Narrative:

I am a first officer on the saab 340. We were at ewr and were on our way to roc. There was an FAA observer doing a random line-check on our flight. He was seated in the jump seat of the saab. After doing all of our normal checklists and procedures we waited on the ramp to get taxi clearance from the very busy ground controller at ewr. When I was finally able to get a word in and ask for taxi, we were holding on the ramp short of taxiway rb. The instructions I heard were txwys a, south, short of taxiway B. I read back the clearance and wrote it down on my clipboard. The first officer always reads the taxi instructions in the saab because the captain has the tiller. The taxi proceeded normally with the taxi checklist and normal items. This was our usual route of taxi to runway 29, and nothing was unusual. As we approached the intersection of txwys a and south, the captain confirmed that he wanted us straight ahead on taxiway south, and not to continue on taxiway a. I looked at what I had written on my clipboard and said that taxiway south short of taxiway M is correct. Shortly after passing the intersection of taxiway south, the controller informed us he wanted us to stay on taxiway a and hold short of taxiway M. He wanted taxiway a short of taxiway M and we thought it was txwys a, south, short of taxiway M. The FAA jump seater proceeded to write down the time, due to the fact it appeared that we were just guilty of non adherence to a taxi clearance. No deviation by any other aircraft was involved. There were no other aircraft nearby, and no evasive or special actions taken. The controller was not affected by the mistake either. He instructed us to make the next left and rejoin our taxi. Had the FAA jump seater not been there it would not have been an issue. The tower made no report of it in the tower log. There are a lot of checks and balances to prevent something like this from happening and I'm not sure where the break-down was. When the original taxi instructions were given the frequency was extremely busy, with people stepping all over each other. But this is normal operation for ewr. When the instructions were given all 3 crew members were on headsets listening to the frequency. We all heard the instructions given, and the readback by myself given. I also wrote the instructions down at that point. I have not yet heard the tapes on this event, so I can not say if I heard and read back the right thing, and the controller thought he gave us something else. Or I heard what he said and read back something else. In which case either the controller, the captain, or the FAA jump seater should have heard the discrepancy. Or finally if I heard and read back exactly what he said and then wrote down the wrong thing. This is the most interesting possibility because it seems so unlikely. However, since what I wrote down was our normal taxi route, it is possible that I heard what I was used to hearing even though the controller gave us something different. But it is also possible that the controller did the same thing on his end. I also find it disturbing that the FAA observer who was briefed as a required crew member heard no discrepancy, and when challenged at the time we reached the intersection, said nothing otherwise. Usually someone in the jump seat has a good sense of what is going on because they are removed from the normal crew duties, and have that extra attention available. The only suggestion I can give is to make a greater effort to notate when a non standard clearance is issued. However, operating at ewr, it is not a matter of if this will happen, just when. The airport is overcrowded, the txwys are confusing, and the ground frequency is always swamped. I witness the similar events every day at ewr, it is inevitable with the way the system is set up there. Personally, I have started paying much closer attention to taxi clrncs that are different from what I am used to. No matter who was at fault here, there are limitations to human communication and only by not becoming complacent can we prevent things from happening. I challenge every taxi clearance that I am not sure of now. Although no one was affected by this event I realize the severity of what could happen if taxi instructions are not followed precisely.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN SF340 FLC FOR AN ACR TAXIES THE WRONG RTE, BUT NO CONFLICT.

