Narrative:

I filed for an IFR flight plan, from ekn (elkins, wv) to ekn, routed through mgw, ckb and back to ekn. Under remarks, it included the following: mgw VOR circling approach, mgw ILS runway 18, ckb ILS runway 21, ckb VOR runway 3, ckb ILS runway 21, ekn lda C. The purpose of the flight was to maintain IFR proficiency. For this purpose, it was conducted under simulated IFR (hood) conditions, on a clear day with unlimited visibility and with an IFR rated safety pilot. I am a low time IFR rated pilot, obtaining my instrument license late in oct 1996. Due to frequent icing conditions in IMC during the winter months in the mountains of wv, few opportunities exist for actual IFR flying during this period of time. Upon departure, the flight was handled by ckb approach for the most part of the flight. Approaching the mgw VOR under vectors, at approximately 15 DME from the VOR and at 4600 ft, I made a procedural error and turned about 15 degrees to the right to intercept the skylo interception and line myself up with the 337 degree inbound radial for the approach. Approach (ckb) questioned my turn and gave me new vectors to the IAF at the mgw VOR. Shortly thereafter, I received a transmission from ckb approach that neither myself nor the safety pilot could copy. I asked for a repeat of what may have been an instruction and received another transmission, out of which we thought to have heard a 'never mind.' this particular approach was completed, as well as all the other ones without further problems. On my last leg returning from ckb to ekn, I was asked to contact approach by telephone after landing. This was done, and the person handling my flight indicated that I had done several things wrong during the flight, specifically on the first 2 approachs at mgw. First, he questioned my right turn out of vectors during the mgw VOR circling approach. He indicated that I would have been in a dangerous situation, 200 ft above some ridges in the area. I agreed with him that my alignment with the inbound vector was premature and in error, however, given our altitude and location we were quite a distance from any ridges and way above their highest peak. The safety pilot indicated that we never got close to any ridges in the area. He also indicated that I had not reported reaching the mgw VOR as instructed on the first approach and that the dixin OM on the mgw ILS runway 18 was reported late. Both the safety pilot and myself did not recall receiving instructions to report passing the mgw VOR. It may have been during the transmission that we could not copy, which he was asked to repeat and all we could get out of was a 'never mind.' the fact remains that I never understood to report the VOR inbound, consequently I never acknowledged the instruction. In regards to the report at dixin OM on the mgw ILS runway 18, it was done twice. Once at dixin which was not acknowledged by mgw tower, and again later, since I did not receive a response from the first call. By then of course, I was inside dixin OM. No problems were indicated with the next 4 approachs that followed. The approach controller concluded the conversation, indicating that he was going to report this incident to gato, due to the fact that he considered them dangerous safety related issues. I was surprised at this controller's reaction to the situation at hand. It was indicated to him that the purpose of the flight was to regain IFR proficiency and that for this reason I selected a clear day with unlimited visibility and included an IFR rated safety pilot. All the theory in the world will not equal the actual experience of flying these approachs for this purpose. I cannot think of a safer environment to accomplish this task. As previously indicated, due to the lack of flying IFR in IMC conditions during the winter months, IFR smoothness will suffer. An airplane is intolerant of pilot rust. Actual flying practice has no substitute and it is the cheapest, most practical insurance that pilots can afford. It is my opinion that the FAA and its controllers should encourage proficiency flts by IFR pilots in non actual conditions, instead of intimidating pilots into not doing so. It is to be expected that so called rusty pltswill not be totally fluent with their procedures, specially in the initial stages of their proficiency flight. The NTSB files are full with accounts of accidents caused by fellow IFR rated pilots that flew or got caught in IMC conditions without being proficient at the time. I recommend that the FAA encourage pilots to indicate under the remarks section of a flight plan, when a particular flight's purpose is to work on proficiency and to encourage their controllers to cooperate in this effort. An antagonistic attitude does not serve anybody well, and leads to an avoidance of this type of flying. To find out that you are rusty in actual IMC conditions may be too late.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C172 ON IFR TRAINING FLT, DEVIATED FROM VECTOR HEADING. CTLR THOUGHT THE ACFT HAD DSNDED TOO NEAR TERRAIN. FLT WAS CONDUCTED WITH A SAFETY PLT, IN VFR CONDITIONS. RPTR AND SAFETY PLT FELT NO HAZARD EXISTED. DID MISS A COM TO RPT DIXIN OM INBOUND.

