Narrative:

After the captain's landing on runway 21L at dtw, the tower controller instructed us to hold short of runway 21C at taxiway F. I acknowledged the hold short clearance with our call sign, and the captain and I discussed the hold short clearance, as well as our probable taxi route to the gate. I was in the process of completing the 'after landing' checklist, and I was observing the departing aircraft lined up for runway 21C when I looked up and saw our aircraft approaching the hold short line in question. I shouted at the captain to 'hold short!' and he aggressively applied the brakes, but the nose of our aircraft had passed across the hold short line for runway 21C. Rapidly assessing the situation with the departing aircraft, the captain elected to clear runway 21C by expeditiously taxiing across the runway at taxiway F. While we were taxiing across the runway, an air carrier Y aircraft had been cleared for takeoff on runway 21C and had begun his takeoff roll. The air carrier Y aircraft completed a normal takeoff, and the tower controller did not realize we had inadvertently crossed the runway until after the event was over. I do not know what our lateral separation was from air carrier Y, but I do know that we had completely crossed the runway while that aircraft was early in his takeoff roll. Later when asked why he did not hold short, the captain explained that he had heard the tower controller clear an aircraft 'into position and hold, traffic crossing downfield.' the captain thought we had been cleared to cross runway 21C, when in fact we had not. Hindsight told him that the clearance 'into position and hold' etc, was for the aircraft behind air carrier Y aircraft previously discussed. Analysis: traffic on runway 21L and runway 21C was being controled on 1 tower frequency, 118.4, and the frequency was very busy. Possibly the captain heard something that he misconstrued as a clearance for us to cross. At some airports you switch to ground control frequency after landing while holding short of active runways. This is very simply a human error incident. The captain took action based on a clearance he did not have. The first officer after discussion with the captain, was confident the captain understood he was to hold short of runway 21C. Perhaps the lesson learned should be as a hold short point is approached, both pilots should once again confirm that they are to hold short at the appropriate point, even to the exclusion of all other duties.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF A DC9 FAILED TO HOLD SHORT OF AN ACTIVE RWY ON WHICH A B757 WAS ON TKOF ROLL RESULTING IN THE CAPT REALIZING HIS MISTAKE AND CONTINUING ON QUICKLY TO CLR THE RWY AND THE B757 CONTINUING TKOF.

Narrative: AFTER THE CAPT'S LNDG ON RWY 21L AT DTW, THE TWR CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 21C AT TXWY F. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE HOLD SHORT CLRNC WITH OUR CALL SIGN, AND THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE HOLD SHORT CLRNC, AS WELL AS OUR PROBABLE TAXI RTE TO THE GATE. I WAS IN THE PROCESS OF COMPLETING THE 'AFTER LNDG' CHKLIST, AND I WAS OBSERVING THE DEPARTING ACFT LINED UP FOR RWY 21C WHEN I LOOKED UP AND SAW OUR ACFT APCHING THE HOLD SHORT LINE IN QUESTION. I SHOUTED AT THE CAPT TO 'HOLD SHORT!' AND HE AGGRESSIVELY APPLIED THE BRAKES, BUT THE NOSE OF OUR ACFT HAD PASSED ACROSS THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 21C. RAPIDLY ASSESSING THE SIT WITH THE DEPARTING ACFT, THE CAPT ELECTED TO CLR RWY 21C BY EXPEDITIOUSLY TAXIING ACROSS THE RWY AT TXWY F. WHILE WE WERE TAXIING ACROSS THE RWY, AN ACR Y ACFT HAD BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 21C AND HAD BEGUN HIS TKOF ROLL. THE ACR Y ACFT COMPLETED A NORMAL TKOF, AND THE TWR CTLR DID NOT REALIZE WE HAD INADVERTENTLY CROSSED THE RWY UNTIL AFTER THE EVENT WAS OVER. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT OUR LATERAL SEPARATION WAS FROM ACR Y, BUT I DO KNOW THAT WE HAD COMPLETELY CROSSED THE RWY WHILE THAT ACFT WAS EARLY IN HIS TKOF ROLL. LATER WHEN ASKED WHY HE DID NOT HOLD SHORT, THE CAPT EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD HEARD THE TWR CTLR CLR AN ACFT 'INTO POS AND HOLD, TFC XING DOWNFIELD.' THE CAPT THOUGHT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO CROSS RWY 21C, WHEN IN FACT WE HAD NOT. HINDSIGHT TOLD HIM THAT THE CLRNC 'INTO POS AND HOLD' ETC, WAS FOR THE ACFT BEHIND ACR Y ACFT PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED. ANALYSIS: TFC ON RWY 21L AND RWY 21C WAS BEING CTLED ON 1 TWR FREQ, 118.4, AND THE FREQ WAS VERY BUSY. POSSIBLY THE CAPT HEARD SOMETHING THAT HE MISCONSTRUED AS A CLRNC FOR US TO CROSS. AT SOME ARPTS YOU SWITCH TO GND CTL FREQ AFTER LNDG WHILE HOLDING SHORT OF ACTIVE RWYS. THIS IS VERY SIMPLY A HUMAN ERROR INCIDENT. THE CAPT TOOK ACTION BASED ON A CLRNC HE DID NOT HAVE. THE FO AFTER DISCUSSION WITH THE CAPT, WAS CONFIDENT THE CAPT UNDERSTOOD HE WAS TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 21C. PERHAPS THE LESSON LEARNED SHOULD BE AS A HOLD SHORT POINT IS APCHED, BOTH PLTS SHOULD ONCE AGAIN CONFIRM THAT THEY ARE TO HOLD SHORT AT THE APPROPRIATE POINT, EVEN TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHER DUTIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.