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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 388027 |
Time | |
Date | 199712 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 0001 To 0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : ind |
State Reference | IN |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : dfw |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B727-100 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : second officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : flight engineer pilot : commercial pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 9500 flight time type : 2000 |
ASRS Report | 388024 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : flight engineer pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 125 flight time total : 3800 flight time type : 500 |
ASRS Report | 388119 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other other : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
On dec/thu/97, at approximately XA50 local EST, as a result of an FAA/company required flight engineer preflight checklist, I observed that the standby attitude indicator power interpretation warning flag came into view while simulating the loss of all generator power 'essential and standby power...check.' this appeared to be an abnormal standby attitude indicator system response. Avionics maintenance was requested. After explaining the situation, the maintenance technician responded that this current standby attitude indicator system confign was normal and authority/authorized as the result of an engineering order. Neither the author, nor the contents of this engineering order were revealed or specified. Since I, nor my crew, had no other documentation to substantiate a rejection of this explanation, we departed indianapolis as scheduled. Upon our arrival in philadelphia, the captain secured a copy of far part 121. The captain then contacted the chief pilot and apprised him of the apparent non compliance of this aircraft standby attitude indicator system with far part 121.305(K)(4) and his concern about the legality of our performing as crew members on the return flight to indianapolis that evening. The chief pilot agreed. That discussion included the fact that there was an additional 6-7 aircraft that were affected similarly by this engineering order and similarly configured. The captain also informed the chief pilot that he would discuss the situation with me and the first officer. Later that afternoon, we informed scheduling that we would not be able to fly the trip back to indianapolis while the aircraft standby attitude indicator system was configured as it was. At approximately XX30L, the captain was contacted by the vice president of flight operations. It was at this time that vice president of flight operations informed us that the aircraft was legal to fly. I informed him that based on the information now available to us, that I believed that the aircraft was not legal to fly and that if it were, as he and the vice president of maintenance claimed, that there was no reason that a written statement could not be provided prior to the flight. The vice president of flight operations denied this request. He then directly asked me for my decision, within the next 30 seconds, if I were going to be the flight engineer on the return trip. I responded, 'that unless I was provided with a written statement that the aircraft was legal to fly as currently configured, that I would not be the flight engineer on the flight to indianapolis.' to the best of my knowledge the captain and first officer responded similarly. Some time shortly after this discussion, the captain received a phone call from vice president of flight operations informing him that a written statement, as we requested, would be included in the dispatch paperwork. The statement was included and we left philadelphia as scheduled. Upon arrival at indianapolis on fri morning at approximately XX00L we discovered that this statement was posted throughout the pilot lounge as a notice to all other crew members. However, I still retain concern about the discrepancy between the fact that the chief pilot agreed early in the day that the aircraft appeared to be illegal to fly, and then only hours later the vice president of flight operations and vice president of maintenance claiming that it was legal to fly. I have still yet to receive any further information substantiating that the standby attitude indicator confign was legal. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter was the so on a B727-100 freighter when he discovered that the standby attitude indicator would not operate when the engine and auxiliary power unit generators were disconnected. After informing maintenance they were shown that the indicator would operate when the standby power selector was switched to the standby position. This is, in the reporter's opinion, contrary to the requirements of the regulations because the flight crew is required to make a selection after an electrical failure. This change in the aircraft's operation came about after a major modification by the reporter's company. In the past, the standby instruments operated using dc power from the battery bus. The airline removed the old dc powered instruments and replaced them with AC powered instruments that operate from AC power produced by the standby inverter, according to the reporter. Therefore, if true, the so must select the standby power switch to the standby position. The so said that the company claims to have an engineering change order, but has not shown it to the flight crew. The reporter is afraid that, although the vice president of flight operations sent them a letter authorizing them to operate the aircraft, they still may be held in violation of the regulation. Further, he is concerned with the safety of operating a mixed fleet of B727S that have different locations for the standby selectors and that have the selections in different locations on the switches.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN ACR B727 FLC DISCOVER THAT THEIR STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR DID NOT OPERATE WHEN THE PRIMARY ENG AND APU GENERATORS WERE DISCONNECTED. THE STANDBY INSTS WOULD OPERATE IF THE STANDBY PWR SWITCH WAS SELECTED TO STANDBY. HOWEVER, THIS PROC APPEARS TO BE CONTRARY TO FAR PART 121 PT 305(K)(4).
