Narrative:

It is XA30 am, jan 1997. I am sitting here working non radar procedures in what is supposed to be a radar approach control. When the question was asked, why is the radar down?, the answer given by the facility manager was that the radar would be out all day because contract workers hired by the FAA had to install new osha approved handrails around the radar antenna. He also explained that repairs to our cenrap equipment that is not yet in use would also be accomplished. I could not believe that controllers in our facility and in the facilities surrounding us were being forced to deal with the extra burden and added stress involved with this type of outage. Even more important than this was the pilots/users were forced to deal with the stress, increased cost of operations, and degradation of safety with this type of environment. All of this is due to poor judgement and a lack of forethought. Safety is by far the most important issue here. Should safety be put aside in favor of poor judgement? The answer to this is no! The contract workers should have been told that the job had to be done during the hours the facility is closed. The facility is closed for seven hours daily. The workers could have set up spotlights to light the work area at night. This would have allowed the work to be done and operations to continue normally. On the issue of the repairs to the cenrap equipment, there is no requirement for the radar to be down in order to facilitate the repairs. The ARTS/computer associated data is the only part of the equipment that needed to be released to airways facilities maintenance. The radar itself can continue to operate normally with little or no impact to safety or the flying public. This is not the first time this type of poor judgement has been exercised. There are numerous instances where airways facilities (a job specialty created solely to support air traffic) fails to repair outages in a timely manner. They do routine checks and maintenance during facility operating hours. This disrupts operations, burdens controllers and pilots, and affects safety. They should be finding ways to do as much of this work as possible during the hours the facility is closed. The entire airways facilities sector/staff has been put on administrative hours. This is great for them but, how does this support air traffic that works all hours? How does this provide the best service to the users? I'll answer this one too, it doesn't. Something should be done about this problem as soon as possible!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CTLR CLAIMS THAT RADAR SHUT DOWN WAS APPROVED BY FACILITY MGMNT TO INSTALL HANDRAILS AROUND ANTENNA. CTLR FEELS THAT ROUTINE MAINT AND OTHER WORK THAT IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO THE OP SHOULD BE SCHEDULED AFTER CLOSING HRS.

Narrative: IT IS XA30 AM, JAN 1997. I AM SITTING HERE WORKING NON RADAR PROCS IN WHAT IS SUPPOSED TO BE A RADAR APCH CTL. WHEN THE QUESTION WAS ASKED, WHY IS THE RADAR DOWN?, THE ANSWER GIVEN BY THE FACILITY MGR WAS THAT THE RADAR WOULD BE OUT ALL DAY BECAUSE CONTRACT WORKERS HIRED BY THE FAA HAD TO INSTALL NEW OSHA APPROVED HANDRAILS AROUND THE RADAR ANTENNA. HE ALSO EXPLAINED THAT REPAIRS TO OUR CENRAP EQUIP THAT IS NOT YET IN USE WOULD ALSO BE ACCOMPLISHED. I COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT CTLRS IN OUR FACILITY AND IN THE FACILITIES SURROUNDING US WERE BEING FORCED TO DEAL WITH THE EXTRA BURDEN AND ADDED STRESS INVOLVED WITH THIS TYPE OF OUTAGE. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN THIS WAS THE PLTS/USERS WERE FORCED TO DEAL WITH THE STRESS, INCREASED COST OF OPS, AND DEGRADATION OF SAFETY WITH THIS TYPE OF ENVIRONMENT. ALL OF THIS IS DUE TO POOR JUDGEMENT AND A LACK OF FORETHOUGHT. SAFETY IS BY FAR THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE HERE. SHOULD SAFETY BE PUT ASIDE IN FAVOR OF POOR JUDGEMENT? THE ANSWER TO THIS IS NO! THE CONTRACT WORKERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE JOB HAD TO BE DONE DURING THE HRS THE FACILITY IS CLOSED. THE FACILITY IS CLOSED FOR SEVEN HRS DAILY. THE WORKERS COULD HAVE SET UP SPOTLIGHTS TO LIGHT THE WORK AREA AT NIGHT. THIS WOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE WORK TO BE DONE AND OPS TO CONTINUE NORMALLY. ON THE ISSUE OF THE REPAIRS TO THE CENRAP EQUIP, THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR THE RADAR TO BE DOWN IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE REPAIRS. THE ARTS/COMPUTER ASSOCIATED DATA IS THE ONLY PART OF THE EQUIP THAT NEEDED TO BE RELEASED TO AIRWAYS FACILITIES MAINT. THE RADAR ITSELF CAN CONTINUE TO OPERATE NORMALLY WITH LITTLE OR NO IMPACT TO SAFETY OR THE FLYING PUBLIC. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THIS TYPE OF POOR JUDGEMENT HAS BEEN EXERCISED. THERE ARE NUMEROUS INSTANCES WHERE AIRWAYS FACILITIES (A JOB SPECIALTY CREATED SOLELY TO SUPPORT AIR TFC) FAILS TO REPAIR OUTAGES IN A TIMELY MANNER. THEY DO ROUTINE CHKS AND MAINT DURING FACILITY OPERATING HRS. THIS DISRUPTS OPS, BURDENS CTLRS AND PLTS, AND AFFECTS SAFETY. THEY SHOULD BE FINDING WAYS TO DO AS MUCH OF THIS WORK AS POSSIBLE DURING THE HRS THE FACILITY IS CLOSED. THE ENTIRE AIRWAYS FACILITIES SECTOR/STAFF HAS BEEN PUT ON ADMINISTRATIVE HRS. THIS IS GREAT FOR THEM BUT, HOW DOES THIS SUPPORT AIR TFC THAT WORKS ALL HRS? HOW DOES THIS PROVIDE THE BEST SVC TO THE USERS? I'LL ANSWER THIS ONE TOO, IT DOESN'T. SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT THIS PROB ASAP!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.