Narrative:

Climbing to FL190 after takeoff from indianapolis, ZAU transmitted for us to slow to 280 KTS for spacing into ord. Because of my poor fitting ear piece and noisy cockpit (wind noise) I asked the first officer what the heading was that ATC wanted. The first officer replied 280 as she looked in her airway manual for the kokomo arrival into ord. I began a 20 degree bank to the left to 280 degrees. We had just finished dealing with a red gear door light that would not go out with the gear handle in the center or off position. Just about the time I rolled the aircraft out on a 280 degree heading, ZAU asked if we were proceeding direct kokomo. At this time the first officer looked up from her search to find the STAR and told me the 280 was a speed reduction, not a heading change. We confessed our miscom to ATC and were issued a heading for knox VOR to resume the kokomo arrival into ord. I asked the controller if there was a problem and the controller replied no, that he caught the turn in time. Several factors led to this miscom: 1) this is the first time in several yrs that I have actually flown the kokomo arrival from indianapolis to ord. Every other time ZAU gives us a radar vector towards ord to be followed by a clearance to direct ord shortly thereafter. 2) I had my STAR out, the first officer did not. Had the first officer had the arrival out instead of looking for it, she would have noticed me turning instead of slowing and asked me where I was going. 3) my poor fitting ear piece combined with a noisy cockpit (wind noise) made radio reception from ZAU less than ideal. 4) fatigue also is a factor that enters into the equation. Being the first night back to work and adjusting to sleeping days is especially difficult after flying from seattle to minneapolis to ind. 5) the nose gear door light problem was an added distraction. 6) finally, I should have verified the heading change from ZAU. This would have prevented the turn. Extra vigilance is required from all flight crew members when they feel like it the least -- at the end of a long night on the first day back to work.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR FREIGHTER FLC TURNS TO THE HDG EQUIVALENT FOR THE AIRSPD GIVEN. DUE TO POOR INFO EXCHANGE BTWN THE FLC THE DIRECTION ERROR WAS NOT CAUGHT UNTIL THE ARTCC RADAR CTLR QUESTIONED THEIR RTE.

Narrative: CLBING TO FL190 AFTER TKOF FROM INDIANAPOLIS, ZAU XMITTED FOR US TO SLOW TO 280 KTS FOR SPACING INTO ORD. BECAUSE OF MY POOR FITTING EAR PIECE AND NOISY COCKPIT (WIND NOISE) I ASKED THE FO WHAT THE HDG WAS THAT ATC WANTED. THE FO REPLIED 280 AS SHE LOOKED IN HER AIRWAY MANUAL FOR THE KOKOMO ARR INTO ORD. I BEGAN A 20 DEG BANK TO THE L TO 280 DEGS. WE HAD JUST FINISHED DEALING WITH A RED GEAR DOOR LIGHT THAT WOULD NOT GO OUT WITH THE GEAR HANDLE IN THE CTR OR OFF POS. JUST ABOUT THE TIME I ROLLED THE ACFT OUT ON A 280 DEG HDG, ZAU ASKED IF WE WERE PROCEEDING DIRECT KOKOMO. AT THIS TIME THE FO LOOKED UP FROM HER SEARCH TO FIND THE STAR AND TOLD ME THE 280 WAS A SPD REDUCTION, NOT A HDG CHANGE. WE CONFESSED OUR MISCOM TO ATC AND WERE ISSUED A HDG FOR KNOX VOR TO RESUME THE KOKOMO ARR INTO ORD. I ASKED THE CTLR IF THERE WAS A PROB AND THE CTLR REPLIED NO, THAT HE CAUGHT THE TURN IN TIME. SEVERAL FACTORS LED TO THIS MISCOM: 1) THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL YRS THAT I HAVE ACTUALLY FLOWN THE KOKOMO ARR FROM INDIANAPOLIS TO ORD. EVERY OTHER TIME ZAU GIVES US A RADAR VECTOR TOWARDS ORD TO BE FOLLOWED BY A CLRNC TO DIRECT ORD SHORTLY THEREAFTER. 2) I HAD MY STAR OUT, THE FO DID NOT. HAD THE FO HAD THE ARR OUT INSTEAD OF LOOKING FOR IT, SHE WOULD HAVE NOTICED ME TURNING INSTEAD OF SLOWING AND ASKED ME WHERE I WAS GOING. 3) MY POOR FITTING EAR PIECE COMBINED WITH A NOISY COCKPIT (WIND NOISE) MADE RADIO RECEPTION FROM ZAU LESS THAN IDEAL. 4) FATIGUE ALSO IS A FACTOR THAT ENTERS INTO THE EQUATION. BEING THE FIRST NIGHT BACK TO WORK AND ADJUSTING TO SLEEPING DAYS IS ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT AFTER FLYING FROM SEATTLE TO MINNEAPOLIS TO IND. 5) THE NOSE GEAR DOOR LIGHT PROB WAS AN ADDED DISTR. 6) FINALLY, I SHOULD HAVE VERIFIED THE HDG CHANGE FROM ZAU. THIS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE TURN. EXTRA VIGILANCE IS REQUIRED FROM ALL FLC MEMBERS WHEN THEY FEEL LIKE IT THE LEAST -- AT THE END OF A LONG NIGHT ON THE FIRST DAY BACK TO WORK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.