Narrative:

As copilot of crew of an air carrier ATR72 from ord to cle, the following communication breakdown occurred. We were cleared direct to cle, given multiple step-downs. The last received was 9000 ft to 3000 ft. The approach controller was handling at least 2 other aircraft at the time. From our position (20 DME northwest) heading 090 degrees, clearance (direct cle descend to 3000 ft) and visual contact on 2 other aircraft approaching from the south and west, we, the crew, deduced we would be #1 to land. To our surprise, approach controller gave us a heading of 150 degrees and it appeared to us he was going to sequence us as #2 to land. From TCASII we had 3 mi behind and in front of the other aircraft. Through 5000 ft the captain decreased the rate of descent to keep us above the preceding aircraft's GS. Passing 4500 ft approach asked what altitude we were descending to. I responded 3000 ft. He said, 'you're amended altitude was 5000 ft.' the captain and I confirmed and I responded 'neither of us received 5000 ft.' he said 'you read it back!' at that time he asked if we had visual on the traffic in front of us. We did and accepted a visual approach with no incident. The problem, in my opinion, happened when approach gave us the 150 degree heading. At that point he seemed to have changed our sequence. He may have intended to amend our altitude at that time but failed, or he did amend our altitude and we read it back then ignored his directions. This second scenario we feel is highly unlikely in the light that our crew has flown together all month and have consistently followed our flight manual procedures of setting, reading back, and confirming any altitude changes. Supplemental information from acn 392400: in my opinion, the potential problem arose for 2 basic reasons. My lack of action to, and a controller's poor game plan. Based on my observations at the time and factoring in previous exposures and experiences, I question the controller's reason for sequencing the airplanes in the manner that he did. My lack of action also played a role in this event. My acceptance of the clearance to proceed directly to the airport without first having satisfied the 'game rules' for such a clearance was inappropriate. Peer pressure factored in on this. Prior to establishing contact with approach control, we had listened (observed) other flts receiving and accepting that same clearance. I know their airplanes were equipped similar to ours. The faulty game plan could have been stopped right there if I had acted properly by requesting an IAF fix to navigation to. At the time I received the clearance to 3000 ft, I had the 'gut feeling' that 3000 ft was inappropriate for our situation. My review of the chart for safe obstruction clearance should have been followed by a query of the controller's operational necessity for that altitude. The so called 5000 ft amendment would not have been needed if I had acted on that gut feeling. By accepting an inappropriate clearance and not questioning procedure integrity, I allowed myself to become part of a faulty game plan. In the cockpit crew environment, if I unknowingly infringe on standard procedure, I expect my first officer to bring this to my attention. I then respond with the required corrective action. This same precept holds true in the pilot/controller relationship.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR ATR72 FLC ACCEPTED A CLRNC DIRECT TO CLE AND THOUGHT THEY WERE CLRED TO DSND TO 3000 FT. THE APCH CTLR TURNED THE ACFT TO SEQUENCE IT BEHIND A JET ACR ACFT AND ALSO QUESTIONED THE ATR72 ALT. THE RPTRS QUESTION THE APCH CTLR'S ACTIONS.

Narrative: AS COPLT OF CREW OF AN ACR ATR72 FROM ORD TO CLE, THE FOLLOWING COM BREAKDOWN OCCURRED. WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO CLE, GIVEN MULTIPLE STEP-DOWNS. THE LAST RECEIVED WAS 9000 FT TO 3000 FT. THE APCH CTLR WAS HANDLING AT LEAST 2 OTHER ACFT AT THE TIME. FROM OUR POS (20 DME NW) HDG 090 DEGS, CLRNC (DIRECT CLE DSND TO 3000 FT) AND VISUAL CONTACT ON 2 OTHER ACFT APCHING FROM THE S AND W, WE, THE CREW, DEDUCED WE WOULD BE #1 TO LAND. TO OUR SURPRISE, APCH CTLR GAVE US A HDG OF 150 DEGS AND IT APPEARED TO US HE WAS GOING TO SEQUENCE US AS #2 TO LAND. FROM TCASII WE HAD 3 MI BEHIND AND IN FRONT OF THE OTHER ACFT. THROUGH 5000 FT THE CAPT DECREASED THE RATE OF DSCNT TO KEEP US ABOVE THE PRECEDING ACFT'S GS. PASSING 4500 FT APCH ASKED WHAT ALT WE WERE DSNDING TO. I RESPONDED 3000 FT. HE SAID, 'YOU'RE AMENDED ALT WAS 5000 FT.' THE CAPT AND I CONFIRMED AND I RESPONDED 'NEITHER OF US RECEIVED 5000 FT.' HE SAID 'YOU READ IT BACK!' AT THAT TIME HE ASKED IF WE HAD VISUAL ON THE TFC IN FRONT OF US. WE DID AND ACCEPTED A VISUAL APCH WITH NO INCIDENT. THE PROB, IN MY OPINION, HAPPENED WHEN APCH GAVE US THE 150 DEG HDG. AT THAT POINT HE SEEMED TO HAVE CHANGED OUR SEQUENCE. HE MAY HAVE INTENDED TO AMEND OUR ALT AT THAT TIME BUT FAILED, OR HE DID AMEND OUR ALT AND WE READ IT BACK THEN IGNORED HIS DIRECTIONS. THIS SECOND SCENARIO WE FEEL IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY IN THE LIGHT THAT OUR CREW HAS FLOWN TOGETHER ALL MONTH AND HAVE CONSISTENTLY FOLLOWED OUR FLT MANUAL PROCS OF SETTING, READING BACK, AND CONFIRMING ANY ALT CHANGES. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 392400: IN MY OPINION, THE POTENTIAL PROB AROSE FOR 2 BASIC REASONS. MY LACK OF ACTION TO, AND A CTLR'S POOR GAME PLAN. BASED ON MY OBSERVATIONS AT THE TIME AND FACTORING IN PREVIOUS EXPOSURES AND EXPERIENCES, I QUESTION THE CTLR'S REASON FOR SEQUENCING THE AIRPLANES IN THE MANNER THAT HE DID. MY LACK OF ACTION ALSO PLAYED A ROLE IN THIS EVENT. MY ACCEPTANCE OF THE CLRNC TO PROCEED DIRECTLY TO THE ARPT WITHOUT FIRST HAVING SATISFIED THE 'GAME RULES' FOR SUCH A CLRNC WAS INAPPROPRIATE. PEER PRESSURE FACTORED IN ON THIS. PRIOR TO ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH APCH CTL, WE HAD LISTENED (OBSERVED) OTHER FLTS RECEIVING AND ACCEPTING THAT SAME CLRNC. I KNOW THEIR AIRPLANES WERE EQUIPPED SIMILAR TO OURS. THE FAULTY GAME PLAN COULD HAVE BEEN STOPPED RIGHT THERE IF I HAD ACTED PROPERLY BY REQUESTING AN IAF FIX TO NAV TO. AT THE TIME I RECEIVED THE CLRNC TO 3000 FT, I HAD THE 'GUT FEELING' THAT 3000 FT WAS INAPPROPRIATE FOR OUR SIT. MY REVIEW OF THE CHART FOR SAFE OBSTRUCTION CLRNC SHOULD HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED BY A QUERY OF THE CTLR'S OPERATIONAL NECESSITY FOR THAT ALT. THE SO CALLED 5000 FT AMENDMENT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN NEEDED IF I HAD ACTED ON THAT GUT FEELING. BY ACCEPTING AN INAPPROPRIATE CLRNC AND NOT QUESTIONING PROC INTEGRITY, I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BECOME PART OF A FAULTY GAME PLAN. IN THE COCKPIT CREW ENVIRONMENT, IF I UNKNOWINGLY INFRINGE ON STANDARD PROC, I EXPECT MY FO TO BRING THIS TO MY ATTN. I THEN RESPOND WITH THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION. THIS SAME PRECEPT HOLDS TRUE IN THE PLT/CTLR RELATIONSHIP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.