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First officer of a B727-200 overshot descent crossing altitude due to distraction of a fuel imbalance problem, inoperative fuel gauge and a directional gyroscope problem.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 367732 |
| Time | |
| Date | 199705 |
| Day | Fri |
| Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | atc facility : dhp |
| State Reference | FL |
| Altitude | msl bound lower : 14500 msl bound upper : 16000 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Controlling Facilities | artcc : zma |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | B727-200 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | descent other |
| Route In Use | arrival other arrival star : star enroute airway : zma |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : first officer |
| Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : flight engineer |
| Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 14000 flight time type : 3000 |
| ASRS Report | 367732 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
| Qualification | pilot : atp |
| Experience | flight time last 90 days : 180 flight time total : 5100 flight time type : 100 |
| ASRS Report | 367730 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe altitude deviation : crossing restriction not met altitude deviation : overshoot non adherence : clearance non adherence : far other anomaly other |
| Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
| Resolutory Action | flight crew : became reoriented flight crew : returned to intended course or assigned course |
| Consequence | Other |
| Supplementary | |
| Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
| Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
We were assigned the fowee 3 arrival, cross junur at 16000 ft. As the PF, I began the descent to cross the assigned fix at the assigned altitude. The captain was engaged in troubleshooting a fuel system problem that could have led to an unbalance situation. I should have been concentrating my efforts solely to flying the aircraft. Instead I had noticed an additional problem that could have been related to the fuel situation or a directional gyro problem. I was trying to ascertain what, if any, relationship there was between the two. I was carefully monitoring my distance from junur and gauging my descent by the rate and distance from junur. I was scanning my altimeter, but I was not concentrating on it. The captain noticed the altitude deviation before I did. When I returned my attention to the altimeter, I was disoriented by not being able to read the altimeter instantly and therefore did not stop the rate of descent until I had descended 1500 ft below assigned. Once stabilized, I returned the aircraft to the assigned altitude. No inquiry by ATC was made! Contributing factors: 1) both pilots were engaged in troubleshooting efforts. The PF should not have been doing so, thereby concentrating his efforts to complying with ATC requirements. 2) this aircraft has several non standard characteristics which both pilots were dealing with. A) the autoplt is not the same as installed in most other fleet aircraft. The autoplt does not automatically capture altitude as in other aircraft. B) the altitude alert system is different from most fleet aircraft. 1000 ft before leveloff, only a light comes on. Then at 300 ft, a nearly inaudible signal. C) the first officer altimeter is described in the aircraft manual as being 'a conventional drum type barometric altimeter.' this is the same type of altimeter that was removed from military helicopters 15 yrs ago because of repeated altdevs by military pilots. Why does FAA allow them to be in service in commercial aircraft today! D) FAA does not promote standardization in commercial aircraft (airlines). If standardization, at least among the basic instruments was required, this deviation would not have occurred. Supplemental information from acn 367730: I believe I should have been much more aware and made sure the first officer was directing all his attention to operation of the aircraft.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FO OF A B727-200 OVERSHOT DSCNT XING ALT DUE TO DISTR OF A FUEL IMBALANCE PROB, INOP FUEL GAUGE AND A DIRECTIONAL GYROSCOPE PROB.
Narrative: WE WERE ASSIGNED THE FOWEE 3 ARR, CROSS JUNUR AT 16000 FT. AS THE PF, I BEGAN THE DSCNT TO CROSS THE ASSIGNED FIX AT THE ASSIGNED ALT. THE CAPT WAS ENGAGED IN TROUBLESHOOTING A FUEL SYS PROB THAT COULD HAVE LED TO AN UNBALANCE SIT. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATING MY EFFORTS SOLELY TO FLYING THE ACFT. INSTEAD I HAD NOTICED AN ADDITIONAL PROB THAT COULD HAVE BEEN RELATED TO THE FUEL SIT OR A DIRECTIONAL GYRO PROB. I WAS TRYING TO ASCERTAIN WHAT, IF ANY, RELATIONSHIP THERE WAS BTWN THE TWO. I WAS CAREFULLY MONITORING MY DISTANCE FROM JUNUR AND GAUGING MY DSCNT BY THE RATE AND DISTANCE FROM JUNUR. I WAS SCANNING MY ALTIMETER, BUT I WAS NOT CONCENTRATING ON IT. THE CAPT NOTICED THE ALTDEV BEFORE I DID. WHEN I RETURNED MY ATTN TO THE ALTIMETER, I WAS DISORIENTED BY NOT BEING ABLE TO READ THE ALTIMETER INSTANTLY AND THEREFORE DID NOT STOP THE RATE OF DSCNT UNTIL I HAD DSNDED 1500 FT BELOW ASSIGNED. ONCE STABILIZED, I RETURNED THE ACFT TO THE ASSIGNED ALT. NO INQUIRY BY ATC WAS MADE! CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) BOTH PLTS WERE ENGAGED IN TROUBLESHOOTING EFFORTS. THE PF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DOING SO, THEREBY CONCENTRATING HIS EFFORTS TO COMPLYING WITH ATC REQUIREMENTS. 2) THIS ACFT HAS SEVERAL NON STANDARD CHARACTERISTICS WHICH BOTH PLTS WERE DEALING WITH. A) THE AUTOPLT IS NOT THE SAME AS INSTALLED IN MOST OTHER FLEET ACFT. THE AUTOPLT DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY CAPTURE ALT AS IN OTHER ACFT. B) THE ALT ALERT SYS IS DIFFERENT FROM MOST FLEET ACFT. 1000 FT BEFORE LEVELOFF, ONLY A LIGHT COMES ON. THEN AT 300 FT, A NEARLY INAUDIBLE SIGNAL. C) THE FO ALTIMETER IS DESCRIBED IN THE ACFT MANUAL AS BEING 'A CONVENTIONAL DRUM TYPE BAROMETRIC ALTIMETER.' THIS IS THE SAME TYPE OF ALTIMETER THAT WAS REMOVED FROM MIL HELIS 15 YRS AGO BECAUSE OF REPEATED ALTDEVS BY MIL PLTS. WHY DOES FAA ALLOW THEM TO BE IN SVC IN COMMERCIAL ACFT TODAY! D) FAA DOES NOT PROMOTE STANDARDIZATION IN COMMERCIAL ACFT (AIRLINES). IF STANDARDIZATION, AT LEAST AMONG THE BASIC INSTS WAS REQUIRED, THIS DEV WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 367730: I BELIEVE I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE AWARE AND MADE SURE THE FO WAS DIRECTING ALL HIS ATTN TO OP OF THE ACFT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.