Narrative:

It was the 10TH leg of an 11 leg day on day 3 of a 3 day trip. The previous day we had flown 7.2 hours and 8 legs and received only our compensatory rest of 10 hours before beginning this day. Up to the incident we had flown 14.7 hours in 2 days with 18 legs completed in those 2 days, making it about .8 hours per leg. The line we were flying was scheduled for 7.2 hours of flying and 14 hours of duty. There were no scheduled breaks, the longest break was 25 mins in chicago to get fuel and during this time we were given an aircraft swap and were unable to even situation down and eat lunch. There were thunderstorms over the ILS course to the field so we requested a VOR approach to runway 12. ZAU gave us vectors to fly west of the field and intercept the VOR course inbound. On base leg center cleared us for the localizer back course runway 13 into the airport. I questioned the clearance stating that there was no such runway or approach at this airport. There was a long pause and center told us to stand by. Meanwhile, we were approaching our course. Center then came back and cleared us for the VOR runway 12 approach and said that we were on the course now. We turned inbound and began the approach. I told the captain to descend to 2300 ft since we had course guidance and were outside of the FAF. He questioned my altitude saying we weren't within 10 NM of the field. Frustrated and tired, I yelled back that we were 2 mi from the FAF and to descend to 2300 ft. He didn't believe me and requested to see the approach plate. I turned on the overhead light, he looked at the approach, and began the descent. Crossing the FAF, we were still high so I told him to keep descending to the MDA of 1280 ft. I clicked on the lights for the field and began looking for the runway. 2 mi from the missed approach, I still didn't have the field in sight, the captain said that he did. I clicked on the lights again thinking maybe they weren't on when I remembered that runway 12 had the runways lights notamed OTS. I told the captain this and gave him the circling MDA of 1280 ft, which he descended to. I then saw the runway lights for runway 18 and told him to turn slightly left to enter a right downwind for runway 18. He turned and called the runway in sight. He then called leaving MDA, flaps 35 degrees, final checks. I placed the flaps to 35 degrees. He turned final and then said that we were not in a position to make a landing and wanted to circle over the field again to re-enter the right downwind for runway 18. He applied power and began climbing back up to 1280 ft. I asked if he wanted the flaps brought up to 17 degrees since it took almost full power to hold altitude with landing flaps and the gear down. The captain said to put the flaps to 17 degrees, which I did. He then circled over the top and entered a wide right downwind for runway 18. I told him to start the turn but he wanted to continue out, thus exceeding the 1.7 NM safety area per the terps. He then turned base and circled over the town at 1300 ft, 600 ft AGL. I called final and we landed without incident. As we turned off the runway, I called center and canceled our IFR flight plan. I then said to the captain that we had just completed the most messed up approach I'd ever seen. He disagreed with me saying that it wasn't that bad. This captain has historically been so detail oriented that he is unable to see the big picture that we had just 1) been cleared for the wrong approach by center only to have it fixed once we were on the final approach course, 2) argued and yelled at each other all the way to the FAF, 3) had set ourselves up for a problem by not remembering that runway 12's lights were OTS, 4) almost descended below the MDA without the runway in sight (he thought he had the runway when he could not have because it was unlit), 5) had to redefine the approach to a circling one less than 2 mi from the field, and 6) exceeded the 1.7 NM circle during the second circle because he felt ok circling 600 ft AGL at night in unfamiliar territory. Contributing factors were: 1) our extreme fatigue from the long day and the long previous day on minimum rest. 2) no time to relax and eat during the day. 3) 5 and 10 min turns at all the cities except ord. 4) our 28 min break in ord taken up with an aircraft swap. 5) fatigue causing us to forget that runway 12 had no lights, causing confusion during the approach. 6) center clearing us for the wrong approach adding further confusion to the approach. 7) the captain not trusting me to read an approach plate correctly for the altitude prior to the FAF.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE02 FLC HAS PROBS WITH A NIGHT LOC BACK COURSE APCH INTO BRL, IA. CREW SUFFERED FROM OVERLOAD CONDITIONS WHICH LED TO COM BREAKDOWNS. PIC, PF, MAKES AN UNAUTH LOW ALT APCH WHILE CIRCLING BRL. RWY LIGHTS WERE OUT ON ASSIGNED APCH RWY AND CREW HAD FORGOTTEN THIS ITEM.

