Narrative:

Landed at hub, had an aircraft swap. Flight release showed mixed engines of -9 and -15. Arrived at aircraft, saw no 'stickers/placards' for affected components. Called maintenance control, found engine had been changed last night (now both - 15's). Called dispatch, requiring new release. Went to get new paperwork. About this time, first officer noted 3000+ pounds of fuel in center tank. (We need full wings if center greater than 1000 pounds). He contacts maintenance to start moving center tank fuel to mains -- which (of course) now requires a new release because of 3000+ pounds fuel. Finally en route, first officer and I began discussing all the confusion. That's when we discovered the 'performance book' hadn't been changed (still had -9 engine data). Safety not (necessarily) compromised because we had data for the 'lower' pwred engines. So we were obviously (in this case) over pwred by our calculations. But there was too many things going on to catch 'em all. We, the pilots, as the ultimate safety catch, need help from our company, to help insure all procedural aspects are in place -- to help us with the safety of our passenger. Contributing factors: 1) aircraft swap. 2) new company procedure for aircraft log book that doesn't leave much information in book (ie, new engine, not shown in aircraft logbook). 3) some parts done, ie 'stickers removed,' our 'speed book' changed. 4) fuel in center tank -- not just 3000 pounds extra. 5) our schedules -- we are required to fly far too much. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that the company has since had a meeting regarding this discrepancy along with other issues to attempt avoiding a future recurrence. He stated that this error was directly caused by a lack of company communication between maintenance and operations. It was the responsibility of maintenance to provide appropriate operating data and placards for equipment changes. He further stated that only time will tell if this same problem has been corrected. The location of this incident was phoenix, az.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A B737-200, NOTICED ENRTE THAT THE ACFT PERFORMANCE BOOK HAD NOT BEEN CHANGED TO REFLECT A NEWLY INSTALLED DIFFERENT MODEL ENG ON 1 SIDE THAN THE STANDARD (-15 IN LIEU OF A -9). THEREFORE, THEY HAD ONLY -9 DATA TO USE IN OPERATING BOTH ENGS. HOWEVER, IT IS NOTED THAT IN THIS INSTANCE, SAFETY WAS NOT COMPROMISED SINCE LESS PWR WAS USED OUT OF THE -15 ENG THAN IT WAS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING.

Narrative: LANDED AT HUB, HAD AN ACFT SWAP. FLT RELEASE SHOWED MIXED ENGS OF -9 AND -15. ARRIVED AT ACFT, SAW NO 'STICKERS/PLACARDS' FOR AFFECTED COMPONENTS. CALLED MAINT CTL, FOUND ENG HAD BEEN CHANGED LAST NIGHT (NOW BOTH - 15'S). CALLED DISPATCH, REQUIRING NEW RELEASE. WENT TO GET NEW PAPERWORK. ABOUT THIS TIME, FO NOTED 3000+ LBS OF FUEL IN CTR TANK. (WE NEED FULL WINGS IF CTR GREATER THAN 1000 LBS). HE CONTACTS MAINT TO START MOVING CTR TANK FUEL TO MAINS -- WHICH (OF COURSE) NOW REQUIRES A NEW RELEASE BECAUSE OF 3000+ LBS FUEL. FINALLY ENRTE, FO AND I BEGAN DISCUSSING ALL THE CONFUSION. THAT'S WHEN WE DISCOVERED THE 'PERFORMANCE BOOK' HADN'T BEEN CHANGED (STILL HAD -9 ENG DATA). SAFETY NOT (NECESSARILY) COMPROMISED BECAUSE WE HAD DATA FOR THE 'LOWER' PWRED ENGS. SO WE WERE OBVIOUSLY (IN THIS CASE) OVER PWRED BY OUR CALCULATIONS. BUT THERE WAS TOO MANY THINGS GOING ON TO CATCH 'EM ALL. WE, THE PLTS, AS THE ULTIMATE SAFETY CATCH, NEED HELP FROM OUR COMPANY, TO HELP INSURE ALL PROCEDURAL ASPECTS ARE IN PLACE -- TO HELP US WITH THE SAFETY OF OUR PAX. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) ACFT SWAP. 2) NEW COMPANY PROC FOR ACFT LOG BOOK THAT DOESN'T LEAVE MUCH INFO IN BOOK (IE, NEW ENG, NOT SHOWN IN ACFT LOGBOOK). 3) SOME PARTS DONE, IE 'STICKERS REMOVED,' OUR 'SPD BOOK' CHANGED. 4) FUEL IN CTR TANK -- NOT JUST 3000 LBS EXTRA. 5) OUR SCHEDULES -- WE ARE REQUIRED TO FLY FAR TOO MUCH. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE COMPANY HAS SINCE HAD A MEETING REGARDING THIS DISCREPANCY ALONG WITH OTHER ISSUES TO ATTEMPT AVOIDING A FUTURE RECURRENCE. HE STATED THAT THIS ERROR WAS DIRECTLY CAUSED BY A LACK OF COMPANY COM BTWN MAINT AND OPS. IT WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MAINT TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE OPERATING DATA AND PLACARDS FOR EQUIP CHANGES. HE FURTHER STATED THAT ONLY TIME WILL TELL IF THIS SAME PROB HAS BEEN CORRECTED. THE LOCATION OF THIS INCIDENT WAS PHOENIX, AZ.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.