Narrative:

Flight from teb to 6n4 (or 60TH st -- a manhattan heliport). Our flight path takes us from teb to the north end of central park, then to the 'north tip' of roosevelt island followed by a right turn along the eastern edge of the east river, followed by another right turn at 'big allis' (a group of 3 power plant smoke stacks) onto the final approach back across the east river to 60TH st heliport. Our altitude crossing manhattan was 1200 ft MSL with our descent beginning after passing central park. The sic was on the lga tower frequency and was advised of another helicopter at 10 O'clock and when traffic was acknowledged, radar service was terminated as we entered the east river exclusion area. This area was designed to accommodate VFR helicopter and seaplane traffic in and out of the various landing sites on the river. 123.05 is the advisory frequency in this area. The PIC called 60TH st at central park to advise them of our intentions to land and pick up passenger. 60TH st instructed us to call final. Our prelndg procedure was complete by the time we passed the 'north tip,' including slowing to 120 KTS for gear extension. The other helicopter was at the same altitude and converging from our left on a swbound course 200-300 mi inland of the east edge of the east river. They appeared to be at cruise airspeed (140 KTS) with retracted landing gear. No radio call was heard from them on 123.05 up to this point. At this time, we assumed the other aircraft was going to continue sbound to another heliport or destination. Just past the 'north tip' we called 60TH st again and they said that our passenger had arrived and to land at the transit spot. Still no call from the other aircraft was heard. At this point the other aircraft was passing us on our left side, decelerating and finally extending its gear as it began to turn right in front of our path. It then became necessary for us to also turn right, just short of the big allis smoke stacks. The other aircraft finally called 60TH st and said that they were turning south to enter the holding area just south of the queensboro bridge. We continued our approach to the transit spot. In hindsight, it became apparent that the other aircraft was intent on arriving at 60TH st before us. It is possible that they called 60TH st before we established radio contact with same. If that was the case, 60TH st did not pass that information on to us. It is normal procedure for the heliport to advise of other aircraft in the area and to issue landing priorities when more than 1 aircraft intends to land at near the same time. Other issues that apply to this situation are: 1) flight time from teb to 6n4 is 5 mins. An after takeoff procedure, a prelndg procedure, 3 frequency changes from a class D to class B to a heliport advisory, and normally heavy traffic creates a busy cockpit. 2) the knowledge that our passenger are standing by and the desire to provide flawless service to them can create a rushed atmosphere. The other aircraft did the right thing in this situation by defusing the problem by breaking off from their approach. We could have done the same thing earlier to accomplish the same result. Better communications between the 3 of us would have also solved the problem.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMT HELI WAS CONVERGING WITH ANOTHER HELI WHILE ON APCH TO A MANHATTEN HELIPORT. THE OTHER HELI HAD THE RIGHT-OF- WAY BUT HE CHOSE TO YIELD. FLC PLANNING INFLT. FLC WORKLOAD.

