Narrative:

We were executing an instrument (ILS) approach to runway 14L at iah. We had been told by approach control that we were '#1 for the approach.' the captain therefore decided to keep our speed up. Since we also had a tailwind this meant we were moving along pretty well. It also meant reconfiguring the aircraft by selecting a lower flap setting. The captain did this at the same time he told the first officer, who was PF, about it, and this seemed to throw him off a bit. At the same time we were in rain and the wipers were going, so the noise level was high. Also at this time we were to switch to tower frequency. What with the rush, confusion about the flaps, and the high noise level, the wrong frequency was selected in the primary communication radio and the rest of the approach and landing was accomplished without radio contact with the tower. The error was not caught until rollout when the captain noticed it. We cleared the runway and contacted ground control. Thankfully there was no traffic conflict. The captain talked to the tower on the phone afterwards and he said they said they were just as glad we landed as otherwise had we gone around it would have created a worse problem what with their traffic and the WX conditions, etc. Nevertheless we had landed without clearance and all felt pretty embarrassed. I see the cause of this incident as primarily the high level of distraction which occurred at a critical moment. Too many things happened at once. If we hadn't been in such a hurry it would have been better. On the plus side, our checklist discipline was excellent, which leads me to wonder why 'landing clearance received' is not an item on the landing checklist. I cannot remember ever seeing it on any landing checklist in nearly 30 yrs of flying, but if it had been on ours we wouldn't have made the mistake we did.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 #1 FOR APCH, CAPT ELECTED TO KEEP SPD UP. ENCOUNTERED STRONG TAILWIND AND IN GETTING THE ACFT SLOWED AND CONFIGURED FOR LNDG FORGOT TO CALL THE TWR. LAND WITHOUT CLRNC. NO CONFLICT.

Narrative: WE WERE EXECUTING AN INST (ILS) APCH TO RWY 14L AT IAH. WE HAD BEEN TOLD BY APCH CTL THAT WE WERE '#1 FOR THE APCH.' THE CAPT THEREFORE DECIDED TO KEEP OUR SPD UP. SINCE WE ALSO HAD A TAILWIND THIS MEANT WE WERE MOVING ALONG PRETTY WELL. IT ALSO MEANT RECONFIGURING THE ACFT BY SELECTING A LOWER FLAP SETTING. THE CAPT DID THIS AT THE SAME TIME HE TOLD THE FO, WHO WAS PF, ABOUT IT, AND THIS SEEMED TO THROW HIM OFF A BIT. AT THE SAME TIME WE WERE IN RAIN AND THE WIPERS WERE GOING, SO THE NOISE LEVEL WAS HIGH. ALSO AT THIS TIME WE WERE TO SWITCH TO TWR FREQ. WHAT WITH THE RUSH, CONFUSION ABOUT THE FLAPS, AND THE HIGH NOISE LEVEL, THE WRONG FREQ WAS SELECTED IN THE PRIMARY COM RADIO AND THE REST OF THE APCH AND LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT RADIO CONTACT WITH THE TWR. THE ERROR WAS NOT CAUGHT UNTIL ROLLOUT WHEN THE CAPT NOTICED IT. WE CLRED THE RWY AND CONTACTED GND CTL. THANKFULLY THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT. THE CAPT TALKED TO THE TWR ON THE PHONE AFTERWARDS AND HE SAID THEY SAID THEY WERE JUST AS GLAD WE LANDED AS OTHERWISE HAD WE GONE AROUND IT WOULD HAVE CREATED A WORSE PROB WHAT WITH THEIR TFC AND THE WX CONDITIONS, ETC. NEVERTHELESS WE HAD LANDED WITHOUT CLRNC AND ALL FELT PRETTY EMBARRASSED. I SEE THE CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT AS PRIMARILY THE HIGH LEVEL OF DISTR WHICH OCCURRED AT A CRITICAL MOMENT. TOO MANY THINGS HAPPENED AT ONCE. IF WE HADN'T BEEN IN SUCH A HURRY IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER. ON THE PLUS SIDE, OUR CHKLIST DISCIPLINE WAS EXCELLENT, WHICH LEADS ME TO WONDER WHY 'LNDG CLRNC RECEIVED' IS NOT AN ITEM ON THE LNDG CHKLIST. I CANNOT REMEMBER EVER SEEING IT ON ANY LNDG CHKLIST IN NEARLY 30 YRS OF FLYING, BUT IF IT HAD BEEN ON OURS WE WOULDN'T HAVE MADE THE MISTAKE WE DID.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.