Narrative:

At XX05, flight abc blocked out for lax. All appeared normal at the time. After landing in lax, manager on duty informed me about a problem during my taxi out in cvg. He and I discussed the problem. Upon arriving back in cvg, manager on duty, my crew, a ramp supervisor and I discussed the incident in detail. At this point, I began to understand exactly what had happened. Details of the problem: 1) all 4 engines were running and we were taxiing out of spot xx under the direction of a marshaller. 2) I noticed that the marshaller was directing us to proceed too far forward and began to slow my taxi speed. 3) the copilot then told me that the marshaller on the south end of the ramp was trying to alert our primary marshaller to signal us to turn right. 4) steps 2 and 3 only took a few seconds to occur. I had almost come to a full stop just as the primary marshaller signaled us to turn right. By this time, there was not any excess room to complete the turn. 5) in order to keep the aircraft moving and turn at the same time, I very carefully and slowly applied 43% thrust to engine #1, 35% thrust to engine #2, 30% thrust to engine #3, and 25% thrust to engine #4. These numbers are approximately, but I believe that they are very close to the actual numbers. However, I am certain that I never exceeded 43% N1. 6) I have been told a cargo container with a person inside was blown across the ramp from a position located behind the aircraft's #1 engine and adjacent to the rear belly door of a B727 parked in spot yy. I never knew anything had happened until after landing in lax. I believe the confusion associated with the marshalling of the aircraft during the initial taxi from the blocks led me to slow my taxi speed, thus requiring additional thrust during a right turn and resulting in the jet blast problem. After talking with the ramp supervisor, I learned that the marshalling technique depends on aircraft momentum to keep the aircraft moving during the right turn, without requiring any thrust during the turn. The supervisor stated that this technique allows the ramp employees to continue loading airplanes, which might be located in the direction of potential jet blast. I had always believed that the marshallers cleared this area, which is in my blind spot behind the aircraft, before waving airplanes out of the blocks. In conclusion, I do feel badly that someone was possibly injured. As a professional pilot, I have a high regard for safety. I can assure the company that I have always adhered to the limits and guidelines set forth in aircraft operating manual, general operating manual, and in the training that I have received. I believe the primary factors contributing to the incident were the confusing marshalling signals, and a congested ramp area. Supplemental information from acn 381835: our DC8-73 at gross weight of 305000 pounds required a 90 degree turn to the right on a slight uphill. Poor marshalling instructions had a late turn, therefore captain slowed down to ensure left wingtip would clear obstruction to his left. This cargo ramp is congested at this time of night. To keep aircraft moving captain advanced throttles on outbound engine to 43% N1 (maximum allowed by gom is 45% N1). On landing at destination we were informed that a container was toppled and pushed with a person inside. No major injuries sustained. Bruises only.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC8-73 BEGINS TAXI OUT FROM RAMP AT CVG, OH, ONLY TO HAVE TO APPLY MORE PWR FOR THE TAXI WHICH CAUSES BLAST DAMAGE BEHIND THE ACFT.

Narrative: AT XX05, FLT ABC BLOCKED OUT FOR LAX. ALL APPEARED NORMAL AT THE TIME. AFTER LNDG IN LAX, MGR ON DUTY INFORMED ME ABOUT A PROB DURING MY TAXI OUT IN CVG. HE AND I DISCUSSED THE PROB. UPON ARRIVING BACK IN CVG, MGR ON DUTY, MY CREW, A RAMP SUPVR AND I DISCUSSED THE INCIDENT IN DETAIL. AT THIS POINT, I BEGAN TO UNDERSTAND EXACTLY WHAT HAD HAPPENED. DETAILS OF THE PROB: 1) ALL 4 ENGS WERE RUNNING AND WE WERE TAXIING OUT OF SPOT XX UNDER THE DIRECTION OF A MARSHALLER. 2) I NOTICED THAT THE MARSHALLER WAS DIRECTING US TO PROCEED TOO FAR FORWARD AND BEGAN TO SLOW MY TAXI SPD. 3) THE COPLT THEN TOLD ME THAT THE MARSHALLER ON THE S END OF THE RAMP WAS TRYING TO ALERT OUR PRIMARY MARSHALLER TO SIGNAL US TO TURN R. 4) STEPS 2 AND 3 ONLY TOOK A FEW SECONDS TO OCCUR. I HAD ALMOST COME TO A FULL STOP JUST AS THE PRIMARY MARSHALLER SIGNALED US TO TURN R. BY THIS TIME, THERE WAS NOT ANY EXCESS ROOM TO COMPLETE THE TURN. 5) IN ORDER TO KEEP THE ACFT MOVING AND TURN AT THE SAME TIME, I VERY CAREFULLY AND SLOWLY APPLIED 43% THRUST TO ENG #1, 35% THRUST TO ENG #2, 30% THRUST TO ENG #3, AND 25% THRUST TO ENG #4. THESE NUMBERS ARE APPROX, BUT I BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE VERY CLOSE TO THE ACTUAL NUMBERS. HOWEVER, I AM CERTAIN THAT I NEVER EXCEEDED 43% N1. 6) I HAVE BEEN TOLD A CARGO CONTAINER WITH A PERSON INSIDE WAS BLOWN ACROSS THE RAMP FROM A POS LOCATED BEHIND THE ACFT'S #1 ENG AND ADJACENT TO THE REAR BELLY DOOR OF A B727 PARKED IN SPOT YY. I NEVER KNEW ANYTHING HAD HAPPENED UNTIL AFTER LNDG IN LAX. I BELIEVE THE CONFUSION ASSOCIATED WITH THE MARSHALLING OF THE ACFT DURING THE INITIAL TAXI FROM THE BLOCKS LED ME TO SLOW MY TAXI SPD, THUS REQUIRING ADDITIONAL THRUST DURING A R TURN AND RESULTING IN THE JET BLAST PROB. AFTER TALKING WITH THE RAMP SUPVR, I LEARNED THAT THE MARSHALLING TECHNIQUE DEPENDS ON ACFT MOMENTUM TO KEEP THE ACFT MOVING DURING THE R TURN, WITHOUT REQUIRING ANY THRUST DURING THE TURN. THE SUPVR STATED THAT THIS TECHNIQUE ALLOWS THE RAMP EMPLOYEES TO CONTINUE LOADING AIRPLANES, WHICH MIGHT BE LOCATED IN THE DIRECTION OF POTENTIAL JET BLAST. I HAD ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT THE MARSHALLERS CLRED THIS AREA, WHICH IS IN MY BLIND SPOT BEHIND THE ACFT, BEFORE WAVING AIRPLANES OUT OF THE BLOCKS. IN CONCLUSION, I DO FEEL BADLY THAT SOMEONE WAS POSSIBLY INJURED. AS A PROFESSIONAL PLT, I HAVE A HIGH REGARD FOR SAFETY. I CAN ASSURE THE COMPANY THAT I HAVE ALWAYS ADHERED TO THE LIMITS AND GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN ACFT OPERATING MANUAL, GENERAL OPERATING MANUAL, AND IN THE TRAINING THAT I HAVE RECEIVED. I BELIEVE THE PRIMARY FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE INCIDENT WERE THE CONFUSING MARSHALLING SIGNALS, AND A CONGESTED RAMP AREA. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 381835: OUR DC8-73 AT GROSS WT OF 305000 LBS REQUIRED A 90 DEG TURN TO THE R ON A SLIGHT UPHILL. POOR MARSHALLING INSTRUCTIONS HAD A LATE TURN, THEREFORE CAPT SLOWED DOWN TO ENSURE L WINGTIP WOULD CLR OBSTRUCTION TO HIS L. THIS CARGO RAMP IS CONGESTED AT THIS TIME OF NIGHT. TO KEEP ACFT MOVING CAPT ADVANCED THROTTLES ON OUTBOUND ENG TO 43% N1 (MAX ALLOWED BY GOM IS 45% N1). ON LNDG AT DEST WE WERE INFORMED THAT A CONTAINER WAS TOPPLED AND PUSHED WITH A PERSON INSIDE. NO MAJOR INJURIES SUSTAINED. BRUISES ONLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.