37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 375884 |
Time | |
Date | 199707 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lax |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 7300 msl bound upper : 8000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : lax |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | descent : approach descent other landing other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 210 flight time total : 6200 flight time type : 550 |
ASRS Report | 375884 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 230 flight time total : 21000 flight time type : 9000 |
ASRS Report | 375479 |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : crossing restriction not met altitude deviation : overshoot non adherence : clearance non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
While descending into lax via civet 1 arrival, we were cleared for the ILS runway 25L. Intercepted localizer and tracked it while descending. Socal approach then cleared us to cross hunda intersection at or above 3500 ft. We interpreted this as the only restr on the approach. Due to aircraft weight and numerous speed restrs issued by socal, the captain elected to begin descent early for hunda crossing altitude. We crossed hunda at 3600 ft and made normal visual approach and landing. Ground control requested that we contact socal by phone who noted that we crossed fuelr intersection at 7300 ft rather than 8000 ft as depicted on ILS runway 25L approach plate. I believe this misunderstanding to be caused by the vague instructions issued by socal approach. If socal had been more explicit on the terminology, then the crew would have had no doubt that we were to stay on the GS ensuring all crossing restrs would be complied with. We were unsure as to our clearance but due to frequency congestion we were discouraged from clarifying the instructions. In addition, the captain's numerous assertions to the first officer that he 'knew what he was doing' prevented the probationary first officer from challenging the captain on his descent profile. Supplemental information from acn 375479: my understanding is, when given a new crossing restr, it voids any prior restr, unless prior restrs are given in the new clearance.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-300 ACFT DSNDING ON CIVET ARR AND CLRED FOR ILS APCH. FLC MISUNDERSTOOD CLRNC AND DSNDED BELOW XING RESTR ALT BY 700 FT. RPTR FO STATES THAT BECAUSE HE WAS ON PROBATION, HE DIDN'T CHALLENGE CAPT'S COMMENTS ABOUT KNOWING WHAT HE WAS DOING.
Narrative: WHILE DSNDING INTO LAX VIA CIVET 1 ARR, WE WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 25L. INTERCEPTED LOC AND TRACKED IT WHILE DSNDING. SOCAL APCH THEN CLRED US TO CROSS HUNDA INTXN AT OR ABOVE 3500 FT. WE INTERPRETED THIS AS THE ONLY RESTR ON THE APCH. DUE TO ACFT WT AND NUMEROUS SPD RESTRS ISSUED BY SOCAL, THE CAPT ELECTED TO BEGIN DSCNT EARLY FOR HUNDA XING ALT. WE CROSSED HUNDA AT 3600 FT AND MADE NORMAL VISUAL APCH AND LNDG. GND CTL REQUESTED THAT WE CONTACT SOCAL BY PHONE WHO NOTED THAT WE CROSSED FUELR INTXN AT 7300 FT RATHER THAN 8000 FT AS DEPICTED ON ILS RWY 25L APCH PLATE. I BELIEVE THIS MISUNDERSTANDING TO BE CAUSED BY THE VAGUE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY SOCAL APCH. IF SOCAL HAD BEEN MORE EXPLICIT ON THE TERMINOLOGY, THEN THE CREW WOULD HAVE HAD NO DOUBT THAT WE WERE TO STAY ON THE GS ENSURING ALL XING RESTRS WOULD BE COMPLIED WITH. WE WERE UNSURE AS TO OUR CLRNC BUT DUE TO FREQ CONGESTION WE WERE DISCOURAGED FROM CLARIFYING THE INSTRUCTIONS. IN ADDITION, THE CAPT'S NUMEROUS ASSERTIONS TO THE FO THAT HE 'KNEW WHAT HE WAS DOING' PREVENTED THE PROBATIONARY FO FROM CHALLENGING THE CAPT ON HIS DSCNT PROFILE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 375479: MY UNDERSTANDING IS, WHEN GIVEN A NEW XING RESTR, IT VOIDS ANY PRIOR RESTR, UNLESS PRIOR RESTRS ARE GIVEN IN THE NEW CLRNC.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.