Narrative:

The captain requested that I fly the first leg to ord, then we would alternate legs for the rest of the day. I proceeded to the aircraft at the gate and conducted the interior cockpit preflight. I reviewed the aircraft logbook upon my entry to the cockpit. Other than the right engine avm placarded inoperative in the MEL section, there were no open logbook discrepancies. The aircraft, an MD80, had arrived from seattle about 30 mins prior to my arrival on the plane. I copied stl ATIS information. I noted the temperature and dewpoint spread, also noting the 'rain and mist' with 300 ft of overcast with 2 1/2 mi of visibility. I calculated the performance data and noted the requirement for full takeoff thrust with engine anti-ice on due to temperature/dewpoint spread, precipitation, and overcast. The captain entered the cockpit and we discussed the current WX, runway, the need for a clear ice check from maintenance, the departure clearance and points of safety including engine and wing anti-ice as requirements. He indicated that there was only some light frost on the bottom of the wings with 1 or 2 frozen rivulets of melted ice. The captain and the chief pilot discussed the need for an ice check. The captain stated to the chief pilot that he had performed the outside preflight and had carefully inspected the wings noting that there was only a little frost and 1 or 2 frozen rivulets of melted ice. The chief pilot informed the captain that the precipitation was only rain. I heard the chief pilot say something to the captain that contained the words 'ice check' and understood the captain to concur with the chief pilot. Simultaneously, the ground mechanic once again started to call the captain on the interphone clearing us to pressurize hydraulics and indicated the aircraft was ready for pushback. Captain acknowledged this call from the mechanic. There was some more discussion of the actual allowable tolerances for the ice check. The chief pilot clearly stated that up to 1/8 inch of frost was allowable on the bottom of the wing. At this point, I believe the CRM training allowed the captain to slip momentarily into a subordinate role as opposed to that of command. The statements made by the chief pilot seemed to assure the captain that the WX and the condition of the wings did not warrant deicing. The captain seemed convinced that the wings were clean and the requirements for a satisfactory clear ice check were met. Up to this point I was in total agreement with the captain with the information presented that the aircraft did not require deicing. The chief pilot led us to believe that the WX would not warrant deicing. I was comfortable of the information, given that I had not performed the exterior preflight. I heard no statement from the mechanic that we needed deicing or that he had completed an ice check, although I overheard the captain ask him directly to inspect the wings on the interphone. The captain turned on the wing anti-ice system passing through 800 ft with visible moisture and a ram air temperature of approximately 4 degrees C. Flaps and slats were retracted on speed schedule. At approximately 3500 ft MSL, we felt rather strong, repeated engine and airframe shudders. The captain noted a right wing deice temperature high light. We suspected possible right engine compressor stalls or some sort of engine