Narrative: IT WAS THE 10TH LEG OF AN 11 LEG DAY ON DAY 3 OF A 3 DAY TRIP. THE PREVIOUS DAY WE HAD FLOWN 7.2 HRS AND 8 LEGS AND RECEIVED ONLY OUR COMPENSATORY REST OF 10 HRS BEFORE BEGINNING THIS DAY. UP TO THE INCIDENT WE HAD FLOWN 14.7 HRS IN 2 DAYS WITH 18 LEGS COMPLETED IN THOSE 2 DAYS, MAKING IT ABOUT .8 HRS PER LEG. THE LINE WE WERE FLYING WAS SCHEDULED FOR 7.2 HRS OF FLYING AND 14 HRS OF DUTY. THERE WERE NO SCHEDULED BREAKS, THE LONGEST BREAK WAS 25 MINS IN CHICAGO TO GET FUEL AND DURING THIS TIME WE WERE GIVEN AN ACFT SWAP AND WERE UNABLE TO EVEN SIT DOWN AND EAT LUNCH. THERE WERE TSTMS OVER THE ILS COURSE TO THE FIELD SO WE REQUESTED A VOR APCH TO RWY 12. ZAU GAVE US VECTORS TO FLY W OF THE FIELD AND INTERCEPT THE VOR COURSE INBOUND. ON BASE LEG CTR CLRED US FOR THE LOC BACK COURSE RWY 13 INTO THE ARPT. I QUESTIONED THE CLRNC STATING THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH RWY OR APCH AT THIS ARPT. THERE WAS A LONG PAUSE AND CTR TOLD US TO STAND BY. MEANWHILE, WE WERE APCHING OUR COURSE. CTR THEN CAME BACK AND CLRED US FOR THE VOR RWY 12 APCH AND SAID THAT WE WERE ON THE COURSE NOW. WE TURNED INBOUND AND BEGAN THE APCH. I TOLD THE CAPT TO DSND TO 2300 FT SINCE WE HAD COURSE GUIDANCE AND WERE OUTSIDE OF THE FAF. HE QUESTIONED MY ALT SAYING WE WEREN'T WITHIN 10 NM OF THE FIELD. FRUSTRATED AND TIRED, I YELLED BACK THAT WE WERE 2 MI FROM THE FAF AND TO DSND TO 2300 FT. HE DIDN'T BELIEVE ME AND REQUESTED TO SEE THE APCH PLATE. I TURNED ON THE OVERHEAD LIGHT, HE LOOKED AT THE APCH, AND BEGAN THE DSCNT. XING THE FAF, WE WERE STILL HIGH SO I TOLD HIM TO KEEP DSNDING TO THE MDA OF 1280 FT. I CLICKED ON THE LIGHTS FOR THE FIELD AND BEGAN LOOKING FOR THE RWY. 2 MI FROM THE MISSED APCH, I STILL DIDN'T HAVE THE FIELD IN SIGHT, THE CAPT SAID THAT HE DID. I CLICKED ON THE LIGHTS AGAIN THINKING MAYBE THEY WEREN'T ON WHEN I REMEMBERED THAT RWY 12 HAD THE RWYS LIGHTS NOTAMED OTS. I TOLD THE CAPT THIS AND GAVE HIM THE CIRCLING MDA OF 1280 FT, WHICH HE DSNDED TO. I THEN SAW THE RWY LIGHTS FOR RWY 18 AND TOLD HIM TO TURN SLIGHTLY L TO ENTER A R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 18. HE TURNED AND CALLED THE RWY IN SIGHT. HE THEN CALLED LEAVING MDA, FLAPS 35 DEGS, FINAL CHKS. I PLACED THE FLAPS TO 35 DEGS. HE TURNED FINAL AND THEN SAID THAT WE WERE NOT IN A POS TO MAKE A LNDG AND WANTED TO CIRCLE OVER THE FIELD AGAIN TO RE-ENTER THE R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 18. HE APPLIED PWR AND BEGAN CLBING BACK UP TO 1280 FT. I ASKED IF HE WANTED THE FLAPS BROUGHT UP TO 17 DEGS SINCE IT TOOK ALMOST FULL PWR TO HOLD ALT WITH LNDG FLAPS AND THE GEAR DOWN. THE CAPT SAID TO PUT THE FLAPS TO 17 DEGS, WHICH I DID. HE THEN CIRCLED OVER THE TOP AND ENTERED A WIDE R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 18. I TOLD HIM TO START THE TURN BUT HE WANTED TO CONTINUE OUT, THUS EXCEEDING THE 1.7 NM SAFETY AREA PER THE TERPS. HE THEN TURNED BASE AND CIRCLED OVER THE TOWN AT 1300 FT, 600 FT AGL. I CALLED FINAL AND WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. AS WE TURNED OFF THE RWY, I CALLED CTR AND CANCELED OUR IFR FLT PLAN. I THEN SAID TO THE CAPT THAT WE HAD JUST COMPLETED THE MOST MESSED UP APCH I'D EVER SEEN. HE DISAGREED WITH ME SAYING THAT IT WASN'T THAT BAD. THIS CAPT HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN SO DETAIL ORIENTED THAT HE IS UNABLE TO SEE THE BIG PICTURE THAT WE HAD JUST 1) BEEN CLRED FOR THE WRONG APCH BY CTR ONLY TO HAVE IT FIXED ONCE WE WERE ON THE FINAL APCH COURSE, 2) ARGUED AND YELLED AT EACH OTHER ALL THE WAY TO THE FAF, 3) HAD SET OURSELVES UP FOR A PROB BY NOT REMEMBERING THAT RWY 12'S LIGHTS WERE OTS, 4) ALMOST DSNDED BELOW THE MDA WITHOUT THE RWY IN SIGHT (HE THOUGHT HE HAD THE RWY WHEN HE COULD NOT HAVE BECAUSE IT WAS UNLIT), 5) HAD TO REDEFINE THE APCH TO A CIRCLING ONE LESS THAN 2 MI FROM THE FIELD, AND 6) EXCEEDED THE 1.7 NM CIRCLE DURING THE SECOND CIRCLE BECAUSE HE FELT OK CIRCLING 600 FT AGL AT NIGHT IN UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: 1) OUR EXTREME FATIGUE FROM THE LONG DAY AND THE LONG PREVIOUS DAY ON MINIMUM REST. 2) NO TIME TO RELAX AND EAT DURING THE DAY. 3) 5 AND 10 MIN TURNS AT ALL THE CITIES EXCEPT ORD. 4) OUR 28 MIN BREAK IN ORD TAKEN UP WITH AN ACFT SWAP. 5) FATIGUE CAUSING US TO FORGET THAT RWY 12 HAD NO LIGHTS, CAUSING CONFUSION DURING THE APCH. 6) CTR CLRING US FOR THE WRONG APCH ADDING FURTHER CONFUSION TO THE APCH. 7) THE CAPT NOT TRUSTING ME TO READ AN APCH PLATE CORRECTLY FOR THE ALT PRIOR TO THE FAF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.