Narrative:

On 3 occurrences I witnessed a supervisor lose horizontal separation (in trail) while working the jfk area final approach position. I was working the departure position, 2 radar scopes away. The first occurrence I noticed was that said supervisor had less than 6 mi with a BA41 following a B767 heavy jet. Second occurrence was when he had less than 5 mi with a B757 following a B767 heavy jet. The third occurrence was when he had less than 4 mi between a B767 and an EA30 heavy. Neither of these losses of separation were reported. This same supervisor requires that we strictly adhere to the minimum separation standards, which we do -- yet he is compelled to ignore his own errors. Supplemental information from acn 361142: on friday, a supervisor had at least 5 operrors while working the final radar position in the kennedy area of the ny TRACON. I was on duty during this time and witnessed these errors. On thursday, management personnel interrogated me as to my knowledge of these incidents. They asked me if I knew of these errors and whether I made entries on my key pack to measure distances between 2 certain aircraft. I denied any knowledge of operrors and denied making such entries on my key pack. I believe management harassed me and other controllers at my facility.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 2 TRACON RADAR CTLRS ALLEGE THAT A SUPVR CTLR WORKING THE JFK FINAL POS HAD FROM 3-5 LOSSES OF SEPARATION BTWN ACFT BEING VECTORED TO JFK. NONE OF THE ACFT EVER GOT LESS THAN 3 MI, BUT THEIR COMPLAINT WAS THAT HE WAS NOT APPLYING PROPER WAKE TURB SEPARATION OR SPACING OF A 'CLASSES' OF ACFT PER THE ATC PROC HANDBOOK. ONE RPTR, WHEN QUESTIONED BY MGMNT, DENIED SEEING THIS OCCUR AND SAYS HE WAS HARASSED BY MGMNT.

Narrative: ON 3 OCCURRENCES I WITNESSED A SUPVR LOSE HORIZ SEPARATION (IN TRAIL) WHILE WORKING THE JFK AREA FINAL APCH POS. I WAS WORKING THE DEP POS, 2 RADAR SCOPES AWAY. THE FIRST OCCURRENCE I NOTICED WAS THAT SAID SUPVR HAD LESS THAN 6 MI WITH A BA41 FOLLOWING A B767 HVY JET. SECOND OCCURRENCE WAS WHEN HE HAD LESS THAN 5 MI WITH A B757 FOLLOWING A B767 HVY JET. THE THIRD OCCURRENCE WAS WHEN HE HAD LESS THAN 4 MI BTWN A B767 AND AN EA30 HVY. NEITHER OF THESE LOSSES OF SEPARATION WERE RPTED. THIS SAME SUPVR REQUIRES THAT WE STRICTLY ADHERE TO THE MINIMUM SEPARATION STANDARDS, WHICH WE DO -- YET HE IS COMPELLED TO IGNORE HIS OWN ERRORS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 361142: ON FRIDAY, A SUPVR HAD AT LEAST 5 OPERRORS WHILE WORKING THE FINAL RADAR POS IN THE KENNEDY AREA OF THE NY TRACON. I WAS ON DUTY DURING THIS TIME AND WITNESSED THESE ERRORS. ON THURSDAY, MGMNT PERSONNEL INTERROGATED ME AS TO MY KNOWLEDGE OF THESE INCIDENTS. THEY ASKED ME IF I KNEW OF THESE ERRORS AND WHETHER I MADE ENTRIES ON MY KEY PACK TO MEASURE DISTANCES BTWN 2 CERTAIN ACFT. I DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF OPERRORS AND DENIED MAKING SUCH ENTRIES ON MY KEY PACK. I BELIEVE MGMNT HARASSED ME AND OTHER CTLRS AT MY FACILITY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.