bleed air problem. The captain placed the right bleed switch to the hp bleed off position. I pulled the power back and the stalls and shuddering stopped. We continued to climb and evaluate the problem, although at a reduced power setting approximately 1.65 EPR. Both engine indications were very similar and well within normal limits. Once the power was reduced there were no additional abnormal indications or vibrations. The captain contacted ATC and inquired about the current WX in stl and ord. He advised ATC of our intentions to fly at 250 KTS. The captain decided that we should continue to our destination ord. Wing and engine anti-ice were secured as we climbed above the overcast and out of icing conditions. When we started our descent into the ord terminal area, we re-entered icing conditions and had to use anti-ice system. There was no recurrence of any problem. The approach was normal and we broke out at about 3300 ft MSL. When flaps 40 degrees were selected and the aircraft slowed to 160 KTS, the compressor stalls and shuddering started again. When I reduced power on the right engine, compressor stalls and shuddering ceased. The landing and rollout were uneventful. After exiting the runway, we taxied to the gate. Postflt inspection revealed damage to both engine compressor sections, requiring engine changes. There was a layer of approximately 1/4 inch of clear ice on the top of portions of the left wing. This ice could have formed any time during the flight. During the climb and descent we were in icing conditions. It was raining slowly but steadily at stl, therefore the layer of ice could have formed any time after the aircraft left the gate up until we cleared the icing conditions. I believe that the mechanic did in fact perform the clear ice check and reported a negative requirement to deice the aircraft wings. This satisfied the captain and was the final step in reaching the decision to take off. From the time the mechanic may have performed the clear ice check to takeoff was approximately 4-5 mins of time. The aircraft had arrived from a 3+ hour flight from seattle and landed with approximately 6000+ pounds of fuel in each of the wing tanks. The company MD80 flight handbook provides an alternate fueling procedure where supercooled fuel is xferred to the center tank and warmer fuel is pumped into the wing tanks. This was not done. Another solution may be to require an item on the after starting engines checklist to challenge the mechanic to inspect the wings and report their condition. Other airlines have heated wing blankets installed on their MD80 fleet. Perhaps an airworthiness directive requirement for all MD80's to have heated wing blankets or at very minimum ice detectors installed. The FAA certificated this model aircraft and knows fully about the potential wing clear ice problems. It is their negligence in certifying this model aircraft that ultimately bears scrutiny. We air crew have to deal with their oversight. Given the economics of the airline industry, this oversight may force some financially troubled airlines into bankruptcy. The alternative is far worse. An expensive retrofit or modification of procedures may prevent at very least, costly ice FOD damage to engines, and possibly prevent a fatal accident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD80 ACR FLC EXPERIENCES ICE DAMAGE TO BOTH ENGS WHEN THEY IGNORE CONDITIONS HIGHLY FAVORABLE TO THE FORMATION OF 'ICE 9' AND DO NOT PERFORM AN ICE CHK OF THE UPPER INBOARD WING SURFACES. THE FLC HAS A SERIES OF COMPRESSOR STALLS FROM THE R ENG AT 3500 FT ON CLBOUT, BUT THEY DECIDE TO CONTINUE THE FLT AT REDUCED SPD TO THEIR DEST.

