Narrative:

Inbound pilot makes vague logbook write-up '#1 pack appears inoperative in-flight, appears to work on ground.' tokyo maintenance discovers #2 pack ram air inlet door hinge broken and removes it. Airline's dispatcher released flight with less than required etp fuel and initially without accommodating fuel penalty for ram air inlet door missing as per cdl. Later issues new flight plans and release allowing for this .5 percent burn increase, but still not observing required etp fuel burn. FAA aci observer of houston, tx, office inspecting on flight xx this date 'who writes and approves the manuals' for airline. I, the PIC, do not wish to emphasize the apparent ineptitude concerning the release and order a fuel load for the worst en route condition, flight at FL290 all the way over the least favorable track of the 2 preferred rtes. Arriving at aircraft briefing with so regarding MEL-cdl restrs to learn the #2 pack must be operated in manual, not automatic, to comply with restr #2 ram air exit louvers remain fully open. Maintenance confirms this and the flight departs in this confign. During final phase of climb, flight engineer announces he is unable to keep the #2 pack from freezing even with the bypass valve in the full hot position and shut down the #2 pack to prevent it from freezing, now, down to one operating pack (#1 placarded inoperative). The cabin altitude began to climb. I ordered the so to consult tokyo maintenance while still in VHF radio range and ask them, 'what would you like us to do.' they responded 'try closing the exit louver slightly. The flight engineer selected automatic control over the pack and restored #2 pack operation. He reported back 'it's working now, but it is in automatic' contrary to cdl restr. With the exit louvers slightly closed and matching the performance and exit louver position of the #3 pack system. I continued flight to hnl without further anomaly and provided hnl maintenance with thorough detail of what took place and 'tko maintenance recommendations followed.' FAA aci observer was silent the entire flight (even slept) and offered no advice even though I informed him at the outset he was part of the crew and was free to point out traffic and/or make recommendations/suggestions. After block-in hnl and parking checklist complete, I turned to him and solicited his debriefing. He said 'the only comment I have is that pack control switch.' he relocated himself facing the flight engineer and stated 'that maintenance person does not have the authority/authorized to tell you to move that switch, and you did not operate by the book.' in an attempt to cool the tension focused on the flight engineer, I stated 'what would you have liked me to do, dump a lot of gas and take it back to tokyo?' he stated, 'yes, that's what I thought we were going to do.' 'but it worked, and it was a very nice flight.' where does this leave us? Are we going to be violated? Confign deviation list and MEL appear contradictory and lacking. I request analysis of this and an opinion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-200 DISPATCHED WITH A PACK INLET COOLING DOOR REMOVED PER CONFIGN DEV LIST. CONFIGN DEV LIST AND MEL FOR COOLING DOOR INOP ARE IN CONFLICT.

Narrative: INBOUND PLT MAKES VAGUE LOGBOOK WRITE-UP '#1 PACK APPEARS INOP INFLT, APPEARS TO WORK ON GND.' TOKYO MAINT DISCOVERS #2 PACK RAM AIR INLET DOOR HINGE BROKEN AND REMOVES IT. AIRLINE'S DISPATCHER RELEASED FLT WITH LESS THAN REQUIRED ETP FUEL AND INITIALLY WITHOUT ACCOMMODATING FUEL PENALTY FOR RAM AIR INLET DOOR MISSING AS PER CDL. LATER ISSUES NEW FLT PLANS AND RELEASE ALLOWING FOR THIS .5 PERCENT BURN INCREASE, BUT STILL NOT OBSERVING REQUIRED ETP FUEL BURN. FAA ACI OBSERVER OF HOUSTON, TX, OFFICE INSPECTING ON FLT XX THIS DATE 'WHO WRITES AND APPROVES THE MANUALS' FOR AIRLINE. I, THE PIC, DO NOT WISH TO EMPHASIZE THE APPARENT INEPTITUDE CONCERNING THE RELEASE AND ORDER A FUEL LOAD FOR THE WORST ENRTE CONDITION, FLT AT FL290 ALL THE WAY OVER THE LEAST FAVORABLE TRACK OF THE 2 PREFERRED RTES. ARRIVING AT ACFT BRIEFING WITH SO REGARDING MEL-CDL RESTRS TO LEARN THE #2 PACK MUST BE OPERATED IN MANUAL, NOT AUTOMATIC, TO COMPLY WITH RESTR #2 RAM AIR EXIT LOUVERS REMAIN FULLY OPEN. MAINT CONFIRMS THIS AND THE FLT DEPARTS IN THIS CONFIGN. DURING FINAL PHASE OF CLB, FE ANNOUNCES HE IS UNABLE TO KEEP THE #2 PACK FROM FREEZING EVEN WITH THE BYPASS VALVE IN THE FULL HOT POS AND SHUT DOWN THE #2 PACK TO PREVENT IT FROM FREEZING, NOW, DOWN TO ONE OPERATING PACK (#1 PLACARDED INOP). THE CABIN ALT BEGAN TO CLB. I ORDERED THE SO TO CONSULT TOKYO MAINT WHILE STILL IN VHF RADIO RANGE AND ASK THEM, 'WHAT WOULD YOU LIKE US TO DO.' THEY RESPONDED 'TRY CLOSING THE EXIT LOUVER SLIGHTLY. THE FE SELECTED AUTOMATIC CTL OVER THE PACK AND RESTORED #2 PACK OP. HE RPTED BACK 'IT'S WORKING NOW, BUT IT IS IN AUTOMATIC' CONTRARY TO CDL RESTR. WITH THE EXIT LOUVERS SLIGHTLY CLOSED AND MATCHING THE PERFORMANCE AND EXIT LOUVER POS OF THE #3 PACK SYS. I CONTINUED FLT TO HNL WITHOUT FURTHER ANOMALY AND PROVIDED HNL MAINT WITH THOROUGH DETAIL OF WHAT TOOK PLACE AND 'TKO MAINT RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOWED.' FAA ACI OBSERVER WAS SILENT THE ENTIRE FLT (EVEN SLEPT) AND OFFERED NO ADVICE EVEN THOUGH I INFORMED HIM AT THE OUTSET HE WAS PART OF THE CREW AND WAS FREE TO POINT OUT TFC AND/OR MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS/SUGGESTIONS. AFTER BLOCK-IN HNL AND PARKING CHKLIST COMPLETE, I TURNED TO HIM AND SOLICITED HIS DEBRIEFING. HE SAID 'THE ONLY COMMENT I HAVE IS THAT PACK CTL SWITCH.' HE RELOCATED HIMSELF FACING THE FE AND STATED 'THAT MAINT PERSON DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTH TO TELL YOU TO MOVE THAT SWITCH, AND YOU DID NOT OPERATE BY THE BOOK.' IN AN ATTEMPT TO COOL THE TENSION FOCUSED ON THE FE, I STATED 'WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE LIKED ME TO DO, DUMP A LOT OF GAS AND TAKE IT BACK TO TOKYO?' HE STATED, 'YES, THAT'S WHAT I THOUGHT WE WERE GOING TO DO.' 'BUT IT WORKED, AND IT WAS A VERY NICE FLT.' WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US? ARE WE GOING TO BE VIOLATED? CONFIGN DEV LIST AND MEL APPEAR CONTRADICTORY AND LACKING. I REQUEST ANALYSIS OF THIS AND AN OPINION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.