Narrative:

Bmi ATIS was reporting 3 mi overcast, 1/2 mi in snow with 7 KT tailwind. The ILS runway 29 approach was necessitated because of the ceiling and visibility. After passing the OM, tower advised that a previously landing jetstream had reported braking action poor and requested a call at 3 DME. At the 3 DME call, tower cleared us to land, said some other things, and said there was a 4 inch snow berm in center of runway. (Later I found out that tower had said they were plowing the runway and perhaps gave a mu report -- which I didn't hear because I was flying the approach.) the aircraft was flown on speed, on course and on GS, landing in the normal touchdown zone on speed. Some initial lateral control problems prevented the use of full reverse and braking in deference to keeping the aircraft aligned straight down the runway. When full braking and reverse thrust could be applied there was not enough runway remaining to stop the aircraft. We slid past the runway termination lights, stopping with all 3 gear just past the end of the runway on a hard, snow covered surface. Tower asked if we needed assistance to taxi in. The aircraft had no apparent damage and we were able to taxi to parking. Postflt inspection revealed no apparent damage and maintenance signed the aircraft off. After a subsequent flight with a different crew, 2 propeller blade tips were found to be bent. I believe a significant factor in this incident was that tower did not advise us of the poor braking action and the fact that the runway was in the process of being plowed until we were deep into 'flying the approach,' applying full attention to that. Also, the crew had no opportunity to discuss the situation. If we had heard that on the ATIS and discussed it, we might have decided not to start the approach until conditions were more favorable. Also, a significant factor is that crews don't get paid unless a flight is flown. Overtime, we develop an attitude of completing the flts if at all possible so that we will get paid. This is compounded if you are running late (as we were, due to bad WX), because if you run too late, they might cancel a later flight(south) so you won't get paid for those either. This takes the emphasis off of safety of flight and puts it on 'mission accomplishment.' another factor is that winter is over, so we are out of the winter/snow/ice mode of thinking. We've flown all winter with nothing happening, so a little spring snow can't be a real problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BA4100 JETSTREAM LANDED SNOW COVERED RWY 29 WITH 7 KT TAILWIND. UNABLE TO STOP ACFT AND ROLLED OFF THE END ONTO HARD PACKED SNOW. ABLE TO RETURN TO RWY AND TAXI TO GATE. MAINT RELEASED THE ACFT FOR FLT BUT ON A LATER FLT BY ANOTHER CREW DISCOVERED BENT PROP TIPS. SEE ACN #365891 FOR BRAKING RPT MADE BY ANOTHER CARRIER.

Narrative: BMI ATIS WAS RPTING 3 MI OVCST, 1/2 MI IN SNOW WITH 7 KT TAILWIND. THE ILS RWY 29 APCH WAS NECESSITATED BECAUSE OF THE CEILING AND VISIBILITY. AFTER PASSING THE OM, TWR ADVISED THAT A PREVIOUSLY LNDG JETSTREAM HAD RPTED BRAKING ACTION POOR AND REQUESTED A CALL AT 3 DME. AT THE 3 DME CALL, TWR CLRED US TO LAND, SAID SOME OTHER THINGS, AND SAID THERE WAS A 4 INCH SNOW BERM IN CTR OF RWY. (LATER I FOUND OUT THAT TWR HAD SAID THEY WERE PLOWING THE RWY AND PERHAPS GAVE A MU RPT -- WHICH I DIDN'T HEAR BECAUSE I WAS FLYING THE APCH.) THE ACFT WAS FLOWN ON SPD, ON COURSE AND ON GS, LNDG IN THE NORMAL TOUCHDOWN ZONE ON SPD. SOME INITIAL LATERAL CTL PROBS PREVENTED THE USE OF FULL REVERSE AND BRAKING IN DEFERENCE TO KEEPING THE ACFT ALIGNED STRAIGHT DOWN THE RWY. WHEN FULL BRAKING AND REVERSE THRUST COULD BE APPLIED THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH RWY REMAINING TO STOP THE ACFT. WE SLID PAST THE RWY TERMINATION LIGHTS, STOPPING WITH ALL 3 GEAR JUST PAST THE END OF THE RWY ON A HARD, SNOW COVERED SURFACE. TWR ASKED IF WE NEEDED ASSISTANCE TO TAXI IN. THE ACFT HAD NO APPARENT DAMAGE AND WE WERE ABLE TO TAXI TO PARKING. POSTFLT INSPECTION REVEALED NO APPARENT DAMAGE AND MAINT SIGNED THE ACFT OFF. AFTER A SUBSEQUENT FLT WITH A DIFFERENT CREW, 2 PROP BLADE TIPS WERE FOUND TO BE BENT. I BELIEVE A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT WAS THAT TWR DID NOT ADVISE US OF THE POOR BRAKING ACTION AND THE FACT THAT THE RWY WAS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING PLOWED UNTIL WE WERE DEEP INTO 'FLYING THE APCH,' APPLYING FULL ATTN TO THAT. ALSO, THE CREW HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE SIT. IF WE HAD HEARD THAT ON THE ATIS AND DISCUSSED IT, WE MIGHT HAVE DECIDED NOT TO START THE APCH UNTIL CONDITIONS WERE MORE FAVORABLE. ALSO, A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IS THAT CREWS DON'T GET PAID UNLESS A FLT IS FLOWN. OVERTIME, WE DEVELOP AN ATTITUDE OF COMPLETING THE FLTS IF AT ALL POSSIBLE SO THAT WE WILL GET PAID. THIS IS COMPOUNDED IF YOU ARE RUNNING LATE (AS WE WERE, DUE TO BAD WX), BECAUSE IF YOU RUN TOO LATE, THEY MIGHT CANCEL A LATER FLT(S) SO YOU WON'T GET PAID FOR THOSE EITHER. THIS TAKES THE EMPHASIS OFF OF SAFETY OF FLT AND PUTS IT ON 'MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.' ANOTHER FACTOR IS THAT WINTER IS OVER, SO WE ARE OUT OF THE WINTER/SNOW/ICE MODE OF THINKING. WE'VE FLOWN ALL WINTER WITH NOTHING HAPPENING, SO A LITTLE SPRING SNOW CAN'T BE A REAL PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.