Narrative:

We had a landing gear problem and had returned to fll for maintenance. The gear retracted, but both the red in transit light and door light remained on after takeoff. Worked through the problem in accordance with published procedures and returned to fll. Determined it was a microswitch. They fixed the airplane and we redispatched to atl. On the second takeoff, the same problem reoccurred. However, I left the gear handle up and stated my intentions to the dispatcher and maintenance coordinator that I wished to continue at reduced airspeed to atl. At first they agreed. Later I received a call from the dispatcher suggesting that we land at the nearest suitable airport. Since I had seen the problem and had it inspected and there was no additional wind noise or vibration that I could safely take the airplane on to atl. To me, landing at the nearest suitable airport encompassed more than just safety. I never felt safety had been compromised since putting the landing gear down was never an issue. I complied with the dispatcher's request and landed in mco. No emergency was ever declared. With the gear handle down, all system were normal. Terms used in operations manuals like 'nearest suitable airport' or 'near practical' should be expanded to 'in the best judgement of the captain.' does suitable and practical have a more encompassing meaning than just safety? Are maintenance issues relevant in the captain's judgement? Is passenger convenience included? In this particular instance, I (captain) was positively certain that this malfunction in no way endangered any crew or passenger.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR L1011 FLC DEPARTED A SECOND TIME AND WERE AGAIN CONFRONTED WITH IMPROPER DISPLAYS AFTER SUCCESSFULLY RAISING THE LNDG GEAR. THIS TIME, THE CAPT DECIDED TO CONTINUE THE FLT, BUT WAS FINALLY PERSUADED TO DIVERT TO AN ENRTE ALTERNATE.

Narrative: WE HAD A LNDG GEAR PROB AND HAD RETURNED TO FLL FOR MAINT. THE GEAR RETRACTED, BUT BOTH THE RED IN TRANSIT LIGHT AND DOOR LIGHT REMAINED ON AFTER TKOF. WORKED THROUGH THE PROB IN ACCORDANCE WITH PUBLISHED PROCS AND RETURNED TO FLL. DETERMINED IT WAS A MICROSWITCH. THEY FIXED THE AIRPLANE AND WE REDISPATCHED TO ATL. ON THE SECOND TKOF, THE SAME PROB REOCCURRED. HOWEVER, I LEFT THE GEAR HANDLE UP AND STATED MY INTENTIONS TO THE DISPATCHER AND MAINT COORDINATOR THAT I WISHED TO CONTINUE AT REDUCED AIRSPD TO ATL. AT FIRST THEY AGREED. LATER I RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE DISPATCHER SUGGESTING THAT WE LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. SINCE I HAD SEEN THE PROB AND HAD IT INSPECTED AND THERE WAS NO ADDITIONAL WIND NOISE OR VIBRATION THAT I COULD SAFELY TAKE THE AIRPLANE ON TO ATL. TO ME, LNDG AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT ENCOMPASSED MORE THAN JUST SAFETY. I NEVER FELT SAFETY HAD BEEN COMPROMISED SINCE PUTTING THE LNDG GEAR DOWN WAS NEVER AN ISSUE. I COMPLIED WITH THE DISPATCHER'S REQUEST AND LANDED IN MCO. NO EMER WAS EVER DECLARED. WITH THE GEAR HANDLE DOWN, ALL SYS WERE NORMAL. TERMS USED IN OPS MANUALS LIKE 'NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT' OR 'NEAR PRACTICAL' SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO 'IN THE BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE CAPT.' DOES SUITABLE AND PRACTICAL HAVE A MORE ENCOMPASSING MEANING THAN JUST SAFETY? ARE MAINT ISSUES RELEVANT IN THE CAPT'S JUDGEMENT? IS PAX CONVENIENCE INCLUDED? IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE, I (CAPT) WAS POSITIVELY CERTAIN THAT THIS MALFUNCTION IN NO WAY ENDANGERED ANY CREW OR PAX.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.