Narrative:

Severe clear, an oddity for lax. Center asked us to maintain 310 KTS commencing the civet arrival. (The DC8 does not have speed brakes and only uses reverse in unusual circumstances due to the age of the aircraft.) approach asked us to slow to 250 KTS and then 190 KTS to limma. (Flap speed on the DC8 is 230 KTS.) the approach was bumpy due to some of the winds (obviously the reason for clear visibility). At approximately 300 ft we experienced a +12-15 KTS on the airspeed. The landing was uneventful. On landing I had the first officer report the airspeed deviation out to realize we were still on approach. I always use the taxi lights as my cue as to whether I've been cleared to land (the position was off, I was never cleared). Contributing factors: 1) unusually high chatter on the approach frequency. 2) winds. 3) high speed approach. 4) first officer with limited lax experience. 5) captain's myopic concern with airspeed and failure to monitor entire cockpit procedures (obvious complacency). Note: the engineer had just recently moved back to the engineer position from captain due to age 60. All 3 of us never heard approach say switch and none of us made notice passing limma of needing to make the switch. Ground diplomat called to advise us that tower suggested we check a possible problem with our radios.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A DC8-71 FAILED TO CONTACT TWR FOR LNDG CLRNC AND LANDED WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: SEVERE CLR, AN ODDITY FOR LAX. CTR ASKED US TO MAINTAIN 310 KTS COMMENCING THE CIVET ARR. (THE DC8 DOES NOT HAVE SPD BRAKES AND ONLY USES REVERSE IN UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES DUE TO THE AGE OF THE ACFT.) APCH ASKED US TO SLOW TO 250 KTS AND THEN 190 KTS TO LIMMA. (FLAP SPD ON THE DC8 IS 230 KTS.) THE APCH WAS BUMPY DUE TO SOME OF THE WINDS (OBVIOUSLY THE REASON FOR CLR VISIBILITY). AT APPROX 300 FT WE EXPERIENCED A +12-15 KTS ON THE AIRSPD. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. ON LNDG I HAD THE FO RPT THE AIRSPD DEV OUT TO REALIZE WE WERE STILL ON APCH. I ALWAYS USE THE TAXI LIGHTS AS MY CUE AS TO WHETHER I'VE BEEN CLRED TO LAND (THE POS WAS OFF, I WAS NEVER CLRED). CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) UNUSUALLY HIGH CHATTER ON THE APCH FREQ. 2) WINDS. 3) HIGH SPD APCH. 4) FO WITH LIMITED LAX EXPERIENCE. 5) CAPT'S MYOPIC CONCERN WITH AIRSPD AND FAILURE TO MONITOR ENTIRE COCKPIT PROCS (OBVIOUS COMPLACENCY). NOTE: THE ENGINEER HAD JUST RECENTLY MOVED BACK TO THE ENGINEER POS FROM CAPT DUE TO AGE 60. ALL 3 OF US NEVER HEARD APCH SAY SWITCH AND NONE OF US MADE NOTICE PASSING LIMMA OF NEEDING TO MAKE THE SWITCH. GND DIPLOMAT CALLED TO ADVISE US THAT TWR SUGGESTED WE CHK A POSSIBLE PROB WITH OUR RADIOS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.