Narrative:

We departed hab with 3800 pounds of fuel and landed in bwg with 2200 pounds of fuel. (45 mins at cruise.) I miscalculated my required fuel on an IFR flight from hab to bwg because of a mathematical error. I was wrong about an expected tailwind, and I was forced to burn too much fuel at low altitude after a VFR takeoff before an IFR clearance was issued. I realized this miscalculation while en route and revised my plans. When we contacted the controller who handles traffic at bwg, I intended to ask for clearance to a minimum vectoring altitude, so I could possibly break out, cancel my IFR flight plan, and proceed VFR because we had enough fuel to do that legally. If that was not possible, I intended to land in nashville and purchase more fuel. When I contacted the controller, I learned that I was fourth in line for the instrument approach to bwg. I told him about my minimum fuel status so I could get more information about the delay. Instead of discussing my status and giving me more detailed information so I could decide what to do and before I could ask for a lower altitude to find VFR conditions, he asked whether I was declaring an emergency. The question startled me because I did not know that FAA procedures now require him to do that automatically without discussing options. Because of a heavy cockpit workload existing at that time, and the surprise nature of this controller's question, I mistakenly replied 'yes' to his question. Immediately, I wanted to take that back, but I felt it was too late, and probably not even possible, to rescind the emergency declaration, so I accepted the clearance to land at bwg. I never intended to declare an emergency, and I did not need to declare an emergency because I could have landed at nashville. This was an inadvertent mistake, caused in part by cockpit workload and a sudden and suggestive question from the controller. I feel that pilots should be warned that when they advise a controller about minimum fuel status, they would receive no suggestions, offers, discussions or other assistance except an invitation to declare an emergency. I think my case proves that too often such an invitation can be unduly suggestive and cause pilots to unnecessarily declare an emergency that not really exist.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF A CL601-3A, ACCEPTED EMER HANDLING BY ATC AFTER HE DECLARED A LOW FUEL STATUS. HE LANDED WITH 45 MINS OF FUEL ABOARD.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED HAB WITH 3800 LBS OF FUEL AND LANDED IN BWG WITH 2200 LBS OF FUEL. (45 MINS AT CRUISE.) I MISCALCULATED MY REQUIRED FUEL ON AN IFR FLT FROM HAB TO BWG BECAUSE OF A MATHEMATICAL ERROR. I WAS WRONG ABOUT AN EXPECTED TAILWIND, AND I WAS FORCED TO BURN TOO MUCH FUEL AT LOW ALT AFTER A VFR TKOF BEFORE AN IFR CLRNC WAS ISSUED. I REALIZED THIS MISCALCULATION WHILE ENRTE AND REVISED MY PLANS. WHEN WE CONTACTED THE CTLR WHO HANDLES TFC AT BWG, I INTENDED TO ASK FOR CLRNC TO A MINIMUM VECTORING ALT, SO I COULD POSSIBLY BREAK OUT, CANCEL MY IFR FLT PLAN, AND PROCEED VFR BECAUSE WE HAD ENOUGH FUEL TO DO THAT LEGALLY. IF THAT WAS NOT POSSIBLE, I INTENDED TO LAND IN NASHVILLE AND PURCHASE MORE FUEL. WHEN I CONTACTED THE CTLR, I LEARNED THAT I WAS FOURTH IN LINE FOR THE INST APCH TO BWG. I TOLD HIM ABOUT MY MINIMUM FUEL STATUS SO I COULD GET MORE INFO ABOUT THE DELAY. INSTEAD OF DISCUSSING MY STATUS AND GIVING ME MORE DETAILED INFO SO I COULD DECIDE WHAT TO DO AND BEFORE I COULD ASK FOR A LOWER ALT TO FIND VFR CONDITIONS, HE ASKED WHETHER I WAS DECLARING AN EMER. THE QUESTION STARTLED ME BECAUSE I DID NOT KNOW THAT FAA PROCS NOW REQUIRE HIM TO DO THAT AUTOMATICALLY WITHOUT DISCUSSING OPTIONS. BECAUSE OF A HVY COCKPIT WORKLOAD EXISTING AT THAT TIME, AND THE SURPRISE NATURE OF THIS CTLR'S QUESTION, I MISTAKENLY REPLIED 'YES' TO HIS QUESTION. IMMEDIATELY, I WANTED TO TAKE THAT BACK, BUT I FELT IT WAS TOO LATE, AND PROBABLY NOT EVEN POSSIBLE, TO RESCIND THE EMER DECLARATION, SO I ACCEPTED THE CLRNC TO LAND AT BWG. I NEVER INTENDED TO DECLARE AN EMER, AND I DID NOT NEED TO DECLARE AN EMER BECAUSE I COULD HAVE LANDED AT NASHVILLE. THIS WAS AN INADVERTENT MISTAKE, CAUSED IN PART BY COCKPIT WORKLOAD AND A SUDDEN AND SUGGESTIVE QUESTION FROM THE CTLR. I FEEL THAT PLTS SHOULD BE WARNED THAT WHEN THEY ADVISE A CTLR ABOUT MINIMUM FUEL STATUS, THEY WOULD RECEIVE NO SUGGESTIONS, OFFERS, DISCUSSIONS OR OTHER ASSISTANCE EXCEPT AN INVITATION TO DECLARE AN EMER. I THINK MY CASE PROVES THAT TOO OFTEN SUCH AN INVITATION CAN BE UNDULY SUGGESTIVE AND CAUSE PLTS TO UNNECESSARILY DECLARE AN EMER THAT NOT REALLY EXIST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.