Narrative:

While in command and conducting IOE as a line check airman on air carrier flight XXX, an unscheduled landing was made at cabaniss nalf instead of landing at corpus christi, tx, as intended. The first officer was working the controls and I was working the radios and checklists. It was about AA15 CDT and the ATIS was reporting 6000 ft overcast with 10 mi visibility. There was also an unrpted broken cloud deck at approximately 2000 ft that we were in and out of as we were on final. This broken deck somewhat obscured our view of the ground. We had been cleared localizer runway 31 approach at crp by crp approach and had intercepted and were tracking the localizer inbound. We were still using full autoplt and had expanded VOR/ILS selected on both HSI screens, with manual selected on the automatic-manual switch and the localizer frequency tuned on the VHF navigation. Crp approach had turned us over to crp tower. We had intercepted the localizer about 7 mi southeast of ducky IAF. We were at 2000 ft MSL. The first officer said the next crossing altitude was 1300 ft and I corrected him and said no it was 1600 ft at ducky. I reached over to the altitude select window to set 1600 ft in the window. I also did a cursory check of the engine and navigation instruments to make sure we had everything properly selected and set up for the approach. When I looked back outside I saw what I thought was the intended runway. I called runway in sight to the first officer and said to land. It did catch me by surprise a little that the runway was already there but I gave no more thought to it since I realized we were high on approach and needed to descend immediately if we were to land. I called crp tower and checked in and told them we had runway in sight and we were cleared to land. We disconnected the autoplt and autothrottle and went visual for landing. We received about 3 sink rate warnings during the descent but because we were visual we proceeded in. We completed the final confign for the landing and the before landing checklist. Still believing cabaniss nalf to be crp we landed on runway 31 at cabaniss nalf. Only during our rollout did we realize we had landed at the wrong airport. We contacted our operations at crp and eventually the customers were bussed to crp. There were no injuries or damage to the aircraft. The main problem was that the localizer for runway 31 at crp runs directly overhead cabaniss nalf. Also that it has a runway 31 made it appear to be runway 31 at crp. I also made a mistake in not xchking my DME from crp after we went visual, but because it was IOE I was extremely busy with configuring the aircraft and running the checklist and the DME reading dropped out of my xchk. Also contributing to our mistaken runway identify was that the first officer had never flown into crp and it had been over 3 yrs at least since I had been there. Also, I should have executed a go around when we got the sink rate warnings even though we are not required to when we have the runway visually. I feel this broken cloud deck at 2000 ft may have caused me to lose my geographical awareness so when I saw the runway at cabaniss nalf I assumed it was crp runway 31. My increased workload for IOE could be a contributing factor. To prevent a recurrence of this incident I would recommend that a warning be placed on airline commercial chart 10-7 pages stating that cabaniss can be mistaken for crp, particularly when approaching from the south for runway 31. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter was the line check airman giving IOE to the first officer. This was their first flight in the B737-500. The lca was explaining all the different features of the EFIS presentation during the approach. The first officer was focused on the upcoming landing. There was no xchking of instrument indications, the reporter was so busy instructing he never looked at his DME to realize he was more than 5 mi out when he decided he had the field in sight. The first officer had never been into crp, he was unsure of everything happening. He had been flying the B737-200 and this was his transition training into the B737-500. He was familiar with the B737, but not all the differences between models. The first officer never got to fly a simulator with all the EFIS system working to learn how to use it. When landing, the captain never realized he was at the wrong airport until he turned off the runway. He tried to get company operations to know which gate to park at but was unable to raise his company. So he called crp tower to see if they could notify company. Crp tower then told him he wasn't on the crp field. The reporter noticed there were no instrument markings on the runway when they landed, which was his first clue something was wrong. However, he had been into crp only 3 times in his career. He knew the tower and terminal were on his right as he landed, and the cabaniss naval auxiliary landing field had warehouses and a tower on the r-hand side. From his peripheral vision, everything looked proper. He desired very much to simply add power and takeoff for crp. Resisting that feeling was sensible to him as he had no takeoff performance data for the field he landed at. The commanding naval officer came out to his aircraft and stated that if the field would have had more aircraft activity, it might have given him indications it was not crp. Reporter was disappointed that takeoff performance was given to him so he could fly revenue passenger or at least ferry the aircraft over to crp. He also had a great deal of anger against himself for letting such a thing occur. No one has been more embarrassed about it than him. Company is putting him through 2 days of simulator training, more IOE for himself, then a final line check. The company has asked for him and the first officer to write a story about how it happened to be published so all pilots might be aware of how it can happen. It is to be written anonymously, but everyone knows who the authors are. Reporter suggests the name of the airport might be written on the runway since it lines up with crp runway. Supplemental information from acn 368559: flaps 5 degrees were selected with intercept and speed started back to 170 KTS at approximately 15 mi. At this point per the approach plate we started a descent to the initial approach altitude of 1600 ft. At 1600 ft the aircraft was leveled, speed 170 KTS, and the next altitude of 1300 ft selected in the altitude select window. Approach control then handed us over to crp tower. Shortly after this the captain advised me he had the field in sight. As my scan was inside the aircraft and there were a couple of scattered clouds just ahead of us and lower, I did not initially see the airport. After a short adjustment I, too, saw the field directly ahead of us and started the confign for landing. As we were in relatively close proximity to the airport, my attention was now focused outside the aircraft, slowing it, configuring and descending to the runway. The aircraft was put on profile and a landing and rollout was made. A turn was made off the runway and a call made to ground control. With no response, we returned to tower and they advised us we had made a landing at cabaniss nalf 4.6 NM short of crp. The iah to crp leg was mine and was flown in a B737-500 EFIS equipped aircraft. The aircraft was being flown on autoplt and autothrottle until the visual sighting of the runway when it was disconnected and the landing made. The mistake made was relying on our visual sighting of the runway and with that being drawn outside the aircraft disregarding the DME which would have told us we were well short of the crp runway. Also, I was not familiar with the airport having never flown there before. The captain had not been to the airport for approximately 3 yrs. The cabaniss nalf lies directly under the localizer for runway 31 crp and the runway is approximately, if not the same, heading as crp.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING IOE WHILE APCHING CRP, A B737-500 LANDS AT ANOTHER FIELD 5 MI CLOSER THAN CRP.

Narrative: WHILE IN COMMAND AND CONDUCTING IOE AS A LINE CHK AIRMAN ON ACR FLT XXX, AN UNSCHEDULED LNDG WAS MADE AT CABANISS NALF INSTEAD OF LNDG AT CORPUS CHRISTI, TX, AS INTENDED. THE FO WAS WORKING THE CTLS AND I WAS WORKING THE RADIOS AND CHKLISTS. IT WAS ABOUT AA15 CDT AND THE ATIS WAS RPTING 6000 FT OVCST WITH 10 MI VISIBILITY. THERE WAS ALSO AN UNRPTED BROKEN CLOUD DECK AT APPROX 2000 FT THAT WE WERE IN AND OUT OF AS WE WERE ON FINAL. THIS BROKEN DECK SOMEWHAT OBSCURED OUR VIEW OF THE GND. WE HAD BEEN CLRED LOC RWY 31 APCH AT CRP BY CRP APCH AND HAD INTERCEPTED AND WERE TRACKING THE LOC INBOUND. WE WERE STILL USING FULL AUTOPLT AND HAD EXPANDED VOR/ILS SELECTED ON BOTH HSI SCREENS, WITH MANUAL SELECTED ON THE AUTO-MANUAL SWITCH AND THE LOC FREQ TUNED ON THE VHF NAV. CRP APCH HAD TURNED US OVER TO CRP TWR. WE HAD INTERCEPTED THE LOC ABOUT 7 MI SE OF DUCKY IAF. WE WERE AT 2000 FT MSL. THE FO SAID THE NEXT XING ALT WAS 1300 FT AND I CORRECTED HIM AND SAID NO IT WAS 1600 FT AT DUCKY. I REACHED OVER TO THE ALT SELECT WINDOW TO SET 1600 FT IN THE WINDOW. I ALSO DID A CURSORY CHK OF THE ENG AND NAV INSTS TO MAKE SURE WE HAD EVERYTHING PROPERLY SELECTED AND SET UP FOR THE APCH. WHEN I LOOKED BACK OUTSIDE I SAW WHAT I THOUGHT WAS THE INTENDED RWY. I CALLED RWY IN SIGHT TO THE FO AND SAID TO LAND. IT DID CATCH ME BY SURPRISE A LITTLE THAT THE RWY WAS ALREADY THERE BUT I GAVE NO MORE THOUGHT TO IT SINCE I REALIZED WE WERE HIGH ON APCH AND NEEDED TO DSND IMMEDIATELY IF WE WERE TO LAND. I CALLED CRP TWR AND CHKED IN AND TOLD THEM WE HAD RWY IN SIGHT AND WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. WE DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLE AND WENT VISUAL FOR LNDG. WE RECEIVED ABOUT 3 SINK RATE WARNINGS DURING THE DSCNT BUT BECAUSE WE WERE VISUAL WE PROCEEDED IN. WE COMPLETED THE FINAL CONFIGN FOR THE LNDG AND THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST. STILL BELIEVING CABANISS NALF TO BE CRP WE LANDED ON RWY 31 AT CABANISS NALF. ONLY DURING OUR ROLLOUT DID WE REALIZE WE HAD LANDED AT THE WRONG ARPT. WE CONTACTED OUR OPS AT CRP AND EVENTUALLY THE CUSTOMERS WERE BUSSED TO CRP. THERE WERE NO INJURIES OR DAMAGE TO THE ACFT. THE MAIN PROB WAS THAT THE LOC FOR RWY 31 AT CRP RUNS DIRECTLY OVERHEAD CABANISS NALF. ALSO THAT IT HAS A RWY 31 MADE IT APPEAR TO BE RWY 31 AT CRP. I ALSO MADE A MISTAKE IN NOT XCHKING MY DME FROM CRP AFTER WE WENT VISUAL, BUT BECAUSE IT WAS IOE I WAS EXTREMELY BUSY WITH CONFIGURING THE ACFT AND RUNNING THE CHKLIST AND THE DME READING DROPPED OUT OF MY XCHK. ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO OUR MISTAKEN RWY IDENT WAS THAT THE FO HAD NEVER FLOWN INTO CRP AND IT HAD BEEN OVER 3 YRS AT LEAST SINCE I HAD BEEN THERE. ALSO, I SHOULD HAVE EXECUTED A GAR WHEN WE GOT THE SINK RATE WARNINGS EVEN THOUGH WE ARE NOT REQUIRED TO WHEN WE HAVE THE RWY VISUALLY. I FEEL THIS BROKEN CLOUD DECK AT 2000 FT MAY HAVE CAUSED ME TO LOSE MY GEOGRAPHICAL AWARENESS SO WHEN I SAW THE RWY AT CABANISS NALF I ASSUMED IT WAS CRP RWY 31. MY INCREASED WORKLOAD FOR IOE COULD BE A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THIS INCIDENT I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT A WARNING BE PLACED ON AIRLINE COMMERCIAL CHART 10-7 PAGES STATING THAT CABANISS CAN BE MISTAKEN FOR CRP, PARTICULARLY WHEN APCHING FROM THE S FOR RWY 31. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR WAS THE LINE CHK AIRMAN GIVING IOE TO THE FO. THIS WAS THEIR FIRST FLT IN THE B737-500. THE LCA WAS EXPLAINING ALL THE DIFFERENT FEATURES OF THE EFIS PRESENTATION DURING THE APCH. THE FO WAS FOCUSED ON THE UPCOMING LNDG. THERE WAS NO XCHKING OF INST INDICATIONS, THE RPTR WAS SO BUSY INSTRUCTING HE NEVER LOOKED AT HIS DME TO REALIZE HE WAS MORE THAN 5 MI OUT WHEN HE DECIDED HE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT. THE FO HAD NEVER BEEN INTO CRP, HE WAS UNSURE OF EVERYTHING HAPPENING. HE HAD BEEN FLYING THE B737-200 AND THIS WAS HIS TRANSITION TRAINING INTO THE B737-500. HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE B737, BUT NOT ALL THE DIFFERENCES BTWN MODELS. THE FO NEVER GOT TO FLY A SIMULATOR WITH ALL THE EFIS SYS WORKING TO LEARN HOW TO USE IT. WHEN LNDG, THE CAPT NEVER REALIZED HE WAS AT THE WRONG ARPT UNTIL HE TURNED OFF THE RWY. HE TRIED TO GET COMPANY OPS TO KNOW WHICH GATE TO PARK AT BUT WAS UNABLE TO RAISE HIS COMPANY. SO HE CALLED CRP TWR TO SEE IF THEY COULD NOTIFY COMPANY. CRP TWR THEN TOLD HIM HE WASN'T ON THE CRP FIELD. THE RPTR NOTICED THERE WERE NO INST MARKINGS ON THE RWY WHEN THEY LANDED, WHICH WAS HIS FIRST CLUE SOMETHING WAS WRONG. HOWEVER, HE HAD BEEN INTO CRP ONLY 3 TIMES IN HIS CAREER. HE KNEW THE TWR AND TERMINAL WERE ON HIS R AS HE LANDED, AND THE CABANISS NAVAL AUX LNDG FIELD HAD WAREHOUSES AND A TWR ON THE R-HAND SIDE. FROM HIS PERIPHERAL VISION, EVERYTHING LOOKED PROPER. HE DESIRED VERY MUCH TO SIMPLY ADD PWR AND TKOF FOR CRP. RESISTING THAT FEELING WAS SENSIBLE TO HIM AS HE HAD NO TKOF PERFORMANCE DATA FOR THE FIELD HE LANDED AT. THE COMMANDING NAVAL OFFICER CAME OUT TO HIS ACFT AND STATED THAT IF THE FIELD WOULD HAVE HAD MORE ACFT ACTIVITY, IT MIGHT HAVE GIVEN HIM INDICATIONS IT WAS NOT CRP. RPTR WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT TKOF PERFORMANCE WAS GIVEN TO HIM SO HE COULD FLY REVENUE PAX OR AT LEAST FERRY THE ACFT OVER TO CRP. HE ALSO HAD A GREAT DEAL OF ANGER AGAINST HIMSELF FOR LETTING SUCH A THING OCCUR. NO ONE HAS BEEN MORE EMBARRASSED ABOUT IT THAN HIM. COMPANY IS PUTTING HIM THROUGH 2 DAYS OF SIMULATOR TRAINING, MORE IOE FOR HIMSELF, THEN A FINAL LINE CHK. THE COMPANY HAS ASKED FOR HIM AND THE FO TO WRITE A STORY ABOUT HOW IT HAPPENED TO BE PUBLISHED SO ALL PLTS MIGHT BE AWARE OF HOW IT CAN HAPPEN. IT IS TO BE WRITTEN ANONYMOUSLY, BUT EVERYONE KNOWS WHO THE AUTHORS ARE. RPTR SUGGESTS THE NAME OF THE ARPT MIGHT BE WRITTEN ON THE RWY SINCE IT LINES UP WITH CRP RWY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 368559: FLAPS 5 DEGS WERE SELECTED WITH INTERCEPT AND SPD STARTED BACK TO 170 KTS AT APPROX 15 MI. AT THIS POINT PER THE APCH PLATE WE STARTED A DSCNT TO THE INITIAL APCH ALT OF 1600 FT. AT 1600 FT THE ACFT WAS LEVELED, SPD 170 KTS, AND THE NEXT ALT OF 1300 FT SELECTED IN THE ALT SELECT WINDOW. APCH CTL THEN HANDED US OVER TO CRP TWR. SHORTLY AFTER THIS THE CAPT ADVISED ME HE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT. AS MY SCAN WAS INSIDE THE ACFT AND THERE WERE A COUPLE OF SCATTERED CLOUDS JUST AHEAD OF US AND LOWER, I DID NOT INITIALLY SEE THE ARPT. AFTER A SHORT ADJUSTMENT I, TOO, SAW THE FIELD DIRECTLY AHEAD OF US AND STARTED THE CONFIGN FOR LNDG. AS WE WERE IN RELATIVELY CLOSE PROX TO THE ARPT, MY ATTN WAS NOW FOCUSED OUTSIDE THE ACFT, SLOWING IT, CONFIGURING AND DSNDING TO THE RWY. THE ACFT WAS PUT ON PROFILE AND A LNDG AND ROLLOUT WAS MADE. A TURN WAS MADE OFF THE RWY AND A CALL MADE TO GND CTL. WITH NO RESPONSE, WE RETURNED TO TWR AND THEY ADVISED US WE HAD MADE A LNDG AT CABANISS NALF 4.6 NM SHORT OF CRP. THE IAH TO CRP LEG WAS MINE AND WAS FLOWN IN A B737-500 EFIS EQUIPPED ACFT. THE ACFT WAS BEING FLOWN ON AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLE UNTIL THE VISUAL SIGHTING OF THE RWY WHEN IT WAS DISCONNECTED AND THE LNDG MADE. THE MISTAKE MADE WAS RELYING ON OUR VISUAL SIGHTING OF THE RWY AND WITH THAT BEING DRAWN OUTSIDE THE ACFT DISREGARDING THE DME WHICH WOULD HAVE TOLD US WE WERE WELL SHORT OF THE CRP RWY. ALSO, I WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT HAVING NEVER FLOWN THERE BEFORE. THE CAPT HAD NOT BEEN TO THE ARPT FOR APPROX 3 YRS. THE CABANISS NALF LIES DIRECTLY UNDER THE LOC FOR RWY 31 CRP AND THE RWY IS APPROX, IF NOT THE SAME, HDG AS CRP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.