Narrative: THE CAPT REQUESTED THAT I FLY THE FIRST LEG TO ORD, THEN WE WOULD ALTERNATE LEGS FOR THE REST OF THE DAY. I PROCEEDED TO THE ACFT AT THE GATE AND CONDUCTED THE INTERIOR COCKPIT PREFLT. I REVIEWED THE ACFT LOGBOOK UPON MY ENTRY TO THE COCKPIT. OTHER THAN THE R ENG AVM PLACARDED INOP IN THE MEL SECTION, THERE WERE NO OPEN LOGBOOK DISCREPANCIES. THE ACFT, AN MD80, HAD ARRIVED FROM SEATTLE ABOUT 30 MINS PRIOR TO MY ARR ON THE PLANE. I COPIED STL ATIS INFO. I NOTED THE TEMP AND DEWPOINT SPREAD, ALSO NOTING THE 'RAIN AND MIST' WITH 300 FT OF OVCST WITH 2 1/2 MI OF VISIBILITY. I CALCULATED THE PERFORMANCE DATA AND NOTED THE REQUIREMENT FOR FULL TKOF THRUST WITH ENG ANTI-ICE ON DUE TO TEMP/DEWPOINT SPREAD, PRECIP, AND OVCST. THE CAPT ENTERED THE COCKPIT AND WE DISCUSSED THE CURRENT WX, RWY, THE NEED FOR A CLR ICE CHK FROM MAINT, THE DEP CLRNC AND POINTS OF SAFETY INCLUDING ENG AND WING ANTI-ICE AS REQUIREMENTS. HE INDICATED THAT THERE WAS ONLY SOME LIGHT FROST ON THE BOTTOM OF THE WINGS WITH 1 OR 2 FROZEN RIVULETS OF MELTED ICE. THE CAPT AND THE CHIEF PLT DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR AN ICE CHK. THE CAPT STATED TO THE CHIEF PLT THAT HE HAD PERFORMED THE OUTSIDE PREFLT AND HAD CAREFULLY INSPECTED THE WINGS NOTING THAT THERE WAS ONLY A LITTLE FROST AND 1 OR 2 FROZEN RIVULETS OF MELTED ICE. THE CHIEF PLT INFORMED THE CAPT THAT THE PRECIP WAS ONLY RAIN. I HEARD THE CHIEF PLT SAY SOMETHING TO THE CAPT THAT CONTAINED THE WORDS 'ICE CHK' AND UNDERSTOOD THE CAPT TO CONCUR WITH THE CHIEF PLT. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE GND MECH ONCE AGAIN STARTED TO CALL THE CAPT ON THE INTERPHONE CLRING US TO PRESSURIZE HYDS AND INDICATED THE ACFT WAS READY FOR PUSHBACK. CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED THIS CALL FROM THE MECH. THERE WAS SOME MORE DISCUSSION OF THE ACTUAL ALLOWABLE TOLERANCES FOR THE ICE CHK. THE CHIEF PLT CLRLY STATED THAT UP TO 1/8 INCH OF FROST WAS ALLOWABLE ON THE BOTTOM OF THE WING. AT THIS POINT, I BELIEVE THE CRM TRAINING ALLOWED THE CAPT TO SLIP MOMENTARILY INTO A SUBORDINATE ROLE AS OPPOSED TO THAT OF COMMAND. THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE CHIEF PLT SEEMED TO ASSURE THE CAPT THAT THE WX AND THE CONDITION OF THE WINGS DID NOT WARRANT DEICING. THE CAPT SEEMED CONVINCED THAT THE WINGS WERE CLEAN AND THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A SATISFACTORY CLR ICE CHK WERE MET. UP TO THIS POINT I WAS IN TOTAL AGREEMENT WITH THE CAPT WITH THE INFO PRESENTED THAT THE ACFT DID NOT REQUIRE DEICING. THE CHIEF PLT LED US TO BELIEVE THAT THE WX WOULD NOT WARRANT DEICING. I WAS COMFORTABLE OF THE INFO, GIVEN THAT I HAD NOT PERFORMED THE EXTERIOR PREFLT. I HEARD NO STATEMENT FROM THE MECH THAT WE NEEDED DEICING OR THAT HE HAD COMPLETED AN ICE CHK, ALTHOUGH I OVERHEARD THE CAPT ASK HIM DIRECTLY TO INSPECT THE WINGS ON THE INTERPHONE. THE CAPT TURNED ON THE WING ANTI-ICE SYS PASSING THROUGH 800 FT WITH VISIBLE MOISTURE AND A RAM AIR TEMP OF APPROX 4 DEGS C. FLAPS AND SLATS WERE RETRACTED ON SPD SCHEDULE. AT APPROX 3500 FT