Narrative:

On dec/xx/97 my copilot and I were departing teb at XY00 in a lear 35 with 3 passenger on board. The departure was a bit rushed as the tower had offered us an immediate departure, and as we approached the end of the runway I asked the first officer to review the SID for me to refresh my memory (I had looked them over earlier). We had been assigned the teb 4 and assigned runway 24 for departure. He read depart runway 24 heading to 1500 ft, turn right to a 280 degree heading, climb and maintain 3000 ft. The SID on later review called for runway heading to 1500 ft, turn to 280 degree heading, maintain 1500 ft until 4.5 DME from teb, then climb and maintain 3000 ft. As we checked on with new york departure out of 2000 ft the controller informed us we were supposed to be at 1500 ft and had a heavy jet over top of us. He then issued a climb to 10000 ft and gave us a 270 degree heading and said nothing further about the incident. In review, I made several errors of judgement in this situation. First, was pushing things along too fast knowing that our passenger has a short temper and hates delays. Since teb often delays departures while new york fits them in, I was anxious to take advantage of the chance to get out right away while we had the chance. The problem with that was that my first officer doesn't yet have the experience to handle the checklists and procedures as quickly as the situation demanded. Second, was not pulling up short when I realized things were piling up on my first officer and giving him the time he needed, unpressured, to do what we had to do. In retrospect the event could have been avoided by taking several mins at the end of the runway to jointly review the procedure and agree on what we were doing so there would be no confusion. As I was heads up throughout the entire event and did not see another aircraft, I don't believe we came close to anyone else, however, separation must have been compromised to prompt the controller to say something about it. Supplemental information from acn 388969: taxi time was minimal. I felt rushed going through the taxi and before takeoff checklist. Before taking the runway the captain asked to review the SID. I thought I read it fully to him but I set 3000 ft in the altitude selector. I called tower and asked if we were cleared for takeoff. Tower said we were already cleared and new york departure was waiting for us! After liftoff the cabin pressure started to climb rapidly and captain said, turn down the rate of climb on the pressure controller. I missed telling the captain to maintain 1500 ft 4.5 DME off teb VOR then we could go to 3000 ft. I contacted new york departure and said 'aircraft X climb to 3000 ft turning to 280 degrees.' departure replied 'you were to maintain 1500 ft until 4.5 DME, an air carrier jet going into ewr had to avoid you.' I feel that being the copilot I should have made the captain slow down. Better lighting in the lear 35 could help in night operations. We both have flown this SID several times and maybe I let my guard down and should have reviewed it again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CPR L35 OVERSHOT ITS INITIAL DEP ALT WHEN THE FLC FAILED TO PROPERLY COORD THEIR DEP PROC IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TEB 4 SID. THIS WAS A NIGHT OP AND THE CAPT WAS IN A HURRY. THE FO WAS LOW IN TIME IN ACFT TYPE.

Narrative: ON DEC/XX/97 MY COPLT AND I WERE DEPARTING TEB AT XY00 IN A LEAR 35 WITH 3 PAX ON BOARD. THE DEP WAS A BIT RUSHED AS THE TWR HAD OFFERED US AN IMMEDIATE DEP, AND AS WE APCHED THE END OF THE RWY I ASKED THE FO TO REVIEW THE SID FOR ME TO REFRESH MY MEMORY (I HAD LOOKED THEM OVER EARLIER). WE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED THE TEB 4 AND ASSIGNED RWY 24 FOR DEP. HE READ DEPART RWY 24 HDG TO 1500 FT, TURN R TO A 280 DEG HDG, CLB AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT. THE SID ON LATER REVIEW CALLED FOR RWY HDG TO 1500 FT, TURN TO 280 DEG HDG, MAINTAIN 1500 FT UNTIL 4.5 DME FROM TEB, THEN CLB AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT. AS WE CHKED ON WITH NEW YORK DEP OUT OF 2000 FT THE CTLR INFORMED US WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE AT 1500 FT AND HAD A HVY JET OVER TOP OF US. HE THEN ISSUED A CLB TO 10000 FT AND GAVE US A 270 DEG HDG AND SAID NOTHING FURTHER ABOUT THE INCIDENT. IN REVIEW, I MADE SEVERAL ERRORS OF JUDGEMENT IN THIS SIT. FIRST, WAS PUSHING THINGS ALONG TOO FAST KNOWING THAT OUR PAX HAS A SHORT TEMPER AND HATES DELAYS. SINCE TEB OFTEN DELAYS DEPS WHILE NEW YORK FITS THEM IN, I WAS ANXIOUS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CHANCE TO GET OUT RIGHT AWAY WHILE WE HAD THE CHANCE. THE PROB WITH THAT WAS THAT MY FO DOESN'T YET HAVE THE EXPERIENCE TO HANDLE THE CHKLISTS AND PROCS AS QUICKLY AS THE SIT DEMANDED. SECOND, WAS NOT PULLING UP SHORT WHEN I REALIZED THINGS WERE PILING UP ON MY FO AND GIVING HIM THE TIME HE NEEDED, UNPRESSURED, TO DO WHAT WE HAD TO DO. IN RETROSPECT THE EVENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY TAKING SEVERAL MINS AT THE END OF THE RWY TO JOINTLY REVIEW THE PROC AND AGREE ON WHAT WE WERE DOING SO THERE WOULD BE NO CONFUSION. AS I WAS HEADS UP THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE EVENT AND DID NOT SEE ANOTHER ACFT, I DON'T BELIEVE WE CAME CLOSE TO ANYONE ELSE, HOWEVER, SEPARATION MUST HAVE BEEN COMPROMISED TO PROMPT THE CTLR TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT IT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 388969: TAXI TIME WAS MINIMAL. I FELT RUSHED GOING THROUGH THE TAXI AND BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. BEFORE TAKING THE RWY THE CAPT ASKED TO REVIEW THE SID. I THOUGHT I READ IT FULLY TO HIM BUT I SET 3000 FT IN THE ALT SELECTOR. I CALLED TWR AND ASKED IF WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. TWR SAID WE WERE ALREADY CLRED AND NEW YORK DEP WAS WAITING FOR US! AFTER LIFTOFF THE CABIN PRESSURE STARTED TO CLB RAPIDLY AND CAPT SAID, TURN DOWN THE RATE OF CLB ON THE PRESSURE CTLR. I MISSED TELLING THE CAPT TO MAINTAIN 1500 FT 4.5 DME OFF TEB VOR THEN WE COULD GO TO 3000 FT. I CONTACTED NEW YORK DEP AND SAID 'ACFT X CLB TO 3000 FT TURNING TO 280 DEGS.' DEP REPLIED 'YOU WERE TO MAINTAIN 1500 FT UNTIL 4.5 DME, AN ACR JET GOING INTO EWR HAD TO AVOID YOU.' I FEEL THAT BEING THE COPLT I SHOULD HAVE MADE THE CAPT SLOW DOWN. BETTER LIGHTING IN THE LEAR 35 COULD HELP IN NIGHT OPS. WE BOTH HAVE FLOWN THIS SID SEVERAL TIMES AND MAYBE I LET MY GUARD DOWN AND SHOULD HAVE REVIEWED IT AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.