Narrative:

I was working local control. Traffic was a DC8 on 5 mi final to runway 9L at 210 KTS, an SF34 holding in position at the end of runway 9L and a VFR BE33 cleared for takeoff from intersection near approach end of runway. Ground control was being worked by a developmental whose only prior experience was in small VFR tower. He was recently certified on ground control. The ground controller apparently didn't scan the runway or the BRITE scope. He told me he needed to cross runway 9L at M3 intersection with a DC10. (The DC10 had crew only, no passenger.) I may have used the term 'ok' in response to him, but followed immediately with information that he'd have to hold short for now because of two on the runway and one on final at 210 KTS. As the BE33 was on departure roll, the ground controller asked if I had someone departing. When I answered yes, he said he was crossing the DC10. I keyed the microphone to try to abort the takeoff, but then I decided that it appeared the BE33's speed was too great for him to stop short of the DC10. I just hoped he would get airborne in time to miss the DC10, which he did. The DC10 pilot was foreign and mistakenly turned down the runway instead of simply crossing it. I got the SF34 off the runway, and the DC10 cleared it just in time for the DC8 to land. The intersection where the DC10 entered the runway was only 2100 ft from where the BE33 began his takeoff roll. The most glaring error here is the inexperienced ground controller's failure to follow the handbook and scan the runway prior to clearing someone onto it. Secondly, he must not cross it without hearing positive clearance from the local controller to cross it. If he ever hears a local controller say something as vague as 'ok,' he should never accept that as clearance to cross, even if the local controller means for him to. Next, I should have bluntly said 'hold short' instead of 'ok' (meaning 'I have your request'). Even though I followed up 'ok' with instructions to hold short, he didn't hear that, and instead acted on his misperception that 'ok' meant he was authority/authorized to cross. Finally, I feel these kind of incidents are going to become more common as long as the FAA continues to bring controllers with such limited backgrounds into level iv ATC facilities. The habit seems to be to then certify them on position with minimal training time and/or competence. The average level of competence at miami tower appears to many of us to be much less than what was considered acceptable prior to the strike of 1981.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GND CTLR COORDINATES TO CROSS AN ACTIVE RWY WITH A DC10. LCL CTLR RESPONDED 'OK' FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY BECAUSE OF TFC. THE GND CTLR DID NOT HEAR THE CLRNC TO HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY AND CROSSED THE DC10. LCL CTLR CLRED A BE33 FOR TKOF, RESULTING IN THE ACFT FLYING DIRECTLY OVER THE DC10.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING LCL CTL. TFC WAS A DC8 ON 5 MI FINAL TO RWY 9L AT 210 KTS, AN SF34 HOLDING IN POS AT THE END OF RWY 9L AND A VFR BE33 CLRED FOR TKOF FROM INTXN NEAR APCH END OF RWY. GND CTL WAS BEING WORKED BY A DEVELOPMENTAL WHOSE ONLY PRIOR EXPERIENCE WAS IN SMALL VFR TWR. HE WAS RECENTLY CERTIFIED ON GND CTL. THE GND CTLR APPARENTLY DIDN'T SCAN THE RWY OR THE BRITE SCOPE. HE TOLD ME HE NEEDED TO CROSS RWY 9L AT M3 INTXN WITH A DC10. (THE DC10 HAD CREW ONLY, NO PAX.) I MAY HAVE USED THE TERM 'OK' IN RESPONSE TO HIM, BUT FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY WITH INFO THAT HE'D HAVE TO HOLD SHORT FOR NOW BECAUSE OF TWO ON THE RWY AND ONE ON FINAL AT 210 KTS. AS THE BE33 WAS ON DEP ROLL, THE GND CTLR ASKED IF I HAD SOMEONE DEPARTING. WHEN I ANSWERED YES, HE SAID HE WAS XING THE DC10. I KEYED THE MIKE TO TRY TO ABORT THE TKOF, BUT THEN I DECIDED THAT IT APPEARED THE BE33'S SPD WAS TOO GREAT FOR HIM TO STOP SHORT OF THE DC10. I JUST HOPED HE WOULD GET AIRBORNE IN TIME TO MISS THE DC10, WHICH HE DID. THE DC10 PLT WAS FOREIGN AND MISTAKENLY TURNED DOWN THE RWY INSTEAD OF SIMPLY XING IT. I GOT THE SF34 OFF THE RWY, AND THE DC10 CLRED IT JUST IN TIME FOR THE DC8 TO LAND. THE INTXN WHERE THE DC10 ENTERED THE RWY WAS ONLY 2100 FT FROM WHERE THE BE33 BEGAN HIS TKOF ROLL. THE MOST GLARING ERROR HERE IS THE INEXPERIENCED GND CTLR'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE HANDBOOK AND SCAN THE RWY PRIOR TO CLRING SOMEONE ONTO IT. SECONDLY, HE MUST NOT CROSS IT WITHOUT HEARING POSITIVE CLRNC FROM THE LCL CTLR TO CROSS IT. IF HE EVER HEARS A LCL CTLR SAY SOMETHING AS VAGUE AS 'OK,' HE SHOULD NEVER ACCEPT THAT AS CLRNC TO CROSS, EVEN IF THE LCL CTLR MEANS FOR HIM TO. NEXT, I SHOULD HAVE BLUNTLY SAID 'HOLD SHORT' INSTEAD OF 'OK' (MEANING 'I HAVE YOUR REQUEST'). EVEN THOUGH I FOLLOWED UP 'OK' WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO HOLD SHORT, HE DIDN'T HEAR THAT, AND INSTEAD ACTED ON HIS MISPERCEPTION THAT 'OK' MEANT HE WAS AUTH TO CROSS. FINALLY, I FEEL THESE KIND OF INCIDENTS ARE GOING TO BECOME MORE COMMON AS LONG AS THE FAA CONTINUES TO BRING CTLRS WITH SUCH LIMITED BACKGROUNDS INTO LEVEL IV ATC FACILITIES. THE HABIT SEEMS TO BE TO THEN CERTIFY THEM ON POS WITH MINIMAL TRAINING TIME AND/OR COMPETENCE. THE AVERAGE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE AT MIAMI TWR APPEARS TO MANY OF US TO BE MUCH LESS THAN WHAT WAS CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE PRIOR TO THE STRIKE OF 1981.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.