Narrative: FLT FROM TEB TO 6N4 (OR 60TH ST -- A MANHATTAN HELIPORT). OUR FLT PATH TAKES US FROM TEB TO THE N END OF CENTRAL PARK, THEN TO THE 'NORTH TIP' OF ROOSEVELT ISLAND FOLLOWED BY A R TURN ALONG THE EASTERN EDGE OF THE EAST RIVER, FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER R TURN AT 'BIG ALLIS' (A GROUP OF 3 PWR PLANT SMOKE STACKS) ONTO THE FINAL APCH BACK ACROSS THE EAST RIVER TO 60TH ST HELIPORT. OUR ALT XING MANHATTAN WAS 1200 FT MSL WITH OUR DSCNT BEGINNING AFTER PASSING CENTRAL PARK. THE SIC WAS ON THE LGA TWR FREQ AND WAS ADVISED OF ANOTHER HELI AT 10 O'CLOCK AND WHEN TFC WAS ACKNOWLEDGED, RADAR SVC WAS TERMINATED AS WE ENTERED THE EAST RIVER EXCLUSION AREA. THIS AREA WAS DESIGNED TO ACCOMMODATE VFR HELI AND SEAPLANE TFC IN AND OUT OF THE VARIOUS LNDG SITES ON THE RIVER. 123.05 IS THE ADVISORY FREQ IN THIS AREA. THE PIC CALLED 60TH ST AT CENTRAL PARK TO ADVISE THEM OF OUR INTENTIONS TO LAND AND PICK UP PAX. 60TH ST INSTRUCTED US TO CALL FINAL. OUR PRELNDG PROC WAS COMPLETE BY THE TIME WE PASSED THE 'NORTH TIP,' INCLUDING SLOWING TO 120 KTS FOR GEAR EXTENSION. THE OTHER HELI WAS AT THE SAME ALT AND CONVERGING FROM OUR L ON A SWBOUND COURSE 200-300 MI INLAND OF THE E EDGE OF THE EAST RIVER. THEY APPEARED TO BE AT CRUISE AIRSPD (140 KTS) WITH RETRACTED LNDG GEAR. NO RADIO CALL WAS HEARD FROM THEM ON 123.05 UP TO THIS POINT. AT THIS TIME, WE ASSUMED THE OTHER ACFT WAS GOING TO CONTINUE SBOUND TO ANOTHER HELIPORT OR DEST. JUST PAST THE 'NORTH TIP' WE CALLED 60TH ST AGAIN AND THEY SAID THAT OUR PAX HAD ARRIVED AND TO LAND AT THE TRANSIT SPOT. STILL NO CALL FROM THE OTHER ACFT WAS HEARD. AT THIS POINT THE OTHER ACFT WAS PASSING US ON OUR L SIDE, DECELERATING AND FINALLY EXTENDING ITS GEAR AS IT BEGAN TO TURN R IN FRONT OF OUR PATH. IT THEN BECAME NECESSARY FOR US TO ALSO TURN R, JUST SHORT OF THE BIG ALLIS SMOKE STACKS. THE OTHER ACFT FINALLY CALLED 60TH ST AND SAID THAT THEY WERE TURNING S TO ENTER THE HOLDING AREA JUST S OF THE QUEENSBORO BRIDGE. WE CONTINUED OUR APCH TO THE TRANSIT SPOT. IN HINDSIGHT, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE OTHER ACFT WAS INTENT ON ARRIVING AT 60TH ST BEFORE US. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY CALLED 60TH ST BEFORE WE ESTABLISHED RADIO CONTACT WITH SAME. IF THAT WAS THE CASE, 60TH ST DID NOT PASS THAT INFO ON TO US. IT IS NORMAL PROC FOR THE HELIPORT TO ADVISE OF OTHER ACFT IN THE AREA AND TO ISSUE LNDG PRIORITIES WHEN MORE THAN 1 ACFT INTENDS TO LAND AT NEAR THE SAME TIME. OTHER ISSUES THAT APPLY TO THIS SIT ARE: 1) FLT TIME FROM TEB TO 6N4 IS 5 MINS. AN AFTER TKOF PROC, A PRELNDG PROC, 3 FREQ CHANGES FROM A CLASS D TO CLASS B TO A HELIPORT ADVISORY, AND NORMALLY HVY TFC CREATES A BUSY COCKPIT. 2) THE KNOWLEDGE THAT OUR PAX ARE STANDING BY AND THE DESIRE TO PROVIDE FLAWLESS SVC TO THEM CAN CREATE A RUSHED ATMOSPHERE. THE OTHER ACFT DID THE RIGHT THING IN THIS SIT BY DEFUSING THE PROB BY BREAKING OFF FROM THEIR APCH. WE COULD HAVE DONE THE SAME THING EARLIER TO ACCOMPLISH THE SAME RESULT. BETTER COMS BTWN THE 3 OF US WOULD HAVE ALSO SOLVED THE PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.