Narrative: ON DEC/THU/97, AT APPROX XA50 LCL EST, AS A RESULT OF AN FAA/COMPANY REQUIRED FE PREFLT CHKLIST, I OBSERVED THAT THE STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR PWR INTERP WARNING FLAG CAME INTO VIEW WHILE SIMULATING THE LOSS OF ALL GENERATOR PWR 'ESSENTIAL AND STANDBY PWR...CHK.' THIS APPEARED TO BE AN ABNORMAL STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR SYS RESPONSE. AVIONICS MAINT WAS REQUESTED. AFTER EXPLAINING THE SIT, THE MAINT TECHNICIAN RESPONDED THAT THIS CURRENT STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR SYS CONFIGN WAS NORMAL AND AUTH AS THE RESULT OF AN ENGINEERING ORDER. NEITHER THE AUTHOR, NOR THE CONTENTS OF THIS ENGINEERING ORDER WERE REVEALED OR SPECIFIED. SINCE I, NOR MY CREW, HAD NO OTHER DOCUMENTATION TO SUBSTANTIATE A REJECTION OF THIS EXPLANATION, WE DEPARTED INDIANAPOLIS AS SCHEDULED. UPON OUR ARR IN PHILADELPHIA, THE CAPT SECURED A COPY OF FAR PART 121. THE CAPT THEN CONTACTED THE CHIEF PLT AND APPRISED HIM OF THE APPARENT NON COMPLIANCE OF THIS ACFT STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR SYS WITH FAR PART 121.305(K)(4) AND HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE LEGALITY OF OUR PERFORMING AS CREW MEMBERS ON THE RETURN FLT TO INDIANAPOLIS THAT EVENING. THE CHIEF PLT AGREED. THAT DISCUSSION INCLUDED THE FACT THAT THERE WAS AN ADDITIONAL 6-7 ACFT THAT WERE AFFECTED SIMILARLY BY THIS ENGINEERING ORDER AND SIMILARLY CONFIGURED. THE CAPT ALSO INFORMED THE CHIEF PLT THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS THE SIT WITH ME AND THE FO. LATER THAT AFTERNOON, WE INFORMED SCHEDULING THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO FLY THE TRIP BACK TO INDIANAPOLIS WHILE THE ACFT STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR SYS WAS CONFIGURED AS IT WAS. AT APPROX XX30L, THE CAPT WAS CONTACTED BY THE VICE PRESIDENT OF FLT OPS. IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT VICE PRESIDENT OF FLT OPS INFORMED US THAT THE ACFT WAS LEGAL TO FLY. I INFORMED HIM THAT BASED ON THE INFO NOW AVAILABLE TO US, THAT I BELIEVED THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT LEGAL TO FLY AND THAT IF IT WERE, AS HE AND THE VICE PRESIDENT OF MAINT CLAIMED, THAT THERE WAS NO REASON THAT A WRITTEN STATEMENT COULD NOT BE PROVIDED PRIOR TO THE FLT. THE VICE PRESIDENT OF FLT OPS DENIED THIS REQUEST. HE THEN DIRECTLY ASKED ME FOR MY DECISION, WITHIN THE NEXT 30 SECONDS, IF I WERE GOING TO BE THE FE ON THE RETURN TRIP. I RESPONDED, 'THAT UNLESS I WAS PROVIDED WITH A WRITTEN STATEMENT THAT THE ACFT WAS LEGAL TO FLY AS CURRENTLY CONFIGURED, THAT I WOULD NOT BE THE FE ON THE FLT TO INDIANAPOLIS.' TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE THE CAPT AND FO RESPONDED SIMILARLY. SOME TIME SHORTLY AFTER THIS DISCUSSION, THE CAPT RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM VICE PRESIDENT OF FLT OPS INFORMING HIM THAT A WRITTEN STATEMENT, AS WE REQUESTED, WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE DISPATCH PAPERWORK. THE STATEMENT WAS INCLUDED AND WE LEFT PHILADELPHIA AS SCHEDULED. UPON ARR AT INDIANAPOLIS ON FRI MORNING AT APPROX XX00L WE DISCOVERED THAT THIS STATEMENT WAS POSTED THROUGHOUT THE PLT LOUNGE AS A NOTICE TO ALL OTHER CREW MEMBERS. HOWEVER, I STILL RETAIN CONCERN ABOUT THE DISCREPANCY BTWN THE FACT THAT THE CHIEF PLT AGREED EARLY IN THE DAY THAT THE ACFT APPEARED TO BE ILLEGAL TO FLY, AND THEN ONLY HRS LATER THE VICE PRESIDENT OF FLT OPS AND VICE PRESIDENT OF MAINT CLAIMING THAT IT WAS LEGAL TO FLY. I HAVE STILL YET TO RECEIVE ANY FURTHER INFO SUBSTANTIATING THAT THE STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR CONFIGN WAS LEGAL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR WAS THE SO ON A B727-100 FREIGHTER WHEN HE DISCOVERED THAT THE STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR WOULD NOT OPERATE WHEN THE ENG AND AUX PWR UNIT GENERATORS WERE DISCONNECTED. AFTER INFORMING MAINT THEY WERE SHOWN THAT THE INDICATOR WOULD OPERATE WHEN THE STANDBY PWR SELECTOR WAS SWITCHED TO THE STANDBY POS. THIS IS, IN THE RPTR'S OPINION, CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE REGS BECAUSE THE FLC IS REQUIRED TO MAKE A SELECTION AFTER AN ELECTRICAL FAILURE. THIS CHANGE IN THE ACFT'S OP CAME ABOUT AFTER A MAJOR MODIFICATION BY THE RPTR'S COMPANY. IN THE PAST, THE STANDBY INSTS OPERATED USING DC PWR FROM THE BATTERY BUS. THE AIRLINE REMOVED THE OLD DC POWERED INSTS AND REPLACED THEM WITH AC POWERED INSTS THAT OPERATE FROM AC PWR PRODUCED BY THE STANDBY INVERTER, ACCORDING TO THE RPTR. THEREFORE, IF TRUE, THE SO MUST SELECT THE STANDBY PWR SWITCH TO THE STANDBY POS. THE SO SAID THAT THE COMPANY CLAIMS TO HAVE AN ENGINEERING CHANGE ORDER, BUT HAS NOT SHOWN IT TO THE FLC. THE RPTR IS AFRAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THE VICE PRESIDENT OF FLT OPS SENT THEM A LETTER AUTHORIZING THEM TO OPERATE THE ACFT, THEY STILL MAY BE HELD IN VIOLATION OF THE REG. FURTHER, HE IS CONCERNED WITH THE SAFETY OF OPERATING A MIXED FLEET OF B727S THAT HAVE DIFFERENT LOCATIONS FOR THE STANDBY SELECTORS AND THAT HAVE THE SELECTIONS IN DIFFERENT LOCATIONS ON THE SWITCHES.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.