Narrative:

On initial contact with ground control at position 1V, first officer thought he heard 'taxi to runway 27, position and hold.' he then read back to ground control 'position and hold runway 27.' captain asked first officer if flight air carrier X had been clear to runway 27 position and hold, and first officer confirmed that was the clearance from ground control. Captain visually checked final approach path and saw no aircraft on or in the area, proceeded to taxi into position and hold runway 27, taxied past night runup point (displaced threshold due to construction on approach end of runway 27). Ground control then asked if we were on the runway 27, we responded affirmative. Ground then cleared us, expedited our takeoff, and said there was traffic on short final. Air carrier X switched to tower frequency and informed them we were on takeoff roll. Tower acknowledged our call and confirmed clearance, when switching to departure control ('to be careful when going out there' -- tower's last comment). (Ie, runway 27.) end of occurrence. This miscom/misunderstanding had several other factors involved: 1) flight air carrier X was delayed 1 hour 30 mins from an XX42L scheduled departure due to loading. Crew was fatigued. First leg with this crew together. 2) there was no other ground traffic in the general area -- ground or air. Very short taxi distance when entering airport ground control area. 3) miscom of what was thought to be clearance onto runway 27 led to flight air carrier X not being on tower frequency when taxiing onto runway 27. 4) ground or tower never admitted that our clearance was other than what we interpreted (cleared into position and hold). Being on ground control versus tower while on runway was the most dangerous of events.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN A300 AIRBUS, TAXIED ONTO RWY AND STARTED TKOF VIA GND CTL INSTRUCTIONS INSTEAD OF LCL CTL. THEY DID ADVISE LCL CTL THAT THEY WERE TAKING OFF. LCL ROGERED AND SUGGESTED THAT 'THEY BE CAREFUL OUT THERE.'

Narrative: ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH GND CTL AT POS 1V, FO THOUGHT HE HEARD 'TAXI TO RWY 27, POS AND HOLD.' HE THEN READ BACK TO GND CTL 'POS AND HOLD RWY 27.' CAPT ASKED FO IF FLT ACR X HAD BEEN CLR TO RWY 27 POS AND HOLD, AND FO CONFIRMED THAT WAS THE CLRNC FROM GND CTL. CAPT VISUALLY CHKED FINAL APCH PATH AND SAW NO ACFT ON OR IN THE AREA, PROCEEDED TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD RWY 27, TAXIED PAST NIGHT RUNUP POINT (DISPLACED THRESHOLD DUE TO CONSTRUCTION ON APCH END OF RWY 27). GND CTL THEN ASKED IF WE WERE ON THE RWY 27, WE RESPONDED AFFIRMATIVE. GND THEN CLRED US, EXPEDITED OUR TKOF, AND SAID THERE WAS TFC ON SHORT FINAL. ACR X SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ AND INFORMED THEM WE WERE ON TKOF ROLL. TWR ACKNOWLEDGED OUR CALL AND CONFIRMED CLRNC, WHEN SWITCHING TO DEP CTL ('TO BE CAREFUL WHEN GOING OUT THERE' -- TWR'S LAST COMMENT). (IE, RWY 27.) END OF OCCURRENCE. THIS MISCOM/MISUNDERSTANDING HAD SEVERAL OTHER FACTORS INVOLVED: 1) FLT ACR X WAS DELAYED 1 HR 30 MINS FROM AN XX42L SCHEDULED DEP DUE TO LOADING. CREW WAS FATIGUED. FIRST LEG WITH THIS CREW TOGETHER. 2) THERE WAS NO OTHER GND TFC IN THE GENERAL AREA -- GND OR AIR. VERY SHORT TAXI DISTANCE WHEN ENTERING ARPT GND CTL AREA. 3) MISCOM OF WHAT WAS THOUGHT TO BE CLRNC ONTO RWY 27 LED TO FLT ACR X NOT BEING ON TWR FREQ WHEN TAXIING ONTO RWY 27. 4) GND OR TWR NEVER ADMITTED THAT OUR CLRNC WAS OTHER THAN WHAT WE INTERPED (CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD). BEING ON GND CTL VERSUS TWR WHILE ON RWY WAS THE MOST DANGEROUS OF EVENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.