Narrative: I AM A FO ON THE SAAB 340. WE WERE AT EWR AND WERE ON OUR WAY TO ROC. THERE WAS AN FAA OBSERVER DOING A RANDOM LINE-CHK ON OUR FLT. HE WAS SEATED IN THE JUMP SEAT OF THE SAAB. AFTER DOING ALL OF OUR NORMAL CHKLISTS AND PROCS WE WAITED ON THE RAMP TO GET TAXI CLRNC FROM THE VERY BUSY GND CTLR AT EWR. WHEN I WAS FINALLY ABLE TO GET A WORD IN AND ASK FOR TAXI, WE WERE HOLDING ON THE RAMP SHORT OF TXWY RB. THE INSTRUCTIONS I HEARD WERE TXWYS A, S, SHORT OF TXWY B. I READ BACK THE CLRNC AND WROTE IT DOWN ON MY CLIPBOARD. THE FO ALWAYS READS THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS IN THE SAAB BECAUSE THE CAPT HAS THE TILLER. THE TAXI PROCEEDED NORMALLY WITH THE TAXI CHKLIST AND NORMAL ITEMS. THIS WAS OUR USUAL RTE OF TAXI TO RWY 29, AND NOTHING WAS UNUSUAL. AS WE APCHED THE INTXN OF TXWYS A AND S, THE CAPT CONFIRMED THAT HE WANTED US STRAIGHT AHEAD ON TXWY S, AND NOT TO CONTINUE ON TXWY A. I LOOKED AT WHAT I HAD WRITTEN ON MY CLIPBOARD AND SAID THAT TXWY S SHORT OF TXWY M IS CORRECT. SHORTLY AFTER PASSING THE INTXN OF TXWY S, THE CTLR INFORMED US HE WANTED US TO STAY ON TXWY A AND HOLD SHORT OF TXWY M. HE WANTED TXWY A SHORT OF TXWY M AND WE THOUGHT IT WAS TXWYS A, S, SHORT OF TXWY M. THE FAA JUMP SEATER PROCEEDED TO WRITE DOWN THE TIME, DUE TO THE FACT IT APPEARED THAT WE WERE JUST GUILTY OF NON ADHERENCE TO A TAXI CLRNC. NO DEV BY ANY OTHER ACFT WAS INVOLVED. THERE WERE NO OTHER ACFT NEARBY, AND NO EVASIVE OR SPECIAL ACTIONS TAKEN. THE CTLR WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THE MISTAKE EITHER. HE INSTRUCTED US TO MAKE THE NEXT L AND REJOIN OUR TAXI. HAD THE FAA JUMP SEATER NOT BEEN THERE IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AN ISSUE. THE TWR MADE NO RPT OF IT IN THE TWR LOG. THERE ARE A LOT OF CHKS AND BALS TO PREVENT SOMETHING LIKE THIS FROM HAPPENING AND I'M NOT SURE WHERE THE BREAK-DOWN WAS. WHEN THE ORIGINAL TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN THE FREQ WAS EXTREMELY BUSY, WITH PEOPLE STEPPING ALL OVER EACH OTHER. BUT THIS IS NORMAL OP FOR EWR. WHEN THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS WERE ON HEADSETS LISTENING TO THE FREQ. WE ALL HEARD THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN, AND THE READBACK BY MYSELF GIVEN. I ALSO WROTE THE INSTRUCTIONS DOWN AT THAT POINT. I HAVE NOT YET HEARD THE TAPES ON THIS EVENT, SO I CAN NOT SAY IF I HEARD AND READ BACK THE RIGHT THING, AND THE CTLR THOUGHT HE GAVE US SOMETHING ELSE. OR I HEARD WHAT HE SAID AND READ BACK SOMETHING ELSE. IN WHICH CASE EITHER THE CTLR, THE CAPT, OR THE FAA JUMP SEATER SHOULD HAVE HEARD THE DISCREPANCY. OR FINALLY IF I HEARD AND READ BACK EXACTLY WHAT HE SAID AND THEN WROTE DOWN THE WRONG THING. THIS IS THE MOST INTERESTING POSSIBILITY BECAUSE IT SEEMS SO UNLIKELY. HOWEVER, SINCE WHAT I WROTE DOWN WAS OUR NORMAL TAXI RTE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT I HEARD WHAT I WAS USED TO HEARING EVEN THOUGH THE CTLR GAVE US SOMETHING DIFFERENT. BUT IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE CTLR DID THE SAME THING ON HIS END. I ALSO FIND IT DISTURBING THAT THE FAA OBSERVER WHO WAS BRIEFED AS A REQUIRED CREW MEMBER HEARD NO DISCREPANCY, AND WHEN CHALLENGED AT THE TIME WE REACHED THE INTXN, SAID NOTHING OTHERWISE. USUALLY SOMEONE IN THE JUMP SEAT HAS A GOOD SENSE OF WHAT IS GOING ON BECAUSE THEY ARE REMOVED FROM THE NORMAL CREW DUTIES, AND HAVE THAT EXTRA ATTN AVAILABLE. THE ONLY SUGGESTION I CAN GIVE IS TO MAKE A GREATER EFFORT TO NOTATE WHEN A NON STANDARD CLRNC IS ISSUED. HOWEVER, OPERATING AT EWR, IT IS NOT A MATTER OF IF THIS WILL HAPPEN, JUST WHEN. THE ARPT IS OVERCROWDED, THE TXWYS ARE CONFUSING, AND THE GND FREQ IS ALWAYS SWAMPED. I WITNESS THE SIMILAR EVENTS EVERY DAY AT EWR, IT IS INEVITABLE WITH THE WAY THE SYS IS SET UP THERE. PERSONALLY, I HAVE STARTED PAYING MUCH CLOSER ATTN TO TAXI CLRNCS THAT ARE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT I AM USED TO. NO MATTER WHO WAS AT FAULT HERE, THERE ARE LIMITATIONS TO HUMAN COM AND ONLY BY NOT BECOMING COMPLACENT CAN WE PREVENT THINGS FROM HAPPENING. I CHALLENGE EVERY TAXI CLRNC THAT I AM NOT SURE OF NOW. ALTHOUGH NO ONE WAS AFFECTED BY THIS EVENT I REALIZE THE SEVERITY OF WHAT COULD HAPPEN IF TAXI INSTRUCTIONS ARE NOT FOLLOWED PRECISELY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.