MSL, WE FELT RATHER STRONG, REPEATED ENG AND AIRFRAME SHUDDERS. THE CAPT NOTED A R WING DEICE TEMP HIGH LIGHT. WE SUSPECTED POSSIBLE R ENG COMPRESSOR STALLS OR SOME SORT OF ENG BLEED AIR PROB. THE CAPT PLACED THE R BLEED SWITCH TO THE HP BLEED OFF POS. I PULLED THE PWR BACK AND THE STALLS AND SHUDDERING STOPPED. WE CONTINUED TO CLB AND EVALUATE THE PROB, ALTHOUGH AT A REDUCED PWR SETTING APPROX 1.65 EPR. BOTH ENG INDICATIONS WERE VERY SIMILAR AND WELL WITHIN NORMAL LIMITS. ONCE THE PWR WAS REDUCED THERE WERE NO ADDITIONAL ABNORMAL INDICATIONS OR VIBRATIONS. THE CAPT CONTACTED ATC AND INQUIRED ABOUT THE CURRENT WX IN STL AND ORD. HE ADVISED ATC OF OUR INTENTIONS TO FLY AT 250 KTS. THE CAPT DECIDED THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO OUR DEST ORD. WING AND ENG ANTI-ICE WERE SECURED AS WE CLBED ABOVE THE OVCST AND OUT OF ICING CONDITIONS. WHEN WE STARTED OUR DSCNT INTO THE ORD TERMINAL AREA, WE RE-ENTERED ICING CONDITIONS AND HAD TO USE ANTI-ICE SYS. THERE WAS NO RECURRENCE OF ANY PROB. THE APCH WAS NORMAL AND WE BROKE OUT AT ABOUT 3300 FT MSL. WHEN FLAPS 40 DEGS WERE SELECTED AND THE ACFT SLOWED TO 160 KTS, THE COMPRESSOR STALLS AND SHUDDERING STARTED AGAIN. WHEN I REDUCED PWR ON THE R ENG, COMPRESSOR STALLS AND SHUDDERING CEASED. THE LNDG AND ROLLOUT WERE UNEVENTFUL. AFTER EXITING THE RWY, WE TAXIED TO THE GATE. POSTFLT INSPECTION REVEALED DAMAGE TO BOTH ENG COMPRESSOR SECTIONS, REQUIRING ENG CHANGES. THERE WAS A LAYER OF APPROX 1/4 INCH OF CLR ICE ON THE TOP OF PORTIONS OF THE L WING. THIS ICE COULD HAVE FORMED ANY TIME DURING THE FLT. DURING THE CLB AND DSCNT WE WERE IN ICING CONDITIONS. IT WAS RAINING SLOWLY BUT STEADILY AT STL, THEREFORE THE LAYER OF ICE COULD HAVE FORMED ANY TIME AFTER THE ACFT LEFT THE GATE UP UNTIL WE CLRED THE ICING CONDITIONS. I BELIEVE THAT THE MECH DID IN FACT PERFORM THE CLR ICE CHK AND RPTED A NEGATIVE REQUIREMENT TO DEICE THE ACFT WINGS. THIS SATISFIED THE CAPT AND WAS THE FINAL STEP IN REACHING THE DECISION TO TAKE OFF. FROM THE TIME THE MECH MAY HAVE PERFORMED THE CLR ICE CHK TO TKOF WAS APPROX 4-5 MINS OF TIME. THE ACFT HAD ARRIVED FROM A 3+ HR FLT FROM SEATTLE AND LANDED WITH APPROX 6000+ LBS OF FUEL IN EACH OF THE WING TANKS. THE COMPANY MD80 FLT HANDBOOK PROVIDES AN ALTERNATE FUELING PROC WHERE SUPERCOOLED FUEL IS XFERRED TO THE CTR TANK AND WARMER FUEL IS PUMPED INTO THE WING TANKS. THIS WAS NOT DONE. ANOTHER SOLUTION MAY BE TO REQUIRE AN ITEM ON THE AFTER STARTING ENGS CHKLIST TO CHALLENGE THE MECH TO INSPECT THE WINGS AND RPT THEIR CONDITION. OTHER AIRLINES HAVE HEATED WING BLANKETS INSTALLED ON THEIR MD80 FLEET. PERHAPS AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE REQUIREMENT FOR ALL MD80'S TO HAVE HEATED WING BLANKETS OR AT VERY MINIMUM ICE DETECTORS INSTALLED. THE FAA CERTIFICATED THIS MODEL ACFT AND KNOWS FULLY ABOUT THE POTENTIAL WING CLR ICE PROBS. IT IS THEIR NEGLIGENCE IN CERTIFYING THIS MODEL ACFT THAT ULTIMATELY BEARS SCRUTINY. WE AIR CREW HAVE TO DEAL WITH THEIR OVERSIGHT. GIVEN THE ECONOMICS OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY, THIS OVERSIGHT MAY FORCE SOME FINANCIALLY TROUBLED AIRLINES INTO BANKRUPTCY. THE ALTERNATIVE IS FAR WORSE. AN EXPENSIVE RETROFIT OR MODIFICATION OF PROCS MAY PREVENT AT VERY LEAST, COSTLY ICE FOD DAMAGE TO ENGS, AND POSSIBLY PREVENT A FATAL ACCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.