Narrative: I FILED FOR AN IFR FLT PLAN, FROM EKN (ELKINS, WV) TO EKN, ROUTED THROUGH MGW, CKB AND BACK TO EKN. UNDER REMARKS, IT INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING: MGW VOR CIRCLING APCH, MGW ILS RWY 18, CKB ILS RWY 21, CKB VOR RWY 3, CKB ILS RWY 21, EKN LDA C. THE PURPOSE OF THE FLT WAS TO MAINTAIN IFR PROFICIENCY. FOR THIS PURPOSE, IT WAS CONDUCTED UNDER SIMULATED IFR (HOOD) CONDITIONS, ON A CLR DAY WITH UNLIMITED VISIBILITY AND WITH AN IFR RATED SAFETY PLT. I AM A LOW TIME IFR RATED PLT, OBTAINING MY INST LICENSE LATE IN OCT 1996. DUE TO FREQUENT ICING CONDITIONS IN IMC DURING THE WINTER MONTHS IN THE MOUNTAINS OF WV, FEW OPPORTUNITIES EXIST FOR ACTUAL IFR FLYING DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME. UPON DEP, THE FLT WAS HANDLED BY CKB APCH FOR THE MOST PART OF THE FLT. APCHING THE MGW VOR UNDER VECTORS, AT APPROX 15 DME FROM THE VOR AND AT 4600 FT, I MADE A PROCEDURAL ERROR AND TURNED ABOUT 15 DEGS TO THE R TO INTERCEPT THE SKYLO INTERCEPTION AND LINE MYSELF UP WITH THE 337 DEG INBOUND RADIAL FOR THE APCH. APCH (CKB) QUESTIONED MY TURN AND GAVE ME NEW VECTORS TO THE IAF AT THE MGW VOR. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, I RECEIVED A XMISSION FROM CKB APCH THAT NEITHER MYSELF NOR THE SAFETY PLT COULD COPY. I ASKED FOR A REPEAT OF WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN AN INSTRUCTION AND RECEIVED ANOTHER XMISSION, OUT OF WHICH WE THOUGHT TO HAVE HEARD A 'NEVER MIND.' THIS PARTICULAR APCH WAS COMPLETED, AS WELL AS ALL THE OTHER ONES WITHOUT FURTHER PROBS. ON MY LAST LEG RETURNING FROM CKB TO EKN, I WAS ASKED TO CONTACT APCH BY TELEPHONE AFTER LNDG. THIS WAS DONE, AND THE PERSON HANDLING MY FLT INDICATED THAT I HAD DONE SEVERAL THINGS WRONG DURING THE FLT, SPECIFICALLY ON THE FIRST 2 APCHS AT MGW. FIRST, HE QUESTIONED MY R TURN OUT OF VECTORS DURING THE MGW VOR CIRCLING APCH. HE INDICATED THAT I WOULD HAVE BEEN IN A DANGEROUS SIT, 200 FT ABOVE SOME RIDGES IN THE AREA. I AGREED WITH HIM THAT MY ALIGNMENT WITH THE INBOUND VECTOR WAS PREMATURE AND IN ERROR, HOWEVER, GIVEN OUR ALT AND LOCATION WE WERE QUITE A DISTANCE FROM ANY RIDGES AND WAY ABOVE THEIR HIGHEST PEAK. THE SAFETY PLT INDICATED THAT WE NEVER GOT CLOSE TO ANY RIDGES IN THE AREA. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT I HAD NOT RPTED REACHING THE MGW VOR AS INSTRUCTED ON THE FIRST APCH AND THAT THE DIXIN OM ON THE MGW ILS RWY 18 WAS RPTED LATE. BOTH THE SAFETY PLT AND MYSELF DID NOT RECALL RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO RPT PASSING THE MGW VOR. IT MAY HAVE BEEN DURING THE XMISSION THAT WE COULD NOT COPY, WHICH HE WAS ASKED TO REPEAT AND ALL WE COULD GET OUT OF WAS A 'NEVER MIND.' THE FACT REMAINS THAT I NEVER UNDERSTOOD TO RPT THE VOR INBOUND, CONSEQUENTLY I NEVER ACKNOWLEDGED THE INSTRUCTION. IN REGARDS TO THE RPT AT DIXIN OM ON THE MGW ILS RWY 18, IT WAS DONE TWICE. ONCE AT DIXIN WHICH WAS NOT ACKNOWLEDGED BY MGW TWR, AND AGAIN LATER, SINCE I DID NOT RECEIVE A RESPONSE FROM THE FIRST CALL. BY THEN OF COURSE, I WAS INSIDE DIXIN OM. NO PROBS WERE INDICATED WITH THE NEXT 4 APCHS THAT FOLLOWED. THE APCH CTLR CONCLUDED THE CONVERSATION, INDICATING THAT HE WAS GOING TO RPT THIS INCIDENT TO GATO, DUE TO THE FACT THAT HE CONSIDERED THEM DANGEROUS SAFETY RELATED ISSUES. I WAS SURPRISED AT THIS CTLR'S REACTION TO THE SIT AT HAND. IT WAS INDICATED TO HIM THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE FLT WAS TO REGAIN IFR PROFICIENCY AND THAT FOR THIS REASON I SELECTED A CLR DAY WITH UNLIMITED VISIBILITY AND INCLUDED AN IFR RATED SAFETY PLT. ALL THE THEORY IN THE WORLD WILL NOT EQUAL THE ACTUAL EXPERIENCE OF FLYING THESE APCHS FOR THIS PURPOSE. I CANNOT THINK OF A SAFER ENVIRONMENT TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK. AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED, DUE TO THE LACK OF FLYING IFR IN IMC CONDITIONS DURING THE WINTER MONTHS, IFR SMOOTHNESS WILL SUFFER. AN AIRPLANE IS INTOLERANT OF PLT RUST. ACTUAL FLYING PRACTICE HAS NO SUBSTITUTE AND IT IS THE CHEAPEST, MOST PRACTICAL INSURANCE THAT PLTS CAN AFFORD. IT IS MY OPINION THAT THE FAA AND ITS CTLRS SHOULD ENCOURAGE PROFICIENCY FLTS BY IFR PLTS IN NON ACTUAL CONDITIONS, INSTEAD OF INTIMIDATING PLTS INTO NOT DOING SO. IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT SO CALLED RUSTY PLTSWILL NOT BE TOTALLY FLUENT WITH THEIR PROCS, SPECIALLY IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF THEIR PROFICIENCY FLT. THE NTSB FILES ARE FULL WITH ACCOUNTS OF ACCIDENTS CAUSED BY FELLOW IFR RATED PLTS THAT FLEW OR GOT CAUGHT IN IMC CONDITIONS WITHOUT BEING PROFICIENT AT THE TIME. I RECOMMEND THAT THE FAA ENCOURAGE PLTS TO INDICATE UNDER THE REMARKS SECTION OF A FLT PLAN, WHEN A PARTICULAR FLT'S PURPOSE IS TO WORK ON PROFICIENCY AND TO ENCOURAGE THEIR CTLRS TO COOPERATE IN THIS EFFORT. AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE DOES NOT SERVE ANYBODY WELL, AND LEADS TO AN AVOIDANCE OF THIS TYPE OF FLYING. TO FIND OUT THAT YOU ARE RUSTY IN ACTUAL IMC CONDITIONS MAY BE TOO LATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.