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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 384087 |
Time | |
Date | 199710 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : dca |
State Reference | DC |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 1500 msl bound upper : 1500 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : dca |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Jetstar 1329 (C140) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Navigation In Use | Other |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | departure : noise abatement departure other departure sid : sid |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | other other : other pilot : atp pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 50 flight time total : 4065 flight time type : 50 |
ASRS Report | 384087 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | other other : other pilot : commercial pilot : cfi pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 40 flight time total : 4000 flight time type : 40 |
ASRS Report | 384560 |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : clearance non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : exited penetrated airspace flight crew : returned to intended course or assigned course other |
Consequence | faa : assigned or threatened penalties faa : investigated faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
It was a nice day at dca airport. We arrived our normal 1 1/2 hours prior to departure. I checked the WX, NOTAMS, and filed flight plans with leesburg FSS. I then gave the FBO the fuel order, enough to complete the next 2 legs of our itinerary. After preflting the aircraft, I instructed the copilot to complete the cockpit checks, takeoff data and get our IFR clearance. I went back in the cabin to organize a few things when I received a page that the passenger would be arriving 30 mins early. I informed the copilot and asked him to get our IFR clearance. After my copilot got the clearance, he called back 2 more times to clarify it. I didn't hear the clearance or readback since he was on his headset and the cockpit speaker was turned off. He read the clearance to me and said we were cleared the 'noise abatement procedures.' I'm not sure he has ever flown this procedure at dca before. The actual clearance was depart northwest noise abatement procedure. I taxied out to the runway behind several aircraft, it was a typical busy day at dca. I briefed the copilot the noise abatement procedures from memory but forgot to include follow the river. Instead I stated runway heading to 5000 ft radar vectors to our assigned fix. After I completed my brief, I asked if there were any questions. Copilot responded, 'no.' the departure procedure was underneath the airport diagram on his approach plate holder, located on the yoke in front of him. I failed to physically hold the departure plate in my hand and brief from the plate. Shortly after takeoff, departure asked if we were in the turn yet. I immediately remembered about the potomac river down to my left and commenced a turn to follow the river. I was then told to copy down a phone number and call it when I landed. Contributing factors: 1) the cockpit speaker was not on, and the entire crew did not hear the IFR clearance or readback. 2) the departure brief was done from memory instead of physically read from the plate. 3) the copilot did not read back complete clearance nor read all of the departure procedures from the plate. 4) passenger arriving 30 mins early. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he had received notice from the FAA regarding investigation of this incident. He also stated that he had received simulator training on all the dca departures and arrs in order to assure that this would not happen again. Supplemental information from acn 384560: when we landed at sfb, we also were told to call the secret service. This whole event arose by not properly reading departure plate and noise abatement procedures. Also, thinking that captain was familiar with departure and not questioning him. Contributing factors were my non familiarity with departure procedures. I will never again take into consideration that the captain always knows the departure procedure. I will always, from now on, read all departure plates thoroughly, and make sure that the captain knows them too.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FLC OF A LOCKHEED 4 ENG JET STAR, PENETRATED THE P56 PROHIBITED AIRSPACE DURING RWY 36 DEP AT DCA ARPT DUE TO THEIR UNFAMILIARITY WITH RWY 36 NOISE ABATEMENT PROCS.
Narrative: IT WAS A NICE DAY AT DCA ARPT. WE ARRIVED OUR NORMAL 1 1/2 HRS PRIOR TO DEP. I CHKED THE WX, NOTAMS, AND FILED FLT PLANS WITH LEESBURG FSS. I THEN GAVE THE FBO THE FUEL ORDER, ENOUGH TO COMPLETE THE NEXT 2 LEGS OF OUR ITINERARY. AFTER PREFLTING THE ACFT, I INSTRUCTED THE COPLT TO COMPLETE THE COCKPIT CHKS, TKOF DATA AND GET OUR IFR CLRNC. I WENT BACK IN THE CABIN TO ORGANIZE A FEW THINGS WHEN I RECEIVED A PAGE THAT THE PAX WOULD BE ARRIVING 30 MINS EARLY. I INFORMED THE COPLT AND ASKED HIM TO GET OUR IFR CLRNC. AFTER MY COPLT GOT THE CLRNC, HE CALLED BACK 2 MORE TIMES TO CLARIFY IT. I DIDN'T HEAR THE CLRNC OR READBACK SINCE HE WAS ON HIS HEADSET AND THE COCKPIT SPEAKER WAS TURNED OFF. HE READ THE CLRNC TO ME AND SAID WE WERE CLRED THE 'NOISE ABATEMENT PROCS.' I'M NOT SURE HE HAS EVER FLOWN THIS PROC AT DCA BEFORE. THE ACTUAL CLRNC WAS DEPART NW NOISE ABATEMENT PROC. I TAXIED OUT TO THE RWY BEHIND SEVERAL ACFT, IT WAS A TYPICAL BUSY DAY AT DCA. I BRIEFED THE COPLT THE NOISE ABATEMENT PROCS FROM MEMORY BUT FORGOT TO INCLUDE FOLLOW THE RIVER. INSTEAD I STATED RWY HDG TO 5000 FT RADAR VECTORS TO OUR ASSIGNED FIX. AFTER I COMPLETED MY BRIEF, I ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY QUESTIONS. COPLT RESPONDED, 'NO.' THE DEP PROC WAS UNDERNEATH THE ARPT DIAGRAM ON HIS APCH PLATE HOLDER, LOCATED ON THE YOKE IN FRONT OF HIM. I FAILED TO PHYSICALLY HOLD THE DEP PLATE IN MY HAND AND BRIEF FROM THE PLATE. SHORTLY AFTER TKOF, DEP ASKED IF WE WERE IN THE TURN YET. I IMMEDIATELY REMEMBERED ABOUT THE POTOMAC RIVER DOWN TO MY L AND COMMENCED A TURN TO FOLLOW THE RIVER. I WAS THEN TOLD TO COPY DOWN A PHONE NUMBER AND CALL IT WHEN I LANDED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) THE COCKPIT SPEAKER WAS NOT ON, AND THE ENTIRE CREW DID NOT HEAR THE IFR CLRNC OR READBACK. 2) THE DEP BRIEF WAS DONE FROM MEMORY INSTEAD OF PHYSICALLY READ FROM THE PLATE. 3) THE COPLT DID NOT READ BACK COMPLETE CLRNC NOR READ ALL OF THE DEP PROCS FROM THE PLATE. 4) PAX ARRIVING 30 MINS EARLY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED NOTICE FROM THE FAA REGARDING INVESTIGATION OF THIS INCIDENT. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED SIMULATOR TRAINING ON ALL THE DCA DEPS AND ARRS IN ORDER TO ASSURE THAT THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 384560: WHEN WE LANDED AT SFB, WE ALSO WERE TOLD TO CALL THE SECRET SVC. THIS WHOLE EVENT AROSE BY NOT PROPERLY READING DEP PLATE AND NOISE ABATEMENT PROCS. ALSO, THINKING THAT CAPT WAS FAMILIAR WITH DEP AND NOT QUESTIONING HIM. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE MY NON FAMILIARITY WITH DEP PROCS. I WILL NEVER AGAIN TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE CAPT ALWAYS KNOWS THE DEP PROC. I WILL ALWAYS, FROM NOW ON, READ ALL DEP PLATES THOROUGHLY, AND MAKE SURE THAT THE CAPT KNOWS THEM TOO.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.