Narrative:

I was assigned on sep/xa/97 to operate my company's flight XXX to sfo at XX18Z. We rotated off of runway 13R at jfk. At approximately 200 ft, I noticed at our 10 O'clock position, a B747 operated by air carrier X who was not in radio contact with ATC control. He was making a missed approach from runway 22L, but was not following published missed approach procedures. At this point, I took control of the aircraft (first officer was flying the leg) and deviated from my departure clearance. I put the aircraft into a left bank of approximately 30-38 degrees and passed behind air carrier X by approximately 200 yards and a vertical separation of 100 ft. Personal comment: I feel that air carrier X's failure to maintain constant contact with air traffic controling facilities through VHF. This was compounded by not following published missed approach procedures for jfk's runway 22L. That led to this serious infringement on my flight's assigned airspace. Supplemental information from acn 381020: aircraft #1 (air carrier X) was on approach to runway 22L. By the time aircraft #1 was on a 5 mi final, I instructed the trainee to reach out to him. The trainee did so with no response from the pilot. Since we were working 2 runways, other xmissions had to be made to other aircraft. The trainee followed up again reaching out to aircraft #1, and then a third time. Each time there was no response. After our second attempt to reach aircraft #1, I pushed the override button on the icss panel and told the controller that I was not talking to air carrier X. The controller told me that I was talking to the wrong controller but that he would pass it along. There was no override direct line to the controller working the '0' tag position or at least it was not labeled as such. By the time the aircraft was on a 1 1/2 mi final, I yelled over to the controller working on the departure runway, however, the aircraft #2 (air carrier Y) had already been cleared for takeoff and was rolling down the runway. As soon as aircraft #2 was airborne, he was told about the traffic headed directly at him and the pilot of aircraft #2 took evasive action. While aircraft #1 was still on final, the trainee made a blind transmission clearing him to land. Aircraft #1 finally checked in over the departure end of the runway and was immediately told about the traffic to his right. Aircraft #1 was told to fly runway heading and further instructions. To prevent recurrence of this situation we need to have our icss buttons labeled correctly and we, as the arrival controllers, could probably have warned the departure controller a little bit sooner about the situation, however, there were other xmissions that needed to be made that were also pertinent.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 2 B747 ACFT, 1 ON TKOF AND 1 ON FINAL APCH TO DIFFERENT RWY. ACFT ON APCH NOT IN COM WITH TWR AND TWR UNABLE TO ALERT APCH CTLR. 2 RWY OP AND ACFT ON TKOF UNDER DIFFERENT TWR CTLR. CONFLICT DEVELOPED WHEN ACFT ON APCH DID GAR JUST AS OTHER ACFT IN INITIAL CLB.

Narrative: I WAS ASSIGNED ON SEP/XA/97 TO OPERATE MY COMPANY'S FLT XXX TO SFO AT XX18Z. WE ROTATED OFF OF RWY 13R AT JFK. AT APPROX 200 FT, I NOTICED AT OUR 10 O'CLOCK POS, A B747 OPERATED BY ACR X WHO WAS NOT IN RADIO CONTACT WITH ATC CTL. HE WAS MAKING A MISSED APCH FROM RWY 22L, BUT WAS NOT FOLLOWING PUBLISHED MISSED APCH PROCS. AT THIS POINT, I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT (FO WAS FLYING THE LEG) AND DEVIATED FROM MY DEP CLRNC. I PUT THE ACFT INTO A L BANK OF APPROX 30-38 DEGS AND PASSED BEHIND ACR X BY APPROX 200 YARDS AND A VERT SEPARATION OF 100 FT. PERSONAL COMMENT: I FEEL THAT ACR X'S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH AIR TFC CTLING FACILITIES THROUGH VHF. THIS WAS COMPOUNDED BY NOT FOLLOWING PUBLISHED MISSED APCH PROCS FOR JFK'S RWY 22L. THAT LED TO THIS SERIOUS INFRINGEMENT ON MY FLT'S ASSIGNED AIRSPACE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 381020: ACFT #1 (ACR X) WAS ON APCH TO RWY 22L. BY THE TIME ACFT #1 WAS ON A 5 MI FINAL, I INSTRUCTED THE TRAINEE TO REACH OUT TO HIM. THE TRAINEE DID SO WITH NO RESPONSE FROM THE PLT. SINCE WE WERE WORKING 2 RWYS, OTHER XMISSIONS HAD TO BE MADE TO OTHER ACFT. THE TRAINEE FOLLOWED UP AGAIN REACHING OUT TO ACFT #1, AND THEN A THIRD TIME. EACH TIME THERE WAS NO RESPONSE. AFTER OUR SECOND ATTEMPT TO REACH ACFT #1, I PUSHED THE OVERRIDE BUTTON ON THE ICSS PANEL AND TOLD THE CTLR THAT I WAS NOT TALKING TO ACR X. THE CTLR TOLD ME THAT I WAS TALKING TO THE WRONG CTLR BUT THAT HE WOULD PASS IT ALONG. THERE WAS NO OVERRIDE DIRECT LINE TO THE CTLR WORKING THE '0' TAG POS OR AT LEAST IT WAS NOT LABELED AS SUCH. BY THE TIME THE ACFT WAS ON A 1 1/2 MI FINAL, I YELLED OVER TO THE CTLR WORKING ON THE DEP RWY, HOWEVER, THE ACFT #2 (ACR Y) HAD ALREADY BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF AND WAS ROLLING DOWN THE RWY. AS SOON AS ACFT #2 WAS AIRBORNE, HE WAS TOLD ABOUT THE TFC HEADED DIRECTLY AT HIM AND THE PLT OF ACFT #2 TOOK EVASIVE ACTION. WHILE ACFT #1 WAS STILL ON FINAL, THE TRAINEE MADE A BLIND XMISSION CLRING HIM TO LAND. ACFT #1 FINALLY CHKED IN OVER THE DEP END OF THE RWY AND WAS IMMEDIATELY TOLD ABOUT THE TFC TO HIS R. ACFT #1 WAS TOLD TO FLY RWY HDG AND FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF THIS SIT WE NEED TO HAVE OUR ICSS BUTTONS LABELED CORRECTLY AND WE, AS THE ARR CTLRS, COULD PROBABLY HAVE WARNED THE DEP CTLR A LITTLE BIT SOONER ABOUT THE SIT, HOWEVER, THERE WERE OTHER XMISSIONS THAT NEEDED TO BE MADE THAT WERE ALSO PERTINENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.