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Facility was unable to restore power to the flight data #1 position after routine maintenance on uninterruptable power supply equipment. A defective circuit was isolated as the problem and an electrical cord was used as a temporary power source until the circuit could be replaced. Reporter claims that the defective circuit was not fixed until 5 days later.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 359178 |
| Time | |
| Date | 199701 |
| Day | Sun |
| Local Time Of Day | 0001 To 0600 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | atc facility : oak |
| State Reference | CA |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | government : faa |
| Function | controller : approach |
| Qualification | controller : radar pilot : instrument |
| Experience | controller radar : 6 controller supervisory : 2 flight time total : 2100 |
| ASRS Report | 359178 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | other anomaly other |
| Independent Detector | other controllera |
| Resolutory Action | none taken : unable |
| Consequence | Other |
| Supplementary | |
| Primary Problem | Navigational Facility |
| Air Traffic Incident | other |
| Situations | |
| ATC Facility | other physical facility |
Narrative:
On the late night shift of jan/sun/97 bay TRACON power was shut off to perform maintenance on the facility's uninterruptable power supply. Traffic was worked from ZOA during this time. When power was restored at bay TRACON, the flight data #1 position would not function properly when brought back on-line. This is not critical as the flight data #2 position was available and can handle all the flight plans into and out of bay approach airspace. An electronic card of some sort was required to replace the defective circuit at the flight data #1 position. The disturbing part of this event is that the necessary replacement part could not be obtained until jan/fri/97, a delay of 5 days. The flight data #1 position is typically open 16 hours a day requiring the flight data #2 position to double its workload when flight data #2 was crossed. If the flight data #2 position had failed during this period, flight plans would have been passed from ZOA to bay approach and vice versa via verbal communications. This would have resulted in significant delays for acrs and aircraft operators.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FACILITY WAS UNABLE TO RESTORE PWR TO THE FLT DATA #1 POS AFTER ROUTINE MAINT ON UNINTERRUPTABLE PWR SUPPLY EQUIP. A DEFECTIVE CIRCUIT WAS ISOLATED AS THE PROB AND AN ELECTRICAL CORD WAS USED AS A TEMPORARY PWR SOURCE UNTIL THE CIRCUIT COULD BE REPLACED. RPTR CLAIMS THAT THE DEFECTIVE CIRCUIT WAS NOT FIXED UNTIL 5 DAYS LATER.
Narrative: ON THE LATE NIGHT SHIFT OF JAN/SUN/97 BAY TRACON PWR WAS SHUT OFF TO PERFORM MAINT ON THE FACILITY'S UNINTERRUPTABLE PWR SUPPLY. TFC WAS WORKED FROM ZOA DURING THIS TIME. WHEN PWR WAS RESTORED AT BAY TRACON, THE FLT DATA #1 POS WOULD NOT FUNCTION PROPERLY WHEN BROUGHT BACK ON-LINE. THIS IS NOT CRITICAL AS THE FLT DATA #2 POS WAS AVAILABLE AND CAN HANDLE ALL THE FLT PLANS INTO AND OUT OF BAY APCH AIRSPACE. AN ELECTRONIC CARD OF SOME SORT WAS REQUIRED TO REPLACE THE DEFECTIVE CIRCUIT AT THE FLT DATA #1 POS. THE DISTURBING PART OF THIS EVENT IS THAT THE NECESSARY REPLACEMENT PART COULD NOT BE OBTAINED UNTIL JAN/FRI/97, A DELAY OF 5 DAYS. THE FLT DATA #1 POS IS TYPICALLY OPEN 16 HRS A DAY REQUIRING THE FLT DATA #2 POS TO DOUBLE ITS WORKLOAD WHEN FLT DATA #2 WAS CROSSED. IF THE FLT DATA #2 POS HAD FAILED DURING THIS PERIOD, FLT PLANS WOULD HAVE BEEN PASSED FROM ZOA TO BAY APCH AND VICE VERSA VIA VERBAL COMS. THIS WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT DELAYS FOR ACRS AND ACFT OPERATORS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.