Narrative:

After engine start we were cleared to taxi. Ground said that runway 5R would be approved. We had requested this normal landing runway as we were very heavy. Our aircraft required it for performance, even with flaps 3 degrees improved, bleeds off numbers. Extra vigilance was being exercised, as language can be a problem at any time operating here. As we approached the taxiway B2 intersection, ground transmitted that 'air carrier X, cleared to cross runway 5L, hold short of runway 5R,' and then something unintelligible that ended with air carrier Y fokker 100. I looked ahead and saw the air carrier Y aircraft, tailpipes on, taxiing for the end of runway 5L, approximately where taxiway B becomes taxiway a. Both the first officer and I interpreted that to be the air carrier Y flight would be holding in position. The first officer replied clearly and deliberately 'air carrier X, cleared to cross runway 5L and hold short of runway 5R.' I was taxiing rather slowly because of the weight so a few moments passed as we were not yet to taxiway B2 for the turn. There was no reply from ground control to that transmission. This is not at all unusual there, and not at all comforting. As we made the turn at taxiway B2, I commented that the air carrier Y fokker was turning into position. Just as our radome crossed the hold line ground came through with, 'air carrier X you are not cleared across until after air carrier Y. He is cleared for takeoff. Remain clear of runway 5L.' I locked the brakes and our plane stopped with the radome just even with the runway edge. The first officer transmitted 'negative, we are on the runway, we will have to continue across to clear the runway.' as he did that, I looked to air carrier Y and evaluated the situation. With the distance, I could not tell if he was rolling. But at that time there were no smoke or heat plumes from the engines. Ground transmitted again to remain clear of runway 5L, the aircraft is cleared for takeoff. The first officer transmitted emphatically, 'negative we are on the runway, our aircraft is on the runway, we will have to taxi clear.' as that was being said, engine smoke appeared behind the air carrier Y aircraft and he took off. I would estimate that there was approximately 25 ft of wingtip clearance as he passed by. I did evaluate options, but there were none that I could detect. The engines on the A320 spool so slowly that attempting to cross was not an option. The same held for an attempt to turn, plus wheel geometry would have put at least the nose gear off the pavement. Further, the geometry would have projected the wing and/or tail into a position of contact. Without option we simply remained very disturbed observers. Once the air carrier Y flight broke ground, we were cleared across runway 5L to hold short of runway 5R. Subsequently, we were issued takeoff clearance and departed with no further incident. We were definitely attentive, and never heard the clearance for air carrier Y. That must have meant that he had switched to tower frequency and received that clearance while taxiing southwest on taxiway B, half way between taxiway B2 and the change to taxiway a. The only other possibility was that we missed it after receiving our taxi clearance, while running the before takeoff checklist. Oh, the first officer said that the air carrier Y captain did wave as he passed our aircraft. Supplemental information from acn 384753: upon taxi out received taxi clearance to runway 5R. Controller spoke very broken english. Received what was to be believed a clearance to 'cross runway 5L, traffic a F100.' read back 'cleared to cross runway 5R have traffic in sight.' we advised our nose was over the runway edge line and to stop the departing aircraft. Controller responded 'roger air carrier X.' the air carrier Y proceeded to depart and again we advised that we were on the runway and again controller responded 'roger air carrier X.' there was time to realize the air carrier Y F100 would have clearance with our nose so no further action was taken. Perceived problem include: language problem, unable to understand clearly the extreme broken english spoken by controllers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 FLC MISUNDERSTOOD CLRNC FROM FOREIGN CTLR TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY UNTIL A DEPARTING FK10 PASSED, THEN CONTINUE ACROSS THE RWY. THE FLC INTERPRETED THE CLRNC AS CLRED ACROSS THE RWY AHEAD OF THE FK10. AFTER XING THE HOLD LINE, THE FLC REALIZED THAT THE FK10 WAS DEPARTING AND HELD SHORT OF THE RWY.

Narrative: AFTER ENG START WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI. GND SAID THAT RWY 5R WOULD BE APPROVED. WE HAD REQUESTED THIS NORMAL LNDG RWY AS WE WERE VERY HVY. OUR ACFT REQUIRED IT FOR PERFORMANCE, EVEN WITH FLAPS 3 DEGS IMPROVED, BLEEDS OFF NUMBERS. EXTRA VIGILANCE WAS BEING EXERCISED, AS LANGUAGE CAN BE A PROB AT ANY TIME OPERATING HERE. AS WE APCHED THE TXWY B2 INTXN, GND XMITTED THAT 'ACR X, CLRED TO CROSS RWY 5L, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 5R,' AND THEN SOMETHING UNINTELLIGIBLE THAT ENDED WITH ACR Y FOKKER 100. I LOOKED AHEAD AND SAW THE ACR Y ACFT, TAILPIPES ON, TAXIING FOR THE END OF RWY 5L, APPROX WHERE TXWY B BECOMES TXWY A. BOTH THE FO AND I INTERPRETED THAT TO BE THE ACR Y FLT WOULD BE HOLDING IN POS. THE FO REPLIED CLRLY AND DELIBERATELY 'ACR X, CLRED TO CROSS RWY 5L AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 5R.' I WAS TAXIING RATHER SLOWLY BECAUSE OF THE WT SO A FEW MOMENTS PASSED AS WE WERE NOT YET TO TXWY B2 FOR THE TURN. THERE WAS NO REPLY FROM GND CTL TO THAT XMISSION. THIS IS NOT AT ALL UNUSUAL THERE, AND NOT AT ALL COMFORTING. AS WE MADE THE TURN AT TXWY B2, I COMMENTED THAT THE ACR Y FOKKER WAS TURNING INTO POS. JUST AS OUR RADOME CROSSED THE HOLD LINE GND CAME THROUGH WITH, 'ACR X YOU ARE NOT CLRED ACROSS UNTIL AFTER ACR Y. HE IS CLRED FOR TKOF. REMAIN CLR OF RWY 5L.' I LOCKED THE BRAKES AND OUR PLANE STOPPED WITH THE RADOME JUST EVEN WITH THE RWY EDGE. THE FO XMITTED 'NEGATIVE, WE ARE ON THE RWY, WE WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE ACROSS TO CLR THE RWY.' AS HE DID THAT, I LOOKED TO ACR Y AND EVALUATED THE SIT. WITH THE DISTANCE, I COULD NOT TELL IF HE WAS ROLLING. BUT AT THAT TIME THERE WERE NO SMOKE OR HEAT PLUMES FROM THE ENGS. GND XMITTED AGAIN TO REMAIN CLR OF RWY 5L, THE ACFT IS CLRED FOR TKOF. THE FO XMITTED EMPHATICALLY, 'NEGATIVE WE ARE ON THE RWY, OUR ACFT IS ON THE RWY, WE WILL HAVE TO TAXI CLR.' AS THAT WAS BEING SAID, ENG SMOKE APPEARED BEHIND THE ACR Y ACFT AND HE TOOK OFF. I WOULD ESTIMATE THAT THERE WAS APPROX 25 FT OF WINGTIP CLRNC AS HE PASSED BY. I DID EVALUATE OPTIONS, BUT THERE WERE NONE THAT I COULD DETECT. THE ENGS ON THE A320 SPOOL SO SLOWLY THAT ATTEMPTING TO CROSS WAS NOT AN OPTION. THE SAME HELD FOR AN ATTEMPT TO TURN, PLUS WHEEL GEOMETRY WOULD HAVE PUT AT LEAST THE NOSE GEAR OFF THE PAVEMENT. FURTHER, THE GEOMETRY WOULD HAVE PROJECTED THE WING AND/OR TAIL INTO A POS OF CONTACT. WITHOUT OPTION WE SIMPLY REMAINED VERY DISTURBED OBSERVERS. ONCE THE ACR Y FLT BROKE GND, WE WERE CLRED ACROSS RWY 5L TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 5R. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE WERE ISSUED TKOF CLRNC AND DEPARTED WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENT. WE WERE DEFINITELY ATTENTIVE, AND NEVER HEARD THE CLRNC FOR ACR Y. THAT MUST HAVE MEANT THAT HE HAD SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ AND RECEIVED THAT CLRNC WHILE TAXIING SW ON TXWY B, HALF WAY BTWN TXWY B2 AND THE CHANGE TO TXWY A. THE ONLY OTHER POSSIBILITY WAS THAT WE MISSED IT AFTER RECEIVING OUR TAXI CLRNC, WHILE RUNNING THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. OH, THE FO SAID THAT THE ACR Y CAPT DID WAVE AS HE PASSED OUR ACFT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 384753: UPON TAXI OUT RECEIVED TAXI CLRNC TO RWY 5R. CTLR SPOKE VERY BROKEN ENGLISH. RECEIVED WHAT WAS TO BE BELIEVED A CLRNC TO 'CROSS RWY 5L, TFC A F100.' READ BACK 'CLRED TO CROSS RWY 5R HAVE TFC IN SIGHT.' WE ADVISED OUR NOSE WAS OVER THE RWY EDGE LINE AND TO STOP THE DEPARTING ACFT. CTLR RESPONDED 'ROGER ACR X.' THE ACR Y PROCEEDED TO DEPART AND AGAIN WE ADVISED THAT WE WERE ON THE RWY AND AGAIN CTLR RESPONDED 'ROGER ACR X.' THERE WAS TIME TO REALIZE THE ACR Y F100 WOULD HAVE CLRNC WITH OUR NOSE SO NO FURTHER ACTION WAS TAKEN. PERCEIVED PROB INCLUDE: LANGUAGE PROB, UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND CLRLY THE EXTREME BROKEN ENGLISH SPOKEN BY CTLRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.