and seemed to have fallen prey to complacency prior to this incident. This regional airline captain feels that the excessive amount of legs, clearing customs, delays, aircraft swapping, and a destination change contributed to his first officer's failure to quickly recognize, communicate, and act on the problem. This reporter further states that the recent nprm for flight crew member flight time limitations and rest requirements does not address the amount of legs that a crew can be scheduled to fly, and he believes that this is a critical element of flight safety at the regional level.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN SF34 FLC ABORTED TKOF WHEN THEY RECEIVED INDICATIONS OF L ENG PROBS, BUT FAILED TO SECURE THE ENG UNTIL THEY WERE BACK AT THE DEP GATE. THE CAPT CITES COMPLACENCY AS THE CAUSE OF A COM BREAKDOWN RESULTING IN THE CREW'S DETOUR FROM TIMELY FOLLOWING OF PROCS.

Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER BRAKE RELEASE ON TKOF ROLL, WHILE ADVANCING THE PWR LEVERS (ACFT WAS MOVING LESS THAN 60 KTS), A LOUD BANGING NOISE WAS HEARD ACCOMPANIED BY THE L ENG OVERTEMP LIGHT AND A HIGH ITT. NONSTANDARD PHRASEOLOGY IN THE COCKPIT DELAYED ABORT CALL AND ENG SHUTDOWN. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF FIRE AND THE ACFT TAXIED TO THE GATE WITHOUT ASSISTANCE. ENG SHUTDOWN CHKLIST (EMER PROC) WAS READ AT THE GATE. LENGTH OF DAY AND THE 'LAST FLT FOR REMAIN OVERNIGHT' WERE CONTRIBUTING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: A HYDROMECHANICAL FUEL CTL UNIT SEAL HAD FAILED WHICH CAUSED EXCESSIVE FUEL FLOW INTO THE ENG DURING PWR ADVANCE. THE FO CONVEYED THE FIRST INDICATION OF A PROB, BUT FAILED TO RESPOND APPROPRIATELY AND FOLLOW THE CAPT'S COMMANDS AFTER THE ABORT. THE CAPT HAD TO TELL THE FO TO CALL 'ABORT' TO THE TWR 3 TIMES AND BECAME DISTR BY THIS BREAKDOWN IN COM. THE FO WAS NEW TO THE COMPANY (BUT NOT INEXPERIENCED), AND SEEMED TO HAVE FALLEN PREY TO COMPLACENCY PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT. THIS REGIONAL AIRLINE CAPT FEELS THAT THE EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF LEGS, CLRING CUSTOMS, DELAYS, ACFT SWAPPING, AND A DEST CHANGE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS FO'S FAILURE TO QUICKLY RECOGNIZE, COMMUNICATE, AND ACT ON THE PROB. THIS RPTR FURTHER STATES THAT THE RECENT NPRM FOR FLC MEMBER FLT TIME LIMITATIONS AND REST REQUIREMENTS DOES NOT ADDRESS THE AMOUNT OF LEGS THAT A CREW CAN BE SCHEDULED TO FLY, AND HE BELIEVES THAT THIS IS A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF FLT SAFETY AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.