Narrative:

Land and hold short operations with airliners do not provide the safety net we enjoy in other areas of operation. Clt conducts closely spaced takeoffs on runway 36R in conjunction with lahso on runway 36R. An airliner could easily encounter jet blast from a departure aircraft and be forced into an extended ground roll or a missed approach. A ground roll of over 6300 ft could cause a possible ground conflict with operations on runway 5, while a missed approach could cause a possible airborne conflict with takeoff operations on runway 5. Lahso is an ill-conceived plan to increase airport capacity. It does not provide the redundancy which has made air travel the safest way to travel. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states that he is an accident investigator for company and union and has seen the result of lahso operations that did not work as planned. He feels there is no safety margin. The flight crew must concern themselves with a possible overrun and now added to that is a conflict with another aircraft. Apparently the landing computations for lahso operations are based on vref speeds. The foqua programs seem to indicate that seldom are aircraft at vref when crossing the threshold, they are usually much hotter. Reporter also feels that if lahso operations are to continue there should be established escape maneuvers for a go around situation to avoid being directly over a departing aircraft. He is working through the company and the union to make some changes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF B737-300 HAS CONCERN REGARDING LAHSO PROCS AT CLT AND IN GENERAL USE. THEY FEEL THE TWR CONDUCTS CLOSELY SPACED TKOFS WITH LAHSO PROCS AND ACRS CAN ENCOUNTER JET BLAST AND BE FORCED INTO LONG LNDG ROLL OR MISSED APCH.

Narrative: LAND AND HOLD SHORT OPS WITH AIRLINERS DO NOT PROVIDE THE SAFETY NET WE ENJOY IN OTHER AREAS OF OP. CLT CONDUCTS CLOSELY SPACED TKOFS ON RWY 36R IN CONJUNCTION WITH LAHSO ON RWY 36R. AN AIRLINER COULD EASILY ENCOUNTER JET BLAST FROM A DEP ACFT AND BE FORCED INTO AN EXTENDED GND ROLL OR A MISSED APCH. A GND ROLL OF OVER 6300 FT COULD CAUSE A POSSIBLE GND CONFLICT WITH OPS ON RWY 5, WHILE A MISSED APCH COULD CAUSE A POSSIBLE AIRBORNE CONFLICT WITH TKOF OPS ON RWY 5. LAHSO IS AN ILL-CONCEIVED PLAN TO INCREASE ARPT CAPACITY. IT DOES NOT PROVIDE THE REDUNDANCY WHICH HAS MADE AIR TRAVEL THE SAFEST WAY TO TRAVEL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT HE IS AN ACCIDENT INVESTIGATOR FOR COMPANY AND UNION AND HAS SEEN THE RESULT OF LAHSO OPS THAT DID NOT WORK AS PLANNED. HE FEELS THERE IS NO SAFETY MARGIN. THE FLC MUST CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH A POSSIBLE OVERRUN AND NOW ADDED TO THAT IS A CONFLICT WITH ANOTHER ACFT. APPARENTLY THE LNDG COMPUTATIONS FOR LAHSO OPS ARE BASED ON VREF SPDS. THE FOQUA PROGRAMS SEEM TO INDICATE THAT SELDOM ARE ACFT AT VREF WHEN XING THE THRESHOLD, THEY ARE USUALLY MUCH HOTTER. RPTR ALSO FEELS THAT IF LAHSO OPS ARE TO CONTINUE THERE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED ESCAPE MANEUVERS FOR A GAR SIT TO AVOID BEING DIRECTLY OVER A DEPARTING ACFT. HE IS WORKING THROUGH THE COMPANY AND THE UNION TO MAKE SOME CHANGES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.