Narrative:

During preparations for a flight from cvg to syr, the FMS was initialized and the company-stored flight plan was pulled up and was checked against our flight release routing and ATC clearance. We both looked at the rtes, believed they matched and activated/executed the FMS flight plan. I was the PNF. During cruise climb, passing approximately FL230 and approximately 10 NM north of the ffo VOR, the ZID controller asked if we 'were navigating to rod.' I responded 'affirmative.' the controller replied, 'negative, negative, turn right to 060 degrees.' we complied and continued climbing while rechking our routing. Rod was not on it. The route read in part: ffo direct djb. The FMS was programmed to fly ffo direct rod direct djb. In retrospect, we did remember noting the difference on the ground but, probably due to typical interruptions, neither of us deleted the unwanted fix. We did not observe any conflicting traffic nor did ATC issue any. Our TCASII display did not show potential conflicting traffic within 40 NM (the longest range that can be displayed). Our climb was not stopped. After a short while the controller asked for our ATC route clearance. I complied and read it to him. He then gave us a short lecture on being sure to check issued clrncs more carefully and that the center had had several previous instances of company aircraft deviating from ATC routing in the same area. He stated he knew we had been briefed by our company on this problem because of contacts with our chief pilot. I replied that we had indeed been briefed but that somehow the error slipped through. He then cleared us direct to djb and on course and handed us off. All communications were calm and cordial. I believe several interruptions with ground servicing tasks during the FMS setup contributed to the programming oversight. This is the first time in my 2 yrs of FMS operation that I have had a problem with a navigation excursion of this kind. Other than more vigilance by crews, the only way this problem might be avoided in the future is to have company more vigorously update 'problem' FMS flight plans, especially when the database does not match scheduled but different routings over extended periods of time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF MDT NEGLECTS TO UPDATE FMS FLT PLAN RESULTING IN HDG DEV TO WRONG VOR. RADAR CTLR CAUGHT THE ERROR.

Narrative: DURING PREPARATIONS FOR A FLT FROM CVG TO SYR, THE FMS WAS INITIALIZED AND THE COMPANY-STORED FLT PLAN WAS PULLED UP AND WAS CHKED AGAINST OUR FLT RELEASE ROUTING AND ATC CLRNC. WE BOTH LOOKED AT THE RTES, BELIEVED THEY MATCHED AND ACTIVATED/EXECUTED THE FMS FLT PLAN. I WAS THE PNF. DURING CRUISE CLB, PASSING APPROX FL230 AND APPROX 10 NM N OF THE FFO VOR, THE ZID CTLR ASKED IF WE 'WERE NAVING TO ROD.' I RESPONDED 'AFFIRMATIVE.' THE CTLR REPLIED, 'NEGATIVE, NEGATIVE, TURN R TO 060 DEGS.' WE COMPLIED AND CONTINUED CLBING WHILE RECHKING OUR ROUTING. ROD WAS NOT ON IT. THE RTE READ IN PART: FFO DIRECT DJB. THE FMS WAS PROGRAMMED TO FLY FFO DIRECT ROD DIRECT DJB. IN RETROSPECT, WE DID REMEMBER NOTING THE DIFFERENCE ON THE GND BUT, PROBABLY DUE TO TYPICAL INTERRUPTIONS, NEITHER OF US DELETED THE UNWANTED FIX. WE DID NOT OBSERVE ANY CONFLICTING TFC NOR DID ATC ISSUE ANY. OUR TCASII DISPLAY DID NOT SHOW POTENTIAL CONFLICTING TFC WITHIN 40 NM (THE LONGEST RANGE THAT CAN BE DISPLAYED). OUR CLB WAS NOT STOPPED. AFTER A SHORT WHILE THE CTLR ASKED FOR OUR ATC RTE CLRNC. I COMPLIED AND READ IT TO HIM. HE THEN GAVE US A SHORT LECTURE ON BEING SURE TO CHK ISSUED CLRNCS MORE CAREFULLY AND THAT THE CTR HAD HAD SEVERAL PREVIOUS INSTANCES OF COMPANY ACFT DEVIATING FROM ATC ROUTING IN THE SAME AREA. HE STATED HE KNEW WE HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY OUR COMPANY ON THIS PROB BECAUSE OF CONTACTS WITH OUR CHIEF PLT. I REPLIED THAT WE HAD INDEED BEEN BRIEFED BUT THAT SOMEHOW THE ERROR SLIPPED THROUGH. HE THEN CLRED US DIRECT TO DJB AND ON COURSE AND HANDED US OFF. ALL COMS WERE CALM AND CORDIAL. I BELIEVE SEVERAL INTERRUPTIONS WITH GND SVCING TASKS DURING THE FMS SETUP CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROGRAMMING OVERSIGHT. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN MY 2 YRS OF FMS OP THAT I HAVE HAD A PROB WITH A NAV EXCURSION OF THIS KIND. OTHER THAN MORE VIGILANCE BY CREWS, THE ONLY WAY THIS PROB MIGHT BE AVOIDED IN THE FUTURE IS TO HAVE COMPANY MORE VIGOROUSLY UPDATE 'PROB' FMS FLT PLANS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE DATABASE DOES NOT MATCH SCHEDULED BUT DIFFERENT ROUTINGS OVER EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.