Narrative:

The inbound flight had one write-up regarding a warning light. The first officer and myself situated ourselves in the cockpit while maintenance began its troubleshooting. A cockpit inspection was accomplished by me, at which time I opened the gear pin 'dog house' and verified that the gear pins were correctly stowed. Shortly after, maintenance notified us that they would have to re-position the aircraft to the remote hardstand for troubleshooting. 1 1/2 hours later the aircraft was returned to service. There happened to be only 3 gates at this particular airport, a, B, and C. Gates a and B were occupied and gate C had a B737 pushing off. Our MD80 was being towed over to gate C by the only 2 mechanics at the station. After pushing back, the B737 reported that it could not start its #2 engine and was coming back to the gate C. A decision was made to borrow gate Z from another carrier provided that an expedited boarding process could be accomplished as that carrier had an aircraft inbound due to arrive in 25 mins. Thus a 'maximum expedite effort' was made to make all the logistics work. A level 2 thunderstorm was causing a heavy downpour on the ramp. As the MD80 pulled into gate Z the first officer began his water-logged walkaround. The maintenance personnel deplaned rapidly in order to get over to the B737. The first officer noted that the gear pins were in during his walkaround. At this point during the hectic boarding and dispatch coordination process, I was concerned with a new valid time (a point to remember) the route of flight, owing to WX en route and possible altitude limitations regarding a subsequent pack problem. Out of habit I made a cursory peek into the gear pin dog house (awkward to see fully from the seat) and saw a flash of grease stained orange and wire (I found out later that it was only a ripped off portion of the lower end of the 'remove before flight' orange flag...sans the actual gear pins). 'Assured' that I had previously seen the pins and having glanced at the flag end I thought the gear pins were onboard as no logbook entry of gear pins being installed had been noted when I had checked the ice sign off and no one had informed me otherwise. As the first officer saw me glance at the dog house, he later told me he felt that it would have been redundant to tell me that he had seen the pins installed during the walkaround. We both became 'educated' upon gear retraction. Extremely chagrined we coordinated for a very quick air return. We landed and taxied over to the remote and kept our engines running. Maintenance met the aircraft, apologized and removed the gear pins and handed them to me through the cockpit window. I filled out a captain's irregularity report and asked the first officer to ask the station operations (who with all the confusion were reaching 'meltdown') to verify that our valid time was 'valid.' handing the report through the window I called for a complete review of all checklists. The first officer coordinated with ATC using an ear piece and boom microphone (important, because normally I monitor the communications on #2 radio in the background and in this case I could not). Not sure if he had obtained a new valid time with our operations, I asked on the company frequency if we had a valid time. The agent responded something to the effect that you are 'good to go' (upon reflection I think she was thinking about the previous new valid time). I turned to the first officer who was busy communicating with ground control and asked, while pointing at the release 'do we have everything...are we ready to go?' he indicated in the affirmative. I re-briefed the takeoff briefing. As we climbed out and things settled down I started to review events. Suddenly, I noticed we had made what appeared to be a 2000 pounds overweight landing. During my original (first) takeoff briefing I had discounted the 2000 pounds as a factor as not only would it have been consumed during any carefully executed emergency engine out procedure, but also because it should be noted that according to our dispatch procedures, a 2000 pound 'pad' is built into the accuload takeoff portion only and therefore in actuality owing to the 'pad' the aircraft may have been right at landing weight, and would have allowed us to land exactly at 'real' maximum normal landing weight. The final blow was when I reviewed the paperwork and found out that the valid release time was the original one and had not been updated. The first officer was under the impression that the Z time operations had given him was the new valid time.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD80 IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF RETURNED TO THE FIELD DUE TO BEING UNABLE TO RETRACT THE LNDG GEAR CAUSED BY GEAR PINS NOT REMOVED AFTER MAINT PERFORMED.

Narrative: THE INBOUND FLT HAD ONE WRITE-UP REGARDING A WARNING LIGHT. THE FO AND MYSELF SITUATED OURSELVES IN THE COCKPIT WHILE MAINT BEGAN ITS TROUBLESHOOTING. A COCKPIT INSPECTION WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY ME, AT WHICH TIME I OPENED THE GEAR PIN 'DOG HOUSE' AND VERIFIED THAT THE GEAR PINS WERE CORRECTLY STOWED. SHORTLY AFTER, MAINT NOTIFIED US THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO RE-POS THE ACFT TO THE REMOTE HARDSTAND FOR TROUBLESHOOTING. 1 1/2 HRS LATER THE ACFT WAS RETURNED TO SVC. THERE HAPPENED TO BE ONLY 3 GATES AT THIS PARTICULAR ARPT, A, B, AND C. GATES A AND B WERE OCCUPIED AND GATE C HAD A B737 PUSHING OFF. OUR MD80 WAS BEING TOWED OVER TO GATE C BY THE ONLY 2 MECHS AT THE STATION. AFTER PUSHING BACK, THE B737 RPTED THAT IT COULD NOT START ITS #2 ENG AND WAS COMING BACK TO THE GATE C. A DECISION WAS MADE TO BORROW GATE Z FROM ANOTHER CARRIER PROVIDED THAT AN EXPEDITED BOARDING PROCESS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AS THAT CARRIER HAD AN ACFT INBOUND DUE TO ARRIVE IN 25 MINS. THUS A 'MAX EXPEDITE EFFORT' WAS MADE TO MAKE ALL THE LOGISTICS WORK. A LEVEL 2 TSTM WAS CAUSING A HVY DOWNPOUR ON THE RAMP. AS THE MD80 PULLED INTO GATE Z THE FO BEGAN HIS WATER-LOGGED WALKAROUND. THE MAINT PERSONNEL DEPLANED RAPIDLY IN ORDER TO GET OVER TO THE B737. THE FO NOTED THAT THE GEAR PINS WERE IN DURING HIS WALKAROUND. AT THIS POINT DURING THE HECTIC BOARDING AND DISPATCH COORD PROCESS, I WAS CONCERNED WITH A NEW VALID TIME (A POINT TO REMEMBER) THE RTE OF FLT, OWING TO WX ENRTE AND POSSIBLE ALT LIMITATIONS REGARDING A SUBSEQUENT PACK PROB. OUT OF HABIT I MADE A CURSORY PEEK INTO THE GEAR PIN DOG HOUSE (AWKWARD TO SEE FULLY FROM THE SEAT) AND SAW A FLASH OF GREASE STAINED ORANGE AND WIRE (I FOUND OUT LATER THAT IT WAS ONLY A RIPPED OFF PORTION OF THE LOWER END OF THE 'REMOVE BEFORE FLT' ORANGE FLAG...SANS THE ACTUAL GEAR PINS). 'ASSURED' THAT I HAD PREVIOUSLY SEEN THE PINS AND HAVING GLANCED AT THE FLAG END I THOUGHT THE GEAR PINS WERE ONBOARD AS NO LOGBOOK ENTRY OF GEAR PINS BEING INSTALLED HAD BEEN NOTED WHEN I HAD CHKED THE ICE SIGN OFF AND NO ONE HAD INFORMED ME OTHERWISE. AS THE FO SAW ME GLANCE AT THE DOG HOUSE, HE LATER TOLD ME HE FELT THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN REDUNDANT TO TELL ME THAT HE HAD SEEN THE PINS INSTALLED DURING THE WALKAROUND. WE BOTH BECAME 'EDUCATED' UPON GEAR RETRACTION. EXTREMELY CHAGRINED WE COORDINATED FOR A VERY QUICK AIR RETURN. WE LANDED AND TAXIED OVER TO THE REMOTE AND KEPT OUR ENGS RUNNING. MAINT MET THE ACFT, APOLOGIZED AND REMOVED THE GEAR PINS AND HANDED THEM TO ME THROUGH THE COCKPIT WINDOW. I FILLED OUT A CAPT'S IRREGULARITY RPT AND ASKED THE FO TO ASK THE STATION OPS (WHO WITH ALL THE CONFUSION WERE REACHING 'MELTDOWN') TO VERIFY THAT OUR VALID TIME WAS 'VALID.' HANDING THE RPT THROUGH THE WINDOW I CALLED FOR A COMPLETE REVIEW OF ALL CHKLISTS. THE FO COORDINATED WITH ATC USING AN EAR PIECE AND BOOM MIKE (IMPORTANT, BECAUSE NORMALLY I MONITOR THE COMS ON #2 RADIO IN THE BACKGROUND AND IN THIS CASE I COULD NOT). NOT SURE IF HE HAD OBTAINED A NEW VALID TIME WITH OUR OPS, I ASKED ON THE COMPANY FREQ IF WE HAD A VALID TIME. THE AGENT RESPONDED SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT YOU ARE 'GOOD TO GO' (UPON REFLECTION I THINK SHE WAS THINKING ABOUT THE PREVIOUS NEW VALID TIME). I TURNED TO THE FO WHO WAS BUSY COMMUNICATING WITH GND CTL AND ASKED, WHILE POINTING AT THE RELEASE 'DO WE HAVE EVERYTHING...ARE WE READY TO GO?' HE INDICATED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. I RE-BRIEFED THE TKOF BRIEFING. AS WE CLBED OUT AND THINGS SETTLED DOWN I STARTED TO REVIEW EVENTS. SUDDENLY, I NOTICED WE HAD MADE WHAT APPEARED TO BE A 2000 LBS OVERWT LNDG. DURING MY ORIGINAL (FIRST) TKOF BRIEFING I HAD DISCOUNTED THE 2000 LBS AS A FACTOR AS NOT ONLY WOULD IT HAVE BEEN CONSUMED DURING ANY CAREFULLY EXECUTED EMER ENG OUT PROC, BUT ALSO BECAUSE IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT ACCORDING TO OUR DISPATCH PROCS, A 2000 LB 'PAD' IS BUILT INTO THE ACCULOAD TKOF PORTION ONLY AND THEREFORE IN ACTUALITY OWING TO THE 'PAD' THE ACFT MAY HAVE BEEN RIGHT AT LNDG WT, AND WOULD HAVE ALLOWED US TO LAND EXACTLY AT 'REAL' MAX NORMAL LNDG WT. THE FINAL BLOW WAS WHEN I REVIEWED THE PAPERWORK AND FOUND OUT THAT THE VALID RELEASE TIME WAS THE ORIGINAL ONE AND HAD NOT BEEN UPDATED. THE FO WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE Z TIME OPS HAD GIVEN HIM WAS THE NEW VALID TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.