Narrative:

I was the so on the flight of a B727, service between okc and atl. We blocked out at 6 mins early because all of our passenger and cargo had arrived and been boarded. Our load was relatively light on this flight with approximately 70 total passenger including an FAA air traffic controller on our cockpit jump seat, and an actual takeoff weight of 150000 pounds. These totals are well less than the 149 passenger seats available and the maximum structural takeoff weight limit of nearly 190000 pounds. The meteorological conditions in okc that morning were clear skies below 12000 ft, winds out of the north and a temperature of 13 degrees C. All runways were dry. Just prior to blocking out and pushing back from the gate our final paperwork arrived at the flight deck. This paperwork includes, final WX, and the awab/wdr (automated weight and balance/weight data record), which includes our computer generated takeoff performance data. During my review of essential information on the awab/wdr I found that the data for the runway that we had briefed as our departure runway, 35R, was not included in the document. We did have data for runways 35L and 31, both of which we were well within limits to use with either alternate or normal power settings. It was my understanding that the reason runway 35R data was missing was because that runway had been closed for routine maintenance earlier that morning and subsequently reopened. Our computer generated system has pre-programmable parameters which can be set in advance of receiving the final passenger and cargo figures. Because runway 35R had been closed and the person who entered this data did not know for how long it would be closed, the runway 35R template was not loaded. There were no NOTAMS which would affect takeoff data for runway 35R. When it came to my attention that the runway 35R data was absent I immediately brought it to the attention of the flight crew. I also made them aware of the fact that we did have data for runways 35L and 31. He then replied that I should utilize the runway 35L data and that we would still use runway 35R for our departure runway. His reasoning was that the runways were the same length and with no NOTAMS the takeoff data would be identical. This is nearly always the case when data is produced for parallel runways of the same length, however unless that data is produced (either via computer or manually via our onboard manuals), I can only guess that it is 'identical.' after another attempt to convince the captain that it would be just as easy to taxi to runways 35L or 31 and that I had no problem with filling out a new takeoff data card (a 4' X 5' size card with hand printed takeoff data for the departure runway), he assured all on the flight deck that runway 35R would work. I agreed in theory, but not in practice, yet to my embarrassment I remained silent on the issue. From that point I worked hard to make sure all other pre-takeoff checklists and procedures were compiled with. This was the 4TH day of a 4 day trip with this flight crew. We had flown over 16 hours and 11 legs together. Up until this point I had every reason to believe that my captain was very sound in his judgement and I had every reason to believe that I would be listened to if I was uncomfortable with or had any objections to anything regarding safety of flight. I would put most of the blame on myself for not being assertive enough to insist on reevaluating the situation and coming up with a mutually agreed upon plan of action. However, when I did not persist but kept silent, it may have been assumed by my captain that I did agree with the plan that he was holding to. In my recollection the first officer showed little or no concern and overall I believe the FAA controller's presence on the flight deck contributed greatly to our lack of communication. Ordinarily, it had been my experience that with the FAA present, it would actually cause us to be even more diligent in our communication. Flight okc-atl was as a whole weak display of professionalism on my part. My duty to my coworkers, as well as to the safety of my passenger was absent during those key moments just prior to takeoff, regardless of the praise I may have received after the flight had terminated in atl. I count the praise as rubbish considering what in my opinion was a failure to do what was right. I only hope that my air carrier will retain my services so that I may use this event as a learning experience which will make an even safer place to work in the future. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states that he discussed the event with the captain after the fact and the captain was very cavalier about it and felt there was no problem. Reporter went to union representative and to his chief pilot and discussed the situation while keeping the rest of the crew anonymous. He was given suggestions on how to be more assertive and state his feelings in a direct but non offensive manner. He has since used this information and been complimented on his technique. What really bothered reporter was that the captain had been such a different person in the previous days they had flown than he appeared to be on this morning. He was in a 'hurry up' mode for no apparent reason. It would have taken about 2 mins for the correct information to be located. Reporter would have gotten this information but was the person reading checklists and felt very pressured. No follow up action of any nature.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF B727 DEPARTS WITHOUT CORRECT RWY TKOF DATA. THIS INFO WAS NOT SENT AS THE RWY HAD BEEN CLOSED EARLIER AND PERSON ENTERING THE DATA DID NOT KNOW HOW LONG IT WOULD BE CLOSED.

Narrative: I WAS THE SO ON THE FLT OF A B727, SVC BTWN OKC AND ATL. WE BLOCKED OUT AT 6 MINS EARLY BECAUSE ALL OF OUR PAX AND CARGO HAD ARRIVED AND BEEN BOARDED. OUR LOAD WAS RELATIVELY LIGHT ON THIS FLT WITH APPROX 70 TOTAL PAX INCLUDING AN FAA AIR TFC CTLR ON OUR COCKPIT JUMP SEAT, AND AN ACTUAL TKOF WT OF 150000 LBS. THESE TOTALS ARE WELL LESS THAN THE 149 PAX SEATS AVAILABLE AND THE MAX STRUCTURAL TKOF WT LIMIT OF NEARLY 190000 LBS. THE METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS IN OKC THAT MORNING WERE CLR SKIES BELOW 12000 FT, WINDS OUT OF THE N AND A TEMP OF 13 DEGS C. ALL RWYS WERE DRY. JUST PRIOR TO BLOCKING OUT AND PUSHING BACK FROM THE GATE OUR FINAL PAPERWORK ARRIVED AT THE FLT DECK. THIS PAPERWORK INCLUDES, FINAL WX, AND THE AWAB/WDR (AUTOMATED WT AND BAL/WT DATA RECORD), WHICH INCLUDES OUR COMPUTER GENERATED TKOF PERFORMANCE DATA. DURING MY REVIEW OF ESSENTIAL INFO ON THE AWAB/WDR I FOUND THAT THE DATA FOR THE RWY THAT WE HAD BRIEFED AS OUR DEP RWY, 35R, WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE DOCUMENT. WE DID HAVE DATA FOR RWYS 35L AND 31, BOTH OF WHICH WE WERE WELL WITHIN LIMITS TO USE WITH EITHER ALTERNATE OR NORMAL PWR SETTINGS. IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE REASON RWY 35R DATA WAS MISSING WAS BECAUSE THAT RWY HAD BEEN CLOSED FOR ROUTINE MAINT EARLIER THAT MORNING AND SUBSEQUENTLY REOPENED. OUR COMPUTER GENERATED SYS HAS PRE-PROGRAMMABLE PARAMETERS WHICH CAN BE SET IN ADVANCE OF RECEIVING THE FINAL PAX AND CARGO FIGURES. BECAUSE RWY 35R HAD BEEN CLOSED AND THE PERSON WHO ENTERED THIS DATA DID NOT KNOW FOR HOW LONG IT WOULD BE CLOSED, THE RWY 35R TEMPLATE WAS NOT LOADED. THERE WERE NO NOTAMS WHICH WOULD AFFECT TKOF DATA FOR RWY 35R. WHEN IT CAME TO MY ATTN THAT THE RWY 35R DATA WAS ABSENT I IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT IT TO THE ATTN OF THE FLC. I ALSO MADE THEM AWARE OF THE FACT THAT WE DID HAVE DATA FOR RWYS 35L AND 31. HE THEN REPLIED THAT I SHOULD UTILIZE THE RWY 35L DATA AND THAT WE WOULD STILL USE RWY 35R FOR OUR DEP RWY. HIS REASONING WAS THAT THE RWYS WERE THE SAME LENGTH AND WITH NO NOTAMS THE TKOF DATA WOULD BE IDENTICAL. THIS IS NEARLY ALWAYS THE CASE WHEN DATA IS PRODUCED FOR PARALLEL RWYS OF THE SAME LENGTH, HOWEVER UNLESS THAT DATA IS PRODUCED (EITHER VIA COMPUTER OR MANUALLY VIA OUR ONBOARD MANUALS), I CAN ONLY GUESS THAT IT IS 'IDENTICAL.' AFTER ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE THE CAPT THAT IT WOULD BE JUST AS EASY TO TAXI TO RWYS 35L OR 31 AND THAT I HAD NO PROB WITH FILLING OUT A NEW TKOF DATA CARD (A 4' X 5' SIZE CARD WITH HAND PRINTED TKOF DATA FOR THE DEP RWY), HE ASSURED ALL ON THE FLT DECK THAT RWY 35R WOULD WORK. I AGREED IN THEORY, BUT NOT IN PRACTICE, YET TO MY EMBARRASSMENT I REMAINED SILENT ON THE ISSUE. FROM THAT POINT I WORKED HARD TO MAKE SURE ALL OTHER PRE-TKOF CHKLISTS AND PROCS WERE COMPILED WITH. THIS WAS THE 4TH DAY OF A 4 DAY TRIP WITH THIS FLC. WE HAD FLOWN OVER 16 HRS AND 11 LEGS TOGETHER. UP UNTIL THIS POINT I HAD EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT MY CAPT WAS VERY SOUND IN HIS JUDGEMENT AND I HAD EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT I WOULD BE LISTENED TO IF I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH OR HAD ANY OBJECTIONS TO ANYTHING REGARDING SAFETY OF FLT. I WOULD PUT MOST OF THE BLAME ON MYSELF FOR NOT BEING ASSERTIVE ENOUGH TO INSIST ON REEVALUATING THE SIT AND COMING UP WITH A MUTUALLY AGREED UPON PLAN OF ACTION. HOWEVER, WHEN I DID NOT PERSIST BUT KEPT SILENT, IT MAY HAVE BEEN ASSUMED BY MY CAPT THAT I DID AGREE WITH THE PLAN THAT HE WAS HOLDING TO. IN MY RECOLLECTION THE FO SHOWED LITTLE OR NO CONCERN AND OVERALL I BELIEVE THE FAA CTLR'S PRESENCE ON THE FLT DECK CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO OUR LACK OF COM. ORDINARILY, IT HAD BEEN MY EXPERIENCE THAT WITH THE FAA PRESENT, IT WOULD ACTUALLY CAUSE US TO BE EVEN MORE DILIGENT IN OUR COM. FLT OKC-ATL WAS AS A WHOLE WEAK DISPLAY OF PROFESSIONALISM ON MY PART. MY DUTY TO MY COWORKERS, AS WELL AS TO THE SAFETY OF MY PAX WAS ABSENT DURING THOSE KEY MOMENTS JUST PRIOR TO TKOF, REGARDLESS OF THE PRAISE I MAY HAVE RECEIVED AFTER THE FLT HAD TERMINATED IN ATL. I COUNT THE PRAISE AS RUBBISH CONSIDERING WHAT IN MY OPINION WAS A FAILURE TO DO WHAT WAS RIGHT. I ONLY HOPE THAT MY ACR WILL RETAIN MY SVCS SO THAT I MAY USE THIS EVENT AS A LEARNING EXPERIENCE WHICH WILL MAKE AN EVEN SAFER PLACE TO WORK IN THE FUTURE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT HE DISCUSSED THE EVENT WITH THE CAPT AFTER THE FACT AND THE CAPT WAS VERY CAVALIER ABOUT IT AND FELT THERE WAS NO PROB. RPTR WENT TO UNION REPRESENTATIVE AND TO HIS CHIEF PLT AND DISCUSSED THE SIT WHILE KEEPING THE REST OF THE CREW ANONYMOUS. HE WAS GIVEN SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO BE MORE ASSERTIVE AND STATE HIS FEELINGS IN A DIRECT BUT NON OFFENSIVE MANNER. HE HAS SINCE USED THIS INFO AND BEEN COMPLIMENTED ON HIS TECHNIQUE. WHAT REALLY BOTHERED RPTR WAS THAT THE CAPT HAD BEEN SUCH A DIFFERENT PERSON IN THE PREVIOUS DAYS THEY HAD FLOWN THAN HE APPEARED TO BE ON THIS MORNING. HE WAS IN A 'HURRY UP' MODE FOR NO APPARENT REASON. IT WOULD HAVE TAKEN ABOUT 2 MINS FOR THE CORRECT INFO TO BE LOCATED. RPTR WOULD HAVE GOTTEN THIS INFO BUT WAS THE PERSON READING CHKLISTS AND FELT VERY PRESSURED. NO FOLLOW UP ACTION OF